




 “A RADICAL PROPOSAL”: THE MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION ACT OF 1968 
ANDREW D. BRADT† 
One of the central stories in current procedural law is the recent and rapid 
ascendance of federal multidistrict litigation, or, as it is commonly known, MDL. As 
the class action has declined in prominence, MDL has surged: to wit, currently more 
than a third of the cases on the federal civil docket are part of an MDL. With MDL’s 
growth has come attention from scholars, much of it critical. One recurring aspect of 
this criticism is that MDL judges have expanded the MDL statute beyond its modest 
ambitions. But what were the original purposes of MDL, and where did the statute 
come from? This Article unearths the origins of MDL by examining the papers of its 
principal drafters. Those papers reveal that the aims of the small group—a handful of 
federal judges and one scholar—who developed and lobbied for the statute’s passage 
were anything but modest. Rather, the group believed that a mass-tort “litigation 
explosion” was coming and that a mechanism was needed to centralize power over 
nationwide litigation in the hands of individual judges committed to the principles of 
active case management. Moreover, the papers show that the judges were relentless in their 
pursuit of the statute’s passage and engaged in sharp-elbowed tactics and horse-trading to 
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succeed. In short, MDL was a power grab—a well-intentioned and brilliant one, but a 
power grab all the same. Understanding the roots of the judges’ accomplishment clarifies 
current debates about MDL and should shift those debates away from fights over the 
scope of the statute to more normative assessments of the concentration of power the 
drafters sought and successfully achieved. In short, MDL currently does what its 
creators intended; critiques of the statute should proceed on those terms, not from the 
position that MDL has somehow grown beyond its modest ambitions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As recently as a decade ago, it would have been reasonable to say that 
multidistrict litigation, the statutory authorization for consolidating cases filed 
around the country in a single federal district court for pretrial proceedings,1 
was a second banana to the class action, which had long demanded the lion’s 
share of public and scholarly attention.2 Despite several high-profile examples, 
 
1 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
2 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1471 (1987) 
(describing MDL as one of several “dubious packaging strategies that are supposedly provisional 
but that in substantive terms may be irremediable”); Howard M. Erichson, Symposium: Multidistrict 
2017] “A Radical Proposal” 833 
scholars have characterized the device, commonly referred to as “MDL,” as an 
obscure device or “disfavored judicial backwater.”3 
To the extent MDL was ever appropriately considered a bit player, things 
have changed. With the Supreme Court and lower courts cutting back the 
viability of the class action under Rule 23 for decades and with Congress 
providing for expanded jurisdiction over class actions in the federal courts,4 
MDL has become the leading mechanism for resolving mass torts.5 As of June 
2014, 36% of all filed federal civil cases were part of a pending MDL, up from 
16% in 2002.6 That now amounts to over 120,000 cases, the vast majority of which 
are mass-tort matters, including products liability or defective drugs—cases that 
had been considered by some courts, at least for a brief period, as appropriate 
subjects for class actions.7 As astute an observer as Professor John Coffee has 
 
Litigation and Aggregation Alternatives, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 877, 881 (2001) (suggesting that 
MDL “cannot be understood without reference to . . . the class action”); Deborah R. Hensler, The 
Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 
883, 885 (2001) (noting that “[m]uch of the attention civil procedure scholars have accorded mass 
torts” had focused on the class action mechanism); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5, 29-35 [hereinafter Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”] 
(explaining the importance of MDL while noting its “relative absence (until recently) from the 
academic literature on federal procedure”). 
3 Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 511, 552 (2013) [hereinafter Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation]; see also DAVID F. HERR, 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 1:1 (2006) (describing the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation’s “relative inconspicuousness” and “obscurity in the vast majority of cases”). 
4 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 
132 (2015) (“[A]fter a long, steady, retreat for nearly two decades, the domain of the class action has 
substantially shrunk—much like a grape in the sun, slowly drying into a raisin.”); Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1439, 1507 (2008) [hereinafter Burbank, CAFA in Historical Context] (describing how “the 
federal appellate courts pretty quickly put an end” to mass-tort class actions and how “the Supreme 
Court made it very difficult for the lower federal courts to certify” settlement classes). 
5 See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, Procedure and Society: An Essay for Steve Yeazell, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. DISC. 136, 144 n.40 (2013) (“In the wake of Amchem and Ortiz, however MDLs have become the 
form for resolution of mass tort matters.”); Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in 
Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 EMORY L.J. 1339, 1346-47 (2014) (“As reliance on Rule 23 has 
diminished, MDL has ascended as the most important federal procedural device to aggregate (and 
settle) mass torts.”); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict 
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 798 (2010) (discussing 
the “massive increase in MDL aggregate litigation” in federal courts that occurred from 2004–2008). 
6 See MDL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES x (DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, 
Proposed Draft 2014), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/MDL_Standards
_and_Best_Practices_2014-REVISED.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X4U-8N4Q] (listing these statistics); see 
also Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 211, 221-22 (2015) (showing the increase in the Panel’s caseload from 1968 to 2012). 
7 See Thomas Metzloff, The MDL Vortex Revisited, 99 JUDICATURE 36, 40 (2015) (explaining 
that MDL is “in fact dominated by mass-tort cases at a remarkable level”); see also Richard Marcus, 
Bending in the Breeze: American Class Actions in the Twenty-First Century, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 
503-04 (2016) [hereinafter R. Marcus, Bending in the Breeze] (describing the brief “golden age” of 
mass-tort class actions). 
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lauded the rise of MDL, while saying that “[t]his achievement may have been the 
product of dumb luck, because the [Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation] was 
created before the modern class action even arose.”8 
The central aim of this Article is to demonstrate that the preeminence of 
MDL is not the product of dumb luck, but a realized ambition. The small group 
of scholars and judges that invented MDL and shepherded it to enactment were 
remarkably prescient. They predicted in the early 1960s a “litigation explosion” 
arising from the increased prevalence of mass torts and recognized the need for 
a device to efficiently process that litigation by centralizing it in the federal 
courts. Moreover, these judges believed deeply that control of these cases 
could not be left in the hands of the parties or their attorneys—or even in the 
hands of federal judges scattered throughout the country committed to what 
the judges considered outmoded norms of party control of the litigation process. 
But, although they saw the need, the proponents of MDL also recognized 
the radical nature of their proposal in a world where massive “aggregate” 
litigation was not yet part of the legal vocabulary. As a result, the judges acted 
strategically at every phase of MDL’s development: drafting the statute in 
limited terms to avoid resistance from the Bar, carefully attracting support 
from key players in the Judicial Conference and Congress, and eventually 
overcoming resistance from corporate defense lawyers who sought to kill the 
proposal. As those current federal litigation statistics amply demonstrate, their 
project was remarkably successful. Not only were the judges ahead of their 
time, their creation was built to last. Some fifty years later, MDL is dominant. 
A natural way to begin to understand MDL’s effectiveness in tort cases is 
by comparing it to its more famous and now-much-diminished cousin, the 
class action. In a class suit, a representative files and pursues litigation on 
behalf of a group of absent plaintiffs. By contrast, in MDL, a panel of federal 
judges transfers already pending and to-be-filed cases sharing a common 
question of fact to a single district judge for “pretrial proceedings.”9 After 
pretrial proceedings are concluded, the statute mandates that cases be 
remanded to the courts from which they were transferred for trial.10 Remand, 
however, happens less than 3% of the time—like most cases, in or out of an 
MDL, the vast majority of transferred cases are terminated or settled before 
 
8 COFFEE, JR., supra note 4, at 155; see also Richard Marcus, America’s Dynamic and Extensive 
Experience with Collective Litigation (“As with modern Rule 23, it is difficult now to determine 
whether the framers of this new judicial body foresaw in the 1960s the importance it would assume 
in later decades.”), in RESOLVING MASS DISPUTES: ADR AND SETTLEMENT OF MASS CLAIMS 
148, 166 (Christopher Hodges & Astrid Stadler, eds., 2013). 
9 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
10 Id.; see also Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34 (1998) 
(affirming that § 1407 “obligates the Panel to remand any pending case to its originating court when 
. . . pretrial proceedings have run their course”). 
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pretrial proceedings conclude, that is, while they are within the control of the 
MDL judge.11 In a world where trials are exceedingly rare, pretrial 
proceedings are the main event.12 
In sum, this structure makes MDL, according to one prominent federal 
district judge, “a ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ opportunity for the resolution of mass 
disputes by bringing similarly situated litigants from around the country, and 
their lawyers, before one judge in one place at one time.”13 Indeed, as another 
prominent district judge has described it, “[I]t is almost a point of honor among 
transferee judges . . . that cases so transferred shall be settled rather than sent 
back to their home courts for trial.”14 While the concept of the “settlement class” 
under Rule 23(b)(3) has withered under Supreme Court scrutiny and after the 
passage of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, MDL has begun to accomplish 
essentially the same end.15 
Courts and lawyers on both sides of the “v.” appear to be adjusting to this 
new era of MDL ascendancy. Plaintiff-side firms have come to appreciate the 
ability to join forces to achieve parity with well-resourced defendants.16 
 
11 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399, 400-01 
(2014) [hereinafter Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation]. In many MDL cases, the parties agree 
to allow newly filed cases to “bypass the transfer process” altogether through a stipulation for “direct 
filing” of cases into the MDL court. Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice 
of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 759 (2012). 
12 See Marc A. Galanter & Angela M. Frozena, A Grin Without A Cat: The Continuing Decline 
& Displacement of Trials in American Courts, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 121 (explaining how “the 
decline [in trials] has become institutionalized in the practices and expectations of judges, 
administrators, lawyers, and parties”). 
13 Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2340 
(2008); see also Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) (explaining that MDL “creates the perfect conditions for an aggregate 
settlement”); Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use 
of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2272 (2008) [hereinafter 
R. Marcus, Cure-All] (describing how MDL allows for “order [to] be produced out of the chaos”); 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the 
Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 482 n.234 (1992) (noting that “the goal of judicial economy” 
is a “dominant consideration” for courts in MDL). 
14 DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Tr., 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152 (D. Mass. 2006). 
15 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 4, at 116 (describing MDL as “group litigation that is the 
functional equivalent to a class action [that] has come to supplant the class action in the mass tort 
field”); Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and 
of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO WASH. L. REV. 628, 657 (2011) (“[T]he MDL process helped to make 
plausible the bundling of mass torts.”); Willging & Lee, supra note 5, at 801 (citing empirical 
evidence “suggest[ing] that the MDL process has supplemented and perhaps displaced the class 
action device as a procedural mechanism for large settlements”). 
16 See John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, 
LITIGATION, Summer/Fall 2012, at 26, 26 (“Overall, counsel believe the panel is accomplishing its 
basic objective of easing the burdens of multiparty, multijurisdictional litigation on parties, counsel, 
and courts.”); D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 1183, 1192-98 (2013) (describing the benefits to plaintiffs and defendants of aggregation). 
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Defendants recognize the opportunity to litigate all claims in a single forum 
where they can both efficiently perform discovery and motion practice and 
eventually achieve peace, whether through victory on a dispositive motion or 
through settlement.17 And, for judges, the power of MDL to vacuum 
thousands of cases filed nationwide into one courtroom carries significant 
docket-clearing benefits.18 
Scholars’ reactions are more mixed. Some laud MDL for its success in 
achieving settlement of massive cases and for the flexibility it provides 
transferee judges.19 But others contend that MDL is a raw deal for individual 
plaintiffs, who, compared to those in a class action, have fewer formal 
protections from unfairness but equally little control over the day-to-day 
conduct of the litigation.20 For instance, although an MDL is not a 
representative suit, unlike a class action, there is no right to opt out of an 
MDL proceeding—once you’re in, you’re in, often for years until “pretrial 
proceedings” have concluded.21 Moreover, while the litigation is within the 
jurisdiction of the MDL court, the cases are prosecuted primarily by “steering 
committees” of lawyers appointed by the court. These lawyers, who receive 
additional fees, take charge of discovery and motion practice and eventually 
play the most prominent role in negotiating global settlements.22 In addition, 
 
17 See Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 11, at 414 (“Centralization likewise 
advantages defendants by making meaningful closure possible through a global settlement.”). 
18 See, e.g., Fallon et al., supra note 13, at 2337-42, (describing the benefits of establishing a 
centralized forum where cases can be litigated and the courts’ interest in promoting effective pretrial 
discovery); Edward F. Sherman, When Remand Is Appropriate in Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. 
REV. 455, 470 (2014) (describing judges’ view of MDL as “reducing the costs in both time and money 
of full-bore individual litigation”). 
19 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 4, at 155 (“[T]he most successful step taken in the administration 
of aggregate litigation in the United States was the creation of the JPML in 1968 . . . .”); Edward F. 
Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 2205, 2209 (2008) [hereinafter Sherman, The MDL Model] (defending MDL as achieving the 
efficiencies of a class action within a “looser and more flexible structure”). 
20 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between, 58 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 889, 898 (2010) [hereinafter Burch, Aggregation] (describing MDL as “a procedural no man’s 
land”); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 391 
(2011) [hereinafter Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines] (arguing that MDL “has stripped away protections 
afforded by [the] class action”); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: 
Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 110 
(2015) (“[T]he current practice of MDL actually makes the modern class action appear to be the 
pinnacle of procedural due process by comparison.”). 
21 See, e.g., Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 994 (2012) (“[A] plaintiff drawn into MDL proceedings has little power to opt 
out in any meaningful sense.”); Redish & Karaba, supra note 20, at 111 (noting that “all MDLs are 
mandatory” (emphasis in original)). 
22 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 73 (2015) 
[hereinafter Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation] (describing the importance of steering 
committees); Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in 
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unlike a class action, there is no requirement that a judge review a settlement 
for fairness.23 But judges nevertheless play an active role in brokering global 
settlement deals, and some of those agreements (most notably in the massive 
set of cases arising from the use of the drug Vioxx) have been criticized as 
unduly coercive to the individual plaintiffs.24 MDL, to these critics, presents 
the worst of both worlds—a statute that provides inadequate power to protect 
plaintiffs but also no real limitations on judges acting imperially to manage 
cases and essentially mandate settlement.25 
Underlying both the criticism and laurels is the sense that MDL was never 
intended to play the leading role it now does and has been impressed into service 
as a second-best, jury-rigged alternative to the now-unavailable class action.26 
Dotting these assessments is the perception that MDL “has clearly become 
much more important than was envisioned by Congress back in the 1960s,”27 
and that what was only a modest tweak to the venue statute intended to provide 
only meager powers to transferee judges has now expanded to become an “end 
run” around the protective strictures of the class-action rule.28 Given MDL’s 
recent ascendance, and the sparseness of the legislative history, this perception 
is wholly understandable. The MDL statute attracted very little controversy 
 
Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 541 [hereinafter Erichson, Beyond the 
Class Action] (finding that MDL committees “dominate the conduct of pretrial litigation”). 
23 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (demonstrating the difference in the 
review process for MDL and class actions with respect to a judge’s ability to review settlements for fairness). 
24 See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979, 
1000-04 (2010) (describing how, almost immediately after the Vioxx settlement “was announced, legal 
ethicists voiced concerns” about the agreement); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate 
Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 218 (describing the “novel” nature of the Vioxx settlement, which 
extended offers to settle individually, but which required all clients to accept for the offer to be valid). 
25 See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District 
Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 111 (2010) (“[J]udges have compromised their 
independence, created unnecessary conflicts of interest, intimidated attorneys, turned a blind eye to 
ethically dubious behavior, and weakened plaintiffs’ lawyers’ incentives to serve clients well.”). 
26 See, e.g., Jeremy T. Grabill, The Pesky Persistence of Class Action Tolling in Mass Tort Multidistrict 
Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 433, 457 (2014) (“MDL consolidation merely brings related lawsuits before 
one judge so that they can be organized and managed collectively to avoid the need to conduct 
duplicative discovery.”); Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 3, at 553 (contending that parties 
and courts are “manipulating MDL procedure to accomplish ends the mechanism was never 
intended to perform”). 
27 RICHARD L. MARCUS, EDWARD F. SHERMAN, & HOWARD M. ERICHSON, COMPLEX 
LITIGATION 140 (5th ed. 2010); see also Metzloff, supra note 7, at 38 (contending that MDL “was 
anticipated to be the exception rather than the rule”); Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines, supra note 20, at 
424-25 (stating that the MDL statute “actually describes a meager and vague set of powers for MDL 
judges” and only a “limited delegation of authority”); Sherman, The MDL Model, supra note 19, at 
2205 (describing MDL as a “modest procedural development”). 
28 See Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines, supra note 20, at 424 (“The MDL statute and MDL procedure 
was never intended to confer such broad power and authority on a federal court . . . .”); Willging & 
Lee, supra note 5, at 806 (noting the lack of “systematic judicial or other regulatory oversight” of 
settlements reached in MDL cases). 
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after it passed in 1968 and not much public attention for decades thereafter.29 
And MDL is being used more than it ever has been in the past, and its use is 
primarily in the service of attaining large-scale settlements—settlements that 
are accurately characterized as built to secure mass resolution.30 
But the story of MDL begins not in the 1990s when the Supreme Court 
began in earnest its cutback on class actions, but in the 1960s when the statute 
was created. Compared to the well-chronicled 1966 amendments to Rule 23 
that spawned the modern era of class actions,31 relatively little has been written 
about the development of the Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968 beyond 
review of its meager legislative history. Indeed, there was almost no debate in 
Congress; after languishing in committee for several years, the Act suddenly 
passed on the consent calendar of both houses with no dissenting votes.32 And 
the idea of transfer to a different district for pretrial proceedings seems to have 
appeared almost out of thin air, with no pedigree in procedure at law or equity. 
This Article unearths MDL’s origins, drawing primarily on the papers of 
the statute’s two principal drafters: Judge William H. Becker of the Western 
District of Missouri33 and Dean Phil C. Neal of the University of Chicago Law 
School.34 Becker was the chairman of the Coordinating Committee on Multiple 
Litigation (the Committee), which was created in 1962 by the Judicial Conference 
to address a deluge of antitrust litigation spawned by revelations of price-fixing 
in the electrical-equipment industry. Neal, a professor and later the dean of the 
University of Chicago Law School, was the Committee’s executive secretary. 
These two men, along with Chief Judge Alfred Murrah of the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and Judge Edwin Robson of the Northern District of Illinois, 
 
29 See Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 2, at 47 (describing MDL as a “‘sleeper’—having 
enormous effect on the world of contemporary litigation but attracting relatively few critical comments”). 
30 Cf. Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1015, 1018-20 (2013) (explaining how MDLs figure into the settlement of mass disputes). 
31 See generally David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2013) (describing the history and use of Rule 23 from 1953 to 
1980); John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. 
REV. 323 (2005) (providing an account of the 1996, 1998, and 2003 amendments to Rule 23). Histories 
of the class action’s development prior to the amendments are also comprehensive. See generally 
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL: FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 
238-66 (1987) (describing the legislative history of Rule 23 and detailing in particular the actions of 
the advisory committee). 
32 See 90 CONG. REC. 4927-28 (March 4, 1968) (recording how “the rules were suspended and 
the bill, as amended, was passed”). 
33 Papers of Judge William H. Becker, Chairman, Coordinating Committee on Multiple 
Litigation, 1962–1968 (on file at the National Archives at Kansas City, Records of the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, Record Group 116). The papers pertinent to this research are 
divided into two sets: (1) Administrative Files, 1962–1967 [hereinafter Becker Papers] and (2) 
Chronological Files, 1964–1968 [hereinafter Becker Chronological Files]. 
34 Papers of Phil C. Neal, Dean, University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, IL [hereinafter 
Neal Papers] (on file at the University of Chicago Library, Special Collections Research Center). 
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spearheaded the effort to turn the experimental methods the Committee used 
to handle the electrical-equipment litigation into a permanent feature of the 
federal litigation system. Becker, in particular, kept voluminous records of this 
effort, documenting the evolution of what became the MDL statute and the 
judges’ efforts to push the statute through Congress. 
What stands out most from the drafters’ papers is that they did not intend 
the role of the MDL statute, or the powers it confers on judges, to be modest. 
Nor did they intend its use to be exceptional. Quite the opposite is true. The 
drafters believed that their creation would reshape federal litigation and become 
the primary mechanism for processing the wave of nationwide mass-tort 
litigation they predicted was headed the federal courts’ way. 
And the drafters believed that for their creation to work effectively, it needed 
to endow the judges overseeing these litigations with plenary power to manage 
them and with the flexibility to innovate when doing so. The creators of the 
statute had the conviction that a litigation explosion was coming that would 
overwhelm the federal courts—an explosion caused by booms in population, 
technology, and expanded rights of action created by Congress. In these judges’ 
view, the only way to meet the demands created by the litigation explosion was 
through centralized judicial power over national controversies. In short, these 
judges believed that individual litigants and judges could not be left in charge 
of litigation. Litigants—and in particular defendants, for whom delay was a 
weapon—would only perpetuate backlogs. Control of these cases therefore 
had to be centralized in the hands of a single and active judge—specifically a 
judge committed to strong pretrial case management who would direct the 
conduct of the nationwide litigation from the bench. 
Although these judges believed that such centralization of power was 
necessary, they also recognized that their idea was a “radical proposal,” one 
without precedent in a system in which the norms were party control of the 
course of litigation and decentralized district courts with little national 
coordination. The papers reveal the judges devised a political answer to this 
problem: consolidation for pretrial proceedings with eventual remand for 
trial. Such a “limited transfer” structure would insulate the statute from both 
the resistance of plaintiffs’ lawyers who might fear loss of control over their 
cases (and their fees) and district judges who might fear invasion of their 
jurisdiction. The transfer structure might also, however, create the necessary 
central control for a single judge to manage the litigation.35 
Having settled on pretrial consolidation as the mechanism for centralizing 
power, the judges entered the political fray to turn their idea into a solid 
statutory reality. In so doing, they were quite savvy. First, they understood that 
such a significant departure from past practice would have to be embodied in a 
 
35 See infra Part III. 
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statute, not a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which could be vulnerable to 
challenge under the Rules Enabling Act.36 Second, they understood the 
necessity of achieving support of the Judicial Conference and Department of 
Justice.37 And third, the judges realized that in order to succeed they would 
have to overcome the opposition of the powerful antitrust defense bar, which 
believed that any mechanism facilitating aggregation of litigation would be 
harmful to their clients’ interests.38 Therefore, the judges engaged in an 
aggressive campaign of lobbying both legislators and lawyers, culminating in 
a face-to-face meeting with the lawyers opposing the statute, at which the 
judges attempted to persuade them to change their minds.39 The lawyers’ 
change of heart, perhaps due to the judges finally including them in the process 
of drafting the first Manual for Complex Litigation, led to passage of the bill and 
the creation of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the Panel).40 The 
Panel, in turn, was staffed primarily by the men who drafted the statute.41 
In telling this story, this Article makes three primary contributions. First, 
it describes for the first time the development and passage of MDL. Becker’s 
and Neal’s papers reveal both the determination of the statute’s drafters and 
their canny strategy for getting it passed. Ultimately, on their terms, this is a 
success story born of a particular historical moment when federal judges could 
exercise significant influence on procedural matters. Congress was well 
disposed to reforms in judicial administration that would enhance the ability 
of private plaintiffs to enforce their claims. These judges both knew how, and 
were willing to use, the tools at their disposal, including twisting the arms of 
the lawyers who would appear before them. 
Second, in this era of MDL ascendancy, a better understanding of the 
statute’s history should inform future debates about how MDL is used. The 
judges did not intend MDL to live in the shadow of the class action, nor did 
they intend it to be a stand-in should the mass-tort class action ultimately prove 
to be unviable. They intentionally drafted the statute as a device that would 
allow for easy aggregation and provided no ability to opt out. The guiding light 
of the judges’ efforts was their perception that power over litigation must be 
centralized in the hands of a single judge with national authority and maximum 
flexibility. The intent of the drafters does not necessarily determine how courts 
should construe the Act today in a litigation world that is admittedly quite 
 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 249–54. 
37 See infra subsections III.C., IV.A. 
38 See infra subsection IV.B. 
39 See infra subsection IV.E. 
40 See infra subsection IV.F. 
41 See infra Part V. 
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different.42 But the story of the statute’s origins should disabuse observers of 
the notion that what was meant to be only a modest innovation has been 
perverted into an authoritarian device. MDL is now working essentially as its 
creators intended, and critics of the statute should train their fire on how judges 
use their power, not on whether the statute provides it. 
Third, and relatedly, the Article highlights the particular genius of the 
statute’s drafters: the political compromise that led to the development of 
partial transfer for pretrial proceedings. In prior work, I have referred to the 
dual nature of MDL in the sense that MDL cases exist simultaneously as a 
tightly consolidated unitary proceeding and as a temporary collection of 
individual cases.43 It is the retention of the individual identities of the 
component lawsuits that gives the doctrinal cover to judges’ control of the 
litigation. In other words, the patina of individual control within a coercive 
mechanism is what makes MDL tolerable as a matter of due process. Whether 
MDL ultimately makes litigants better off than possible alternatives is a 
subject for future work. But the origins of the statute reveal that its creators 
understood that retaining the individual identity of cases—embodied in 
choice of forum, choice of law, and eventual remand—was necessary to secure 
MDL’s passage and legitimacy, particularly in an era when aggregate 
litigation was more of an anomaly. Essentially, MDL is an iron fist in a velvet 
glove. It is the surface-level modesty of the statute that facilitates the 
achievement of its creators’ aims—something its creators understood well. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I briefly describe how MDL 
works, its current prominence, and why, after a long period of relative neglect, 
it has become a lightning rod for academic criticism. In Part II, I turn to the 
roots of the MDL statute, in particular the creation of the Judicial Conference 
and its committee system, as well as the electrical-equipment litigation that 
spawned the committee that wrote the MDL statute. In Parts III and IV, I 
detail the process of drafting and the passage of the statute, drawing on 
Becker’s and Neal’s papers. In Part V, I offer some observations about the 
implications of this story in the era of MDL ascendancy. 
Today, procedure scholars and lawmakers understand that procedure is 
about power, both in terms of the law determining who controls litigation and 
who gets to make that law.44 The story of MDL is a story about the power of 
 
42 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1026 (1982) 
[hereinafter Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act] (noting, in a different context, that “[o]f course, the 
history is not a Baedeker”). 
43 See Bradt, supra note 11, at 791 (noting that “cases within [an MDL] retain their individual 
identities”); see also R. Marcus, Cure-All, supra note 13, at 2265 (noting “an inherent tension in the 
split authority arrangement Congress built into the statute”). 
44 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 513 (1996) [hereinafter 
Burbank, Procedure and Power] (“[T]he most important developments in federal civil procedure in 
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procedure. In particular, it is the story of how a small group of judges 
developed a tool to transfer power in large-scale litigation away from the 
parties and from judges scattered around the country to individual judges 
committed to the principles of active case management. It is also a story of 
how that small group of judges used the tools at their disposal to make their 
idea a statutory reality that was built to last, essentially invulnerable to future 
interference, except by statutory amendment. MDL is a success story, and its 
impact is lasting. Far from being a modest innovation that has metastasized 
into the dominant structure of mass-tort litigation, MDL today is essentially 
just what its creators hoped it would be: an exceptionally powerful tool. 
I.  WHAT IS MDL, AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT AND 
CONTROVERSIAL? 
To set the stage, consolidation and coordination of multidistrict litigation in 
the federal courts is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The statute provides, 
“When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are 
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district 
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”45 To accomplish these 
transfers, the statute mandates creation of a panel of seven federal judges, 
appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, called the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation.46 Upon its own motion, or the motion of any party 
in any action to potentially be transferred, the Panel may initiate proceedings to 
create an MDL.47 After notice to any affected party and a hearing, if the Panel 
decides that it “will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will 
promote the just and efficient conduct of [the] actions,” it may transfer all of 
the pending cases to a single district judge of its choosing, commonly referred to 
as the “MDL judge,” for pretrial proceedings.48 All later-filed cases involving the 
same subject matter are transferred rather seamlessly as “tagalong cases” to the 
MDL judge.49 The Panel’s transfer orders are reviewable only by extraordinary 
writ;50 the Panel’s orders denying transfer are not reviewable at all.51 The statute 
 
the last ten to fifteen years have concerned power: who has it and who should have it both in 
litigation and in making the rules for litigation.”). 
45 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
46 Id. § 1407(d). 
47 Id. § 1407(c). 
48 Id. § 1407(a). 
49 See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 3865 (4th ed. 2015) (discussing the process for transferring tag-along matters, for 
which “there is considerable pressure to have . . . transferred expeditiously”). 
50 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e). 
51 Id. 
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mandates that the cases be remanded to the districts from which they came at 
the conclusion of pretrial proceedings.52 
During pretrial proceedings, all actions in the transferor courts are stayed, 
and the MDL judge possesses all of the powers of any district judge, 
including the power to manage discovery, dismiss cases, exclude evidence, and 
grant summary judgment or other dispositive motions.53 The result is that the 
MDL judge has complete authority over the mass of cases, whose numbers 
can run into the thousands, until pretrial proceedings have concluded and the 
cases have to be returned to their original courts. In practice, however, the 
MDL judge actively attempts to guide the litigation to a conclusion, typically 
through a “global settlement” that resolves most, if not all, of the component 
cases in the litigation.54 As a result of the MDL judge’s power to terminate and 
assist in settling the cases, very few cases are ultimately remanded to their home 
districts. Historically, the remand rate is around 3%.55 Moreover, when cases 
involving the same subject matter are pending in both federal MDL proceedings 
and state court MDL analogs, the state court judges often coordinate with and 
defer to the federal MDL judges to reach a resolution.56 
Although the MDL statute was little noticed when it was passed in 1968 
and remained that way for the first decades of its existence, today it is central. 
The numbers are staggering—and become more so every year. According to 
a recent report by the Duke Law School Center for Judicial Studies, 
More than one-third of the civil cases pending in the nation’s federal courts are 
consolidated in multidistrict litigations. In 2014, these MDL cases make up 36% 
of the civil case load. In 2002, that number was 16%. Removing 70,328 prisoner 
and social security cases from the total, cases that typically (though not always) 
require relatively little time of Article III judges, the 120,449 pending actions 
in MDLs represented 45.6% of the pending civil cases as of June 2014.57 
Strikingly, 96% of these cases are what are commonly considered “mass 
tort” cases—that is, tort claims involving similar claims by a large group of 
 
52 Id. § 1407(a); see also Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 
35 (1998) (affirming that § 1407 “obligates the Panel to remand any pending case to its originating 
court when . . . pretrial proceedings have run their course”). 
53 See Bradt, supra note 11, at 788. 
54 See Bradt, supra note 11, at 790-91. 
55 See Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 22, at 73 (“[T]ransferee judges have 
remanded a scant 2.9% of cases to their original districts.”). 
56 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1358 (discussing how coordination of analogous state and federal 
claims “likely involves some persuasion and influence by the MDL judges over their state court 
colleagues, urging them to follow the MDL court’s lead”). 
57 MDL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 6, at x-xi. 
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plaintiffs—and the vast majority of those are state-law products liability cases.58 
Some MDLs are enormous. For instance, the pelvic-mesh product liability 
cases, consolidated in the Southern District of West Virginia, contain nearly 
50,000 cases.59 Those are at the high end of the spectrum, but there are 
currently twenty pending MDLs containing more than one thousand 
component cases, amounting to over 115,000 cases.60 
Without belaboring the point, it is fair to say that MDL has exploded, 
particularly in the area of mass-tort products cases. Why the recent surge? It 
is apparently because such cases, at least for a brief period, were class actions 
(typically settlement class actions) brought under Rule 23(b)(3) in federal 
court or, when those class actions became more difficult to maintain in federal 
court, were class actions brought in state court.61 Rule 23(b)(3) class actions 
have become harder to maintain in federal court due to restrictive lower 
appellate court decisions and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor62 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.63 When lawyers turned 
to comparatively friendly state courts, Congress responded by extending 
federal jurisdiction over class actions in the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005.64 The catch-22 created by that combination (there is federal jurisdiction 
over these class actions, but under Rule 23 they cannot be certified as class 
 
58 See Metzloff, supra note 7, at 41 (“The results are stunning: mass-tort MDL dockets 
consolidated over 125,000 civil actions constituting over 96 percent of all pending actions included 
in all of the MDL dockets.”) 
59 See id. at 42 tbl.2 (listing MDL No. 2327, Ethicon, Inc., as having 23,569 pending actions 
and 24,220 historical actions as of March 2015). 
60 See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT – 
DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY ACTIONS PENDING 6 (2017), http://www.jpml.
uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_Actions_Pending-January-17-2017.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/5GZS-3DST]; see also In re Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL Nos. 2187, 2325, 
2326, 2327, 2387, 2440, 2511 (S.D. W. Va. 2015). 
61 See R. Marcus, Bending in the Breeze, supra note 7, at 499-503 (discussing the, albeit brief, 
“golden age” of class actions). 
62 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
63 527 U.S. 815 (1999). See Burbank, CAFA in Historical Context, supra note 4, at 1507 (describing 
how “the federal appellate courts pretty quickly put an end” to mass-tort class actions and how “the 
Supreme Court made it very difficult for the lower federal courts to certify [mass tort] cases, first 
under Rule 23(b)(3) in Amchem, and then under Rule 23(b)(1) in Ortiz”). 
64 See Burbank, CAFA in Historical Context, supra note 4, at 1494-1509 (discussing the history 
of, and changes brought by the Class Action Fairness Act to, mass tort and settlement classes in 
federal court); Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 371, 
372-73 (2014) (“Presently, with the passage of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and the general 
disfavor of nationwide class actions expressed by several U.S. circuit courts, multidistrict litigation 
is playing an increasingly significant quantitative role in all civil litigation in the United States.”); 
see also Willging & Lee, supra note 5, at 803-04 (comparing the procedural questions raised by MDL 
to those in the class action context). 
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actions) created a vacuum for aggregate mass-tort litigation.65 Hiding in plain 
sight was the MDL statute, which has emerged as the primary alternative for 
mass-tort litigation.66 Although it is not as blunt an aggregation tool as the 
class action because the plaintiffs file and formally pursue their own cases 
rather than being represented by a class representative, MDL achieves many 
of the same efficiencies—namely, coordinated discovery and motion practice 
controlled by small committees of lawyers appointed by the court and 
gathering most parties together into a single proceeding for a potential global 
resolution.67 From an efficiency standpoint, there is much to be said for the 
flexibility offered by the MDL process. The MDL judge has the ability to 
coordinate and manage the litigation to its ultimate conclusion, relieving the 
federal courts of the burden of resolving the cases individually.68 The parties 
and courts get a lot of bang for their aggregation buck without having to 
surmount the many hurdles to class certification. 
Although many courts and lawyers have come to embrace MDL, it has 
come under attack in the academy. Why? It is precisely because MDL achieves 
many of the efficiencies of class actions without all of the procedural 
protections for absent plaintiffs.69 By way of comparison, in order to sustain 
a mass-tort class action under Rule 23(b)(3), a class representative must fulfill 
all of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a),70 plus show that the common questions 
predominate over individual questions,71 demonstrate that the class action is 
a superior way of proceeding,72 and provide notice and the opportunity to opt 
 
65 See Myriam Gilles, Tribal Rituals of the MDL: A Comment on Williams, Lee, and Borden, Repeat 
Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 173, 176 (2012) (“MDL proceedings have become an even 
more active venue for aggregating and resolving mass litigation in the ‘post-class action’ era . . . .”); see 
generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013) (discussing 
how courts have limited the viability of class actions). 
66 See Burbank, CAFA in Historical Context, supra note 4, at 1538 (arguing that “CAFA may dry 
up the market for statewide class actions, leading counsel who understand the dynamics of the MDL 
process to seek to be the first in line” to file suit (internal citation omitted)); Deborah R. Hensler, 
Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 883, 907 (2007) (discussing the 
major increase in products liability MDLs); Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 144 n.40 (“In the wake of 
Amchem and Ortiz, however, MDLs have become the forum for resolution of mass tort matters.”). 
67 See R. Marcus, Cure-All, supra note 13, at 2279 (noting MDLs’ potential for “resolving 
dispersed litigation” while registering “prudential concerns and statutory concerns” raised by their 
operation); Willging & Lee, supra note 5, at 803-05 (comparing the procedural protections offered 
by class actions to MDLs). 
68 See Sherman, The MDL Model, supra note 19, at 2223 (“The MDL model, applied creatively, 
can be an effective alternative in certain situations to class treatment for accomplishing an aggregate 
or global settlement.”). 
69 See Burch, Aggregation, supra note 20, at 898 (describing MDL as “a procedural no man’s 
land” that leaves plaintiffs “without the protections of either” individual or class action litigation). 
70 FED R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)-(4); see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 
§§ 7.21–7.22 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites and requirements under 23(b)). 
71 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
72 Id. 
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out to class members.73 MDL requires none of that. All that is necessary for 
consolidation is one common question of fact,74 and there is no opportunity 
to opt out.75 Once a plaintiff ’s case has been transferred into an MDL, it 
remains there until pretrial proceedings have been concluded, which, in 
practice, typically means until the MDL is terminated or settled.76 
In a class action, all of these procedural hurdles are thought to be necessary 
because most of the plaintiffs are not actively participating in the litigation. 
Instead, they are represented by the class representative and must be protected 
from incompetent or unscrupulous representation.77 In MDL, it is said that none 
of these additional protections need to exist because the plaintiff prosecutes her 
own case with her own attorney.78 This, however, is not an accurate portrayal of 
how MDL actually works. In practice, the MDL process looks, in many ways, 
very much like the class action process, with judge-appointed steering 
committees of attorneys representing the plaintiffs as a whole, many of whose 
cases have been transferred to a far-flung location selected by the Panel.79 
The three most prominent strands of criticism of MDL are that (1) MDL 
insufficiently protects individual plaintiffs’ due process rights, including the 
right to a meaningful day in court,80 (2) there are no established rules governing 
MDL judges’ procedures, resulting in inconsistency,81 and (3) MDL cases take 
a very long time to litigate.82 These critiques are detailed and complex, but for 
brevity’s sake, I will boil them down: critics think that the MDL statute gives 
MDL judges unlimited discretion and deprives plaintiffs of control over their 
cases with little procedural protection. The result for many plaintiffs is a coercive 
 
73 Id. 23(c)(2). 
74 See Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 11, at 403 (“[C]ases need to share but 
one common question of fact.”). 
75 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
76 See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
77 See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the MDL Judge, 105 
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing the role of the judge in protecting absentee class members). 
78 See Bradt, supra note 11, at 791 (“[T]he cases in an MDL keep their individual character.”). 
79 See Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 22, at 73 (“[J]udges appoint steering 
committees and other lead lawyers to conduct discovery, disseminate information, draft motions, 
negotiate settlements, and try bellwether cases.”); Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 22, 
at 540-41 (discussing how MDL “litigation comes to resemble a class action in the sense that hub 
lawyers conduct important work in the litigation on behalf of a large group of clients”). 
80 See Redish & Karaba, supra note 20, at 115 (arguing that the way MDLs “crudely and 
artificially reshape[]” individuals’ claims into a “generic lowest common denominator” violates the 
Fifth Amendment). 
81 See Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 22, at 524-25 (identifying MDLs’ lack of the 
same procedural safeguards of class actions as a significant problem); see also Bradt, supra note 11, at 786-
87 (discussing how briefing and argument before the Panel is dominated by where to transfer the cases 
“as the parties vie for their preferred venue and even district judge”). 
82 See Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 16, at 31 (noting delays as “the single most prominent 
complaint about multi-district litigation”). 
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global settlement negotiated in a distant court by someone else’s lawyer that the 
plaintiffs have little practical choice but to accept.83 In sum, what makes MDL 
such an effective means of resolving mass litigation is also what provokes 
intense criticism: the almost unlimited discretion of the district judge that the 
Panel puts in charge of the litigation. Yet, unlike the class action, the MDL 
structure has been unmolested by due process–based attacks to its legitimacy.84 
In one sense, the crackdown on alleged lawlessness of class actions has 
facilitated a shift to MDL and potential lawlessness in the other direction.85 
Compared to the class action, MDL was, until recently and with notable 
exceptions, relatively underemphasized in academic literature.86 But now that 
MDL is in the spotlight, it has begun to attract significant attention as well as 
trenchant commentary. This reaction proceeds from the accurate perception 
that MDL has emerged only after the demise of the mass-tort class action.87 
Much of this commentary, however, also proceeds from the assumption that 
MDL was intended to be used rarely and that the statute’s aims were 
modest—that it is only the vacuum created by the class action that has 
spawned its expanded use and judges’ imperialistic conceptions of their power 
in MDL cases.88 This characterization of the statute raises the questions: What 
did its creators intend in the early 1960s before the class action boom? How did 
this statute come to be? And, given how controversial it has become, how did it 
manage to pass the House and the Senate on the consent calendar without even 
a roll call vote? I turn to that story now, beginning in the 1920s. 
II.  THE ROOTS OF THE MDL STATUTE 
A. An Integrated Federal Judiciary and the Ascendance of Pretrial Procedure 
The roots of the MDL statute can be found long before its passage, with 
the creation of the Judicial Conference in 1922 and the activities of its Pretrial 
 
83 See Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines, supra note 20, at 391 (describing MDL as having “stripped 
away” the protections of Rule 23); Silver & Miller, supra note 25, at 124 (“Being stuck forever in a 
court that cannot preside over a trial and that wants a global settlement at all costs, plaintiffs caught 
up in MDLs have little bargaining leverage.”). 
84 See Redish & Karaba, supra note 20, at 115 (“[N]o court appears to have even considered, 
much less ruled upon, a due process challenge to MDL.”); see also R. Marcus, Cure-All, supra note 
13, at 2248 (noting that MDL has “not caused the sort of controversy the class action produced” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
85 Cf. Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation & Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of 
Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 408 (2011) (describing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly 
and Iqbal as “acts of lawlessness” that spawned “lower courts . . . ignoring Iqbal—lawlessness cubed”). 
86 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1350 (noting that MDL “remains one of the least studied types 
of federal litigation”). For exceptions to Professor Thomas’s observation, see generally supra note 2. 
87 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
88 See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
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Committee in the 1940s and 1950s. The creation of the Conference and its 
emergence as a policymaking force in Congress were a distinct break from 
the past. From their creation in the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal district 
courts were traditionally decentralized and autonomous with largely 
immobile judges.89 The first Congress, drawing on suggestions in the 
Federalist Papers,90 divided the country into geographically drawn judicial 
districts, all of which were located within the borders of a state.91 This 
geographic decentralization was intentional because it allowed local figures 
throughout the country to represent the federal government to a dispersed 
population.92 As Alison LaCroix has observed, “the inferior federal courts—not 
Congress—were the most important symbolic and institutional nodes by which 
the people of the nation would encounter the authority of the general 
government.”93 Despite being the local face of the federal government, the 
federal district courts were essentially autonomous and disconnected entities.94 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the district courts operated with almost no 
centralized oversight and possessed relatively limited jurisdiction.95 
In the 1920s, however, Chief Justice William Howard Taft sought to unify 
both the federal courts and federal judges.96 The fractured nature of the federal 
 
89 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary: On the Potential 
Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1040-42 (2014) (describing the 
structure of the early federal judiciary). 
90 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008) 
(“[I]t will be found highly expedient and useful to divide the United States into four or five or half 
a dozen districts . . . .”). 
91 See Krotoszynski, supra note 89, at 1041 (“Congress designed the lower federal courts to be 
local institutions within the states . . . .”). 
92 See id. at 1044 (“[F]ederal courts were to be local federal institutions and would operate in a 
decentralized fashion.” (emphasis in original)); Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 205, 206 (2012) (noting that Justices Marshall and Story believed deeply 
that “the inferior federal courts were and ought to be the principal physical embodiment of the national 
government, reaching into the otherwise highly localized space of the cities, towns, and countryside”). 
93 LaCroix, supra note 92, at 207; see also PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 7-8 (1973) (“[A]rticulation of national law and assimilation of state and 
local values . . . consumed the time and energy of the judges from Washington.”). 
94 See FISH, supra note 93, at 12 (“[E]ach court administratively constituted an independent 
and autonomous unit.”). 
95 See id. at 13 (noting that “decentralizing features of the Act of 1789 were everywhere in evidence”); 
Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 
223, 273 (2003) (“Only in the twentieth century did federal judges gain the capacity to function as a 
cohort . . . .”). 
96 See Carl Baar, Federal Judicial Administration: Political Strategies and Organizational Change 
(calling the outcome of Taft’s efforts “the most important change in the judicial branch of the federal 
government during the past half-century”), in RUSSELL R. WHEELER & HOWARD R. WHITCOMB, 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: TEXT AND READINGS 97, 97 (1977). In this regard, one should also 
consider Chief Justice Taft’s support of the merger of law and equity. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling 
Act, supra note 42, at 1069-70 (detailing Taft’s proposal that the Court should have the power to “blend” 
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courts and the absence of a representative voice in Congress prevented the 
judiciary from formulating and effectively supporting reforms to remedy the 
numerous problems it was facing.97 Among the most glaring problems, 
according to Taft, was “delayed justice” in crowded, urban federal courts that 
negatively affected the legitimacy of the courts.98 To solve this problem, Taft 
supported the creation of a nationally unified and geographically unconstrained 
corps of judges belonging to “a system by which the whole judicial force of 
circuit and district judges could be distributed to dispose of the entire mass of 
business promptly.”99 Taft’s plan centered on convincing Congress to authorize 
the Chief Justice to appoint a force of “judges-at-large” who could travel as 
needed to different districts to combat overwhelmed dockets and delay.100 But 
Taft’s attempt to create such a “flying squadron” of judges never really got off 
the ground.101 Congress considered such a break from tradition too stark and 
such power in the hands of the Chief Justice too great (particularly when such 
a power threatened the traditional patronage opportunity presented by federal 
 
law and equity “into a code” with the same procedure (quoting William Howard Taft, Three Needed 
Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A. J. 34, 35 (1922))). 
97 See FISH, supra note 93, at 24 (citing Taft’s desire for “administrative integration of the 
judiciary” in order to create a centralized means of control). 
98 Id. at 19; see also JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE 
POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 198-212 (2012) (summarizing Taft’s goals, which 
often related to judicial autonomy, and his political savvy in achieving many of them). 
99 William Howard Taft, Address of the President, in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL 
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 384 (1914); see also William Howard Taft, The 
Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J. 3, 16 (1916) (describing his recommendations for 
“adjustment of our judicial force to the disposition of the increasing business”). 
100 See Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the 
Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1617 (2006) (“Taft wanted Congress 
to commission eighteen ‘judges-at-large’ to be dispatched at the discretion of the Chief Justice.”). 
101 See id. (describing how Congress rejected Taft’s proposal to create a “flying squadron of 
judges” (quoting Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 341, 356 (2004))). 
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judgeships).102 Local lawyers similarly bristled at the idea of appearing before 
judges whose predilections were unknown.103 
Although his attempts to achieve a flexible and mobile judiciary failed, Taft 
succeeded in convincing Congress to authorize the creation of a multi-judge body 
responsible for proposing legislation in the judiciary’s interest that was capable 
of enhancing communication among federal judges.104 In 1922, Congress passed 
legislation creating the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, the predecessor to 
the modern Judicial Conference.105 According to judicial-administration scholar 
Peter Graham Fish, the Conference “created an institutional framework with 
administrative leadership and informal responsibility lodged in the Chief Justice 
and the presiding officers of the intermediate appellate courts.”106 The 
Conference received additional resources in 1939 when Congress created the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which serves as an institutional liaison 
between Congress and federal judges.107 Over the years, Taft’s creation has been 
wildly successful in becoming, as Judith Resnik describes it, “the corporate 
policymaking voice for the federal judiciary.”108 
 
102 See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 236 (1928) (ascribing the failure of Taft’s 
proposal to survive the committee stage to the fact that “[r]egard for local representation is one of 
the most obstinate characteristics of American politics”); David S. Clark, Adjudication to 
Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 65, 111 (1981) (“Congressmen, reflecting their local biases, could not accept the idea of ‘outside’ 
judges whose judicial philosophy was unknown and whose decisions might reflect values prevalent 
in other parts of the country.”); Peter G. Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes: 
Conservative Politicians as Chief Judicial Reformers, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 136 (“Such a departure 
from historic principles of localism fell before heated congressional opposition.”); Ruger, supra note 
101, at 356 (pointing out that Taft’s “plan encountered heated opposition in Congress because of the 
proposal’s sharp break from the traditional conception of geographic fixity”). 
103 See FISH, supra note 93, at 60 (noting that “such judges [were] met with criticism from local 
lawyers” who complained of uncertainty and the judges’ unfamiliarity with the local context). 
104 See Jeremy Buchman, Judicial Lobbying and Politics of Judicial Structure: An Examination of the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 4-5 (2003) (describing how Taft “launch[ed] a comprehensive 
lobbying campaign on behalf of legislation that would enhance the Court’s policymaking capacity”); 
Fish, supra note 102, at 136 (noting Taft’s success in establishing “a policy-making institution with 
ready access to Congress”). 
105 An Act for the Appointment of an Additional Circuit Judge for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, 
for the Appointment of Additional District Judges for Certain Districts, Providing for an Annual 
Conference of Certain Judges, and for Other Purposes, ch. 306, 42 Stat. 837 (1922). 
106 FISH, supra note 93, at 39. 
107 See John W. Winkle III, Interbranch Politics: The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts as Liaison, 
24 JUST. SYS. J. 43, 45 (2003) (describing the Administrative Office as the “chief administrative 
policymaker for the federal courts”). 
108 Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally): The Monuments of Chief 
Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 823, 863 (2012). 
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The Conference develops policy proposals primarily through committees 
of judges appointed by the Chief Justice.109 Certain committee members 
develop the various federal rules of practice and procedure while others 
develop legislation to present to the Conference as a whole, and then, with the 
Conference’s approval, to Congress.110 One of the most influential committees 
is the Committee on Pretrial Procedure (the Pretrial Committee), established 
in 1943. Up until that point, the prevailing norm among federal judges was to 
remain passive in cases until trial, leaving it to the parties to manage litigation 
at their own pace unless the judge was called upon to decide a motion.111 Even 
though the original 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure included a 
provision for pretrial conferences, judges rarely used it.112 The Pretrial 
Committee sought to change that by engaging in a major educational and 
promotional campaign to convince judges of the benefits of pretrial case 
management, including active control of discovery and repeated pretrial 
conferences.113 The Pretrial Committee’s chairman, Chief Judge Alfred 
Murrah of the Tenth Circuit (who, when appointed to the district court at 
age thirty-two, was one of the youngest federal judges ever), traveled the 
country proselytizing experienced judges and training new ones about the 
virtues of active case management to sharpen the issues for trial, reduce costs 
and delays, and facilitate settlement when appropriate.114 
By the 1950s, the Pretrial Committee’s efforts were gaining traction, 
particularly as the federal courts were more regularly confronted with 
complicated, large-scale, multi-party cases.115 Murrah argued, “[T]he judicial 
 
109 See FISH, supra note 93, at 269-71 (detailing the development and organization of the 
Judicial Conference’s committee system). 
110 See id. at 271 (discussing the creation of “a Committee on Committees” by the Judicial 
Conference to take stock of and manage this administrative framework). 
111 See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 670-71 
(2010) (discussing the old norm of “federal judges sit[ting] back passively and let[ting] the lawyers 
manage their cases unless and until they encounter[ed] a problem that require[d] judicial attention”). 
112 See Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 44, at 514 (“[F]ederal judges, accustomed to a 
relatively passive role in common law cases, were loath to use the tools that were given them in 1938 
. . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
113 See Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking 
on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 173-74 (1997) (discussing the 
Judicial Conference’s authorization of educational seminars for judges). 
114 See id. at 174 (“One of the agendas of this educational effort was to teach judges about 
‘effective judicial supervision of litigation from “cradle to grave,”’ and another was to educate lawyers 
about new procedures. The proponents were self-described ‘proselytizers.’” (citations omitted)); see 
also William J. Brennan, Jr., Remarks on Pretrial Procedure in Protracted Civil and Criminal Litigation, 
23 F.R.D. 319, 379 (1958) (suggesting that effective pretrial management “puts people in a frame of 
mind to settle”). 
115 See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1969, 1983 (1989) (“Judges began to see themselves less as neutral adjudicators—
deciding what the parties brought to them for decision and proceeding at a pace to be determined 
by the parties—and more as managers of a costly and complicated process.”). 
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process was literally breaking down under the weight of these cases.”116 In 
1949, due to the increase in complex antitrust actions in the 1940s brought 
both by the government and private plaintiffs, Chief Justice Vinson appointed 
a subcommittee of ten federal judges to study the problem of large-scale, 
“protracted” litigation—so-called “big cases.”117 As part of this subcommittee, 
Murrah continued to circulate around the country, frequently speaking to 
judicial meetings to expound on the importance of pretrial conferences and 
control of discovery in complex cases.118 
In 1951, the subcommittee issued the “Prettyman Report,” named after its 
chairman E. Barrett Prettyman, Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit.119 The 
Prettyman Report described the growth of complex cases as an “acute major 
problem in the current administration of justice,” both because of the 
complexity of those cases—in which the litigation was “less certain and less 
accurate”—but also because of the congestion they created in the district 
courts.120 The Prettyman Report refrained from proposing new legislation or 
rules to respond to the “big cases,” but instead offered suggestions based on 
the experiences of judges and lawyers in litigating these cases.121 Foremost 
among these suggestions was increased pretrial procedure and “rigid control” 
by the trial judge from the outset of the litigation.122 
The Prettyman Report was met with widespread praise.123 And in 1955, still 
troubled by the problem of delay in federal litigation, Chief Justice Warren 
 
116 Alfred P. Murrah, Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23 
F.R.D. 319, 386 (1958) [hereinafter Murrah, Proceedings]; see also Alfred P. Murrah, Seminar on 
Procedures Prior to Trial, 20 F.R.D. 485, 491 (1957) (“A judge must be willing to assume his role as 
the governor of a lawsuit. He can’t be just an umpire.”). 
117 See Murrah, Proceedings, supra note 116, at 319 (discussing the “panel of federal judges 
appointed by the Chief Justice . . . to study the problems of procedure in protracted civil and 
criminal litigation”); see also Breck P. McAllister, The Judicial Conference Report on the “Big Case”: 
Procedural Problems of Protracted Litigation, 38 A.B.A. J. 289, 289-92 (1952) (summarizing the report 
of the Judicial Conference of the United States “entitled ‘Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other 
Protracted Cases’”); E. Barrett Prettyman, Needed: New Trial Technique: Suggestions for the Trial of 
Complicated Cases, 34 A.B.A. J. 766, 767 (1948) (arguing that “[o]ur time-honored trial procedure” 
was not designed for the “complicated, cumbersome and expensive” cases that were “coming to the 
trial Courts in increasing number”). 
118 See Earl Warren, The Problem of Delay: A Task for Bench and Bar Alike, 44 A.B.A. J. 1043, 
1045 (1958) (noting Murrah’s efforts over the past ten years to demonstrate to federal judges the 
importance of pretrial procedure). 
119 See Judicial Conference of the U.S., Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 
F.R.D. 41, 62 (1951).  
120 Id. at 64. 
121 See id. (noting that the “Committee does not recommend legislation or rules” based on the 
belief that the most effective “remedial methods and measures” came from the “experienced judges”). 
122 Id. at 66. 
123 See, e.g., SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE TRIAL OF ANTITRUST CASES 1-3 (1954) (reviewing the 
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formed a new subcommittee (which included several of the same members as 
the 1949 subcommittee, including Murrah as chairman) to translate the 
Prettyman Report into courtroom action.124 Warren actively promoted the 
project, lauding Murrah personally in his keynote speech at the annual 
meeting of the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1958.125 In that speech, 
Warren decried how “interminable and unjustifiable delays in our courts are 
today compromising the basic legal rights of countless thousands of Americans 
and, imperceptibly, corroding the very foundations of constitutional 
government in the United States.”126 Among the solutions to this problem, 
Warren claimed, was the kind of pretrial procedure that “Judge Murrah has 
tried for ten years to demonstrate to our federal judges.”127 
Ultimately, the result of these discussions and “[t]hree years of intensive 
investigation” by the subcommittee was the Handbook of Recommended 
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases (the Handbook), adopted by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States in March 1960.128 In an introductory 
note, Judge Prettyman noted that the Handbook primarily would respond to 
the “lack of central control” of cases by trial judges.129 The Handbook 
recommended (1) early identification of protracted litigation, (2) assignment of 
the case to a single judge, (3) definition of the contested issues through use of 
pretrial conferences, (4) confined discovery to prevent fishing expeditions, and 
(5) careful planning of trial procedure.130 In short, the Handbook endorsed all 
of the tenets of what we now consider typical case management.131 
The ink was barely dry on the Handbook when the federal courts would 
be confronted with the biggest “big case” in their history. The tenets of rigid 
control would soon be put to an extreme test. 
 
report positively); Leon Yankwich, Short Cuts in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 48 (1953) (affirming that 
the Committee was correct to emphasize that “much can be achieved through pre-trial” procedure). 
124 See Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 2, at 30 (discussing how “Chief Justice Warren 
appointed another committee . . . charged with considering the problems of ‘protracted cases.’”). 
125 See Warren, supra note 118, at 1045 (attributing improvements in the administration of such 
cases to the “untiring efforts of such men as . . . Alfred P. Murrah”). 
126 Id. at 1043. 
127 Id. at 1045. 
128 Alfred P. Murrah, Foreword to JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY GRP. ON PRETRIAL 
PROCEDURE IN PROTRACTED LITIG., HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE 
TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES 5, 5 (1960). 
129 E. Barrett Prettyman, Preface to HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE 
TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES, supra note 128, at 9, 10. 
130 See HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED 
CASES, supra note 128, at 23-24 (listing these “solutions for handling the big case”). 
131 See generally Gensler, supra note 111, at 669 (examining the prominence of case management 
in modern complex litigation); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2013) (discussing how the “managerial judge . . . displaced the passive 
umpire as the dominant paradigm in the federal courts”). 
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B. The Electrical-Equipment Antitrust Litigation 
In 1961, an unprecedented challenge arose: massive antitrust litigation 
involving the electrical-equipment industry that threatened to overwhelm the 
federal courts.132 Before the electrical-equipment cases began, civil antitrust 
actions comprised a significant amount of the business in the federal courts, 
and indeed they motivated much of the original investigation into adapting 
procedure to the “big case.” But their impact was manageable.133 In 1959, for 
instance, 315 antitrust cases were filed in the federal courts, amounting to 
approximately one per district judge.134 
In 1960, though, virtually every significant American manufacturer of 
electrical equipment, from General Electric to Westinghouse on down, was 
indicted under the Sherman Act.135 The indictments alleged conspiracies to 
divide business and fix prices in twenty product lines of electrical equipment, 
implicating $6-7 billion in sales.136 The Chief Judge of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, where the indictments issued, called the conspiracies “a 
shocking indictment of a vast section of our economy.”137 Ultimately, the 
criminal cases were resolved through a series of guilty and nolo contendere 
pleas in February 1961, resulting in nearly $2 million in fines, some short jail 
sentences for relatively low-level defendant-employees, and consent decrees 
 
132 See Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 44, at 515 (discussing “[t]he crisis emerging 
from the electrical equipment antitrust cases”). 
133 See Warren Olney III, Meeting the Impact of Antitrust Litigation in the United States District 
Courts (noting that “antitrust litigation does have a heavy impact on the business of the federal 
courts,” but “[n]umerically, antitrust cases account for but a small percentage of the total caseload”), 
in N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, 1960 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM: NEW THEORIES OF FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT 3, 4 (1960). 
134 See id. (reporting this statistic). 
135 See generally Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel 
Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 621 (1964) (discussing the flood of cases against the electrical 
equipment industry). For a comprehensive description of the activities that led to the indictments, 
see JOHN HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY: THE STORY OF THE ANTITRUST 
VIOLATIONS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY (1962), which discusses the electrical industry’s multi-
billion-dollar violations of antitrust laws. 
136 See CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE 
DAMAGE ACTIONS 83 (1973) (“[I]n the light of the total sales that seemed to have been involved in 
the claims, estimated in the range from $6 to $7 billion, . . . it is clear that the claims for damages, 
after trebling, were in the hundreds of millions of dollars.”). 
137 Id. at 14. (quoting Chief Judge James Cullen Ganey). 
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entered in September 1962.138 Congressional hearings held by Senator Estes 
Kefauver followed.139 
Although the criminal cases concluded by the fall of 1962, the civil 
litigation was just beginning. As Charles Bane, the lawyer who represented 
plaintiff Commonwealth Edison, noted, “[I]t was clear to . . . practically every 
investor-owned public utility in the United States, and to their counsel, that the 
convictions in themselves, together with the information (meager though it was) 
developed at the Kefauver hearings, established that there had been unlawful 
conspiracies to fix prices and allocate markets.”140 These investor-owned utilities 
were purchasers of all of the equipment involved in the indictments, and they 
organized among themselves a group of attorneys to study the extent of the 
damages they had suffered during the conspiracies, which had allegedly 
stretched back to the 1940s.141 Having realized that the overcharges amounted 
to up to forty percent for some products, plaintiffs filed treble-damage actions 
nationwide against the manufacturers, mostly in the plaintiffs’ home 
districts.142 As Bane put it, “[t]oward the end of 1961 the filings for treble 
damages had swollen to a torrent.”143 Over 1800 cases were filed in thirty-five 
federal districts.144 As Chief Judge Thomas Clary of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania noted, “[I]n these cases, there were as many as 40 plaintiffs. 
There were actually 25,632 claims, in other words, individual cases involved in 
these 1912 cases.”145 Although the cases were scattered throughout the country, 
the courts with the most individual filings were in major cities, with New York, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, and Seattle leading the way.146 
This opening of the floodgates caught the attention of the Judicial 
Conference, and in February 1962, Chief Justice Warren formed a subcommittee 
 
138 See id. at 20-21. The penalties were, at the time, “among the strongest ever levied for 
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.” Wayne E. Baker & Robert R. Faulkner, The Social 
Organization of Conspiracy: Illegal Networks in the Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry, 58 AM. SOC. 
REV. 837, 838-39 (1993). 
139 See generally Price Fixing and Bid Rigging in the Electrical Manufacturing Industry: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 16507 (1961). 
140 BANE, supra note 136, at 50. 
141 See id. at 50-51 (discussing the organization that was formed to “carry[] through expert 
studies to find the answers to the damages questions . . . raised by the Philadelphia convictions”). 
142 See id. at 75 (describing how the investor-owned utilities “generally [filed suit] in their home 
federal districts”). 
143 Id. at 81. 
144 See Neal & Goldberg, supra note 135, at 622 (referring to the filings as an “avalanche of over 
1,800 complex, protracted cases filed in thirty-five districts”). 
145 Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Judicial Conference: Third Judicial Circuit of the 
United States, 39 F.R.D. 375, 497 (1965) [hereinafter Judicial Conference Proceedings] (statement of 
Thomas J. Clary, C.J., U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Pa.); see also BANE, supra note 136, at 83 
(“[T]he 1,912 separate cases in fact represented over 25,000 separate antitrust claims.”). 
146 The number of cases filed in each relevant districts was as follows: S.D.N.Y., 427; N.D. Ill., 
226; E.D. Pa., 182; and W.D. Wash., 141. Neal & Goldberg, supra note 135, at 622 tbl.3. 
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of the Committee on Pretrial Procedure “for the purpose of considering the 
problems arising from discovery procedures in multiple litigation filed in 
different judicial districts but with common witnesses and exhibits,” such as 
“major air crashes” and “antitrust conspiracies.”147 As Warren noted, “A proper 
solution of these problems . . . [was] essential to the proper administration of 
our court system.”148 The new committee, christened the Coordinating 
Committee on Multiple Litigation, included seven judges: Alfred P. Murrah 
(Chairman; C.J., 10th Cir.), George H. Boldt (J., W.D. Wash.), Thomas J. Clary 
(C.J., E.D. Pa.), Joe E. Estes (C.J., N.D. Tex.), Edwin A. Robson (J., N.D. Ill.), 
Sylvester J. Ryan (C.J., S.D.N.Y.), and Roszel C. Thomsen (C.J., D. Md.).149 
Judges William H. Becker (J., W.D. Mo.) and William M. Byrne (J., S.D. Cal.) 
were added later in 1962.150 Murrah, appointed to the bench by Franklin 
Roosevelt, was the first chairman.151 In 1964, Robson, appointed in 1951 by 
President Eisenhower, succeeded him, and in 1966, Becker, a 1961 Kennedy 
appointment, succeeded Robson. These three judges would ultimately 
become the driving force behind the MDL statute. 
The Committee met in New York on February 21, 1962, and reported to 
the Judicial Conference in early March that it would seek to coordinate the 
progress of the litigation “in the hands of as few judges as possible, who 
should carefully supervise and regulate all discovery procedures.”152 In so 
doing, the Committee agreed “that the principles enumerated in the 
[Handbook] are applicable and should be applied to these cases.”153 The 
Judicial Conference endorsed these plans, and the Committee was off and 
running.154 The Committee’s operations were centered in Chicago, in an office 
adjoining Judge Robson’s chambers. Dean Phil C. Neal of the nearby 
 
147 Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts 1-2 (Feb. 7, 1962) [hereinafter Feb. 1962 Press 
Release] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 6, Folder 16) (announcing the membership of the 
Coordinating Committee). 
148 Id. at 2; see also Edward Ranzal, Warren Combats Utility-Suit Jam, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1962, 
at A1 (describing how Chief Justice Warren had created a panel of federal judges to deal with the 
“more than 1,500 damages suits filed against electrical equipment manufacturers”). 
149 See Feb. 1962 Press Release, supra note 147, at 1 (announcing the members of the 
Coordinating Committee). 
150 See Neal & Goldberg, supra note 135, at 623 (listing Judges Byrne and Becker as members 
of the Coordinating Committee). 
151 See id. 
152 SUBCOMM. ON MULTIPLE LITIG., REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON PRETRIAL PROCEDURE FOR CONSIDERING DISCOVERY PROBLEMS ARISING IN MULTIPLE 
LITIGATION WITH COMMON WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS 5 (1962) (on file at Becker Papers, supra 
note 33, Box 6, Folder 15) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON MULTIPLE LITIG.]. 
153 Id. at 4-5. 
154 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES: PROCEEDINGS, MARCH 8-9, 1962, at 26 (1962) (“[T]he Conference desires to 
express its approval and encouragement of the forthcoming meetings of judges aimed to effect voluntary 
coordinating procedures in processing the civil antitrust cases in the electrical equipment industry.”). 
2017] “A Radical Proposal” 857 
University of Chicago Law School was named Executive Secretary, and he 
hired Perry Goldberg, a 1960 graduate of the school, as his clerk.155 
The Committee had no power to enter any orders or to require any judge 
assigned to any of the cases to do anything—its efforts depended entirely on 
the voluntary cooperation of the district judges involved.156 The first major 
innovation of the coordination program was a series of uniform pretrial 
orders, the first set of which were borrowed from the orders Chief Judge 
Sylvester Ryan (a Committee member) had already issued in the cases 
pending before him in the Southern District of New York.157 The orders were 
developed at national meetings—first by the Committee, finally with all of 
the judges assigned to the cases, and then after hearings open to all 
attorneys.158 Following these hearings, the local judges entered the proposed 
pretrial orders in their own cases after “local” hearings, at which the parties 
could be heard, though the orders were rarely altered.159 Although it was not 
unanimous, the level of cooperation by district judges was remarkable.160 
The pretrial orders followed the guidance of the Handbook by placing 
control of discovery within the hands of the judge.161 Moreover, these orders 
stayed already issued discovery requests or scheduled depositions in order to 
coordinate discovery on a national level, including having uniform sets of 
interrogatories issued to the defendants in cases involving major product 
 
155 See Neal & Goldberg, supra note 135, at 621, 624-25 (listing the titles of each man vis-à-vis 
the subcommittee and offering a brief biographical background of each). 
156 See, e.g., Judicial Conference Proceedings, supra note 145, at 515 (statement of Benjamin P. 
Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch.) (“Now bear in mind that the Coordinating Committee can 
do nothing except by voluntary cooperation . . . . Unless the judges act with substantial unanimity on 
these Orders, the plan would break down.”); see also Phil C. Neal, Multi-district Coordination—The 
Antecedents of § 1407, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 99, 101 (1969) (“The Committee was of course operating 
without statutory or other formal authority. The success of its effort depended entirely upon the 
willingness of all the judges responsible for the cases to follow the lead of the Committee.”). 
157 See Neal & Goldberg, supra note 135, at 623 (discussing how the “set of seven pretrial orders 
recommended by the Co-ordinating Committee” was developed from Chief Judge Ryan’s previously 
entered orders). 
158 See id. at 623-24 (describing this process). 
159 See id. at 624 (discussing how the cases were handled on the “local” level). 
160 See id. at 623 (discussing “several important objectives” that were effectively “accomplished” 
by the pretrial orders). Some judges bristled at the heavy-handedness of the Coordinating Committee. 
For example, Judge Sherrill Halbert of the Northern District of California ceased cooperating with the 
national program based on his “strong feeling that a Court ought to be able to run its own affairs . . . I 
may be wrong, but I will tell you very candidly that I think these cases would have all been done and 
disposed of long ago had it not been for the intervention of this super-dooper Court.” Reporter’s 
Transcript Motion to Bring in Additional Parties, Motion to Enter National Pre-trial Orders at 2, 4, 
Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Gen. Elec. Co., Nos. 8380-83, 8403-04 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1963). 
161 See BANE, supra note 136, at 123 (discussing how the pretrial orders “took control of discovery 
from counsel . . . and placed that control in the judges”). 
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lines.162 Other cases, involving products lines with less sales, were, by consent 
of the parties, placed on “back burner” status, so that national discovery could 
proceed on the largest sets of claims.163 In order to manage the nationwide 
depositions of defense witnesses, the plaintiffs’ lawyers met in Chicago to 
appoint a “steering committee.”164 The steering committee would decide in what 
order the witnesses would be deposed and divide up the workload.165 The next 
major steps included establishing, at defendants’ expense, a national document 
depository in Chicago, at which all discovery of defendants’ materials would be 
housed and available to the lawyers.166 Later a similar depository funded by 
plaintiffs was established in New York for plaintiffs’ documents.167 
The Committee also created a schedule of national depositions—first by 
plaintiffs, then by defendants—that were presided over by a judge who would 
make legal rulings, and which were held around the country so that common 
witnesses would be deposed only once.168 Plaintiffs and defendants agreed 
among themselves who would conduct the depositions, but the deposition 
would remain “open” for forty days after oral testimony concluded so that any 
other lawyer could ask additional questions.169 
Although discovery was moving full steam ahead, the judges had been 
requesting that the parties consider settlement since December 1962.170 In 
response, the plaintiffs’ steering committee began developing damage models 
and lump-sum proposals for the defendants.171 Settlement talks did not heat 
up, however, until the government settled its claims against the defendants in 
 
162 See id. at 123-24 (discussing how the pretrial orders set about to achieve coordinated discovery); 
see also Neal & Goldberg, supra note 135, at 626 (“Suits in three product lines, steam turbine-generators, 
hydrogenerators and power transformers, were selected for priority . . . .”). 
163 See BANE, supra note 136, at 125 (discussing the cases put on the “back burner” in order). 
164 See id. at 131 (“Approximately eighty attorneys representing plaintiffs met in Chicago . . . 
and organized the plaintiffs’ counsel Steering Committee.”). 
165 See id. at 131-34 (discussing how the Steering Committee set about to “carry out the plaintiffs’ 
obligations under the deposition program”). 
166 See id. at 135 (describing the establishment of a “national document depositor[y]” of 
defendants’ documents in Chicago). 
167 See Neal & Goldberg, supra note 135, at 627 (“[P]laintiffs agreed to establish a national 
depository in New York similar to the defendants’ depository in Chicago.”). 
168 See id. at 625-26 (discussing the process of coordinating and executing the committee’s 
national deposition plan). 
169 See BANE, supra note 136, at 129-30 (detailing the parameters set by the pretrial orders regarding 
depositions); see also Judicial Conference Proceedings, supra note 145, at 498 (statement of Thomas J. Clary, 
C.J., U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Pa.) (noting that “an assorted 180—by actual count—lawyers 
from throughout the country were present in the courtroom” for the first national deposition). 
170 See BANE, supra note 136, at 215 (noting that “[a]s early as December 1962, . . . Judge Clary 
requested the parties to the Philadelphia actions to open settlement negotiations”). 
171 See id. at 220-21 (describing the various models and formulas used by plaintiffs to calculate 
their damages). 
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the spring of 1963,172 and General Electric, the largest defendant, came to the 
table with the civil plaintiffs. 173 From the beginning, the judges played an 
active role in the negotiations between General Electric and the plaintiffs, 
including most notably the private conferences conducted by Chief Judge 
Ryan and Judges Robson and Wilfred Feinberg (J., S.D.N.Y.).174 At the 
conferences, the judges frankly assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the 
parties’ cases—and the acceptability of their settlement positions. Upon 
hearing one of the plaintiffs’ early settlement offers, Judge Ryan made clear 
that he considered it a non-starter on the ground that “what the utility executive 
was asking for would break General Electric and put it out of business.”175 
Eventually, General Electric came to an agreement with the plaintiffs, 
settling all claims against it for around $300 million by the end of 1964.176 
Although they were not required to do so, the judges nevertheless held 
hearings to approve the fairness of the settlements.177 The plaintiffs’ actively 
acknowledged the judges’ involvement in the entire settlement process. For 
instance, at the fairness hearing approving Commonwealth Edison’s settlement 
with Westinghouse, its lawyer remarked, “[W]e believe we can honestly 
attribute [the settlement agreement] to your Honor and your Honor’s efforts, 
and we wish to thank you for it.”178 
Although by mid-1965 the cases involving the major product lines had 
begun settling in droves, some cases involving smaller product lines, which 
had been placed on the “back burner,” had not yet settled.179 The judges’ plan 
was to transfer these remaining cases for trial to one district court per product 
 
172 See id. at 225 (noting that, upon settling the criminal charges against the defendants, 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy stated that the “Department of Justice ha[d] a responsibility 
to help clean up [the] congestion” created by the private civil litigation). 
173 See id. at 232 (“As the parties came into the latter part of 1963, it was obvious that the key 
to settlement lay with the larger manufacturers and, above all others, with General Electric.”). 
174 See id. at 238, 244-45 (describing the conferences and small meetings that these judges held 
with the parties during the negotiation process). 
175 Id. at 239. 
176 See id. at 250 (noting estimations of the payments reaching as high as $300 million). 
177 See id. at 259-61 (describing the settlements which “were made subject to court approval,” 
despite “[s]uch approvals . . . not [being] required by federal rules in any of the cases”). Apparently, 
another reason the parties sought judicial approval of the settlements as fair and reasonable was to 
justify the decision of plaintiffs’ officers and directors in approving the settlement. Id. at 261. Moreover, 
approval of the settlements as “price adjustments” rather than treble damages carried important tax 
consequences for both the plaintiffs and the defendants. Id. The judges’ acquiescence in the parties’ 
preferred classification for tax purposes is a further illustration of the scope of judicial involvement 
in the settlements. Id. at 261-62. 
178 Id. at 259-60. 
179 See id. at 339 (noting that while “practically all claims of plaintiffs against practically all 
defendants” were resolved or close to resolution, over 1000 claims against I-T-E Circuit Breaker 
Company were still pending). 
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line.180 One sticking point in this plan was the defendant I-T-E Circuit 
Breaker, primarily represented by the Philadelphia law firm Dechert, Price & 
Rhoads.181 By the end of 1965, I-T-E was the defendant with the largest 
number of cases still pending against it—“some 365”182—and the Committee 
determined that Judge Robson should try those cases in the Northern District 
of Illinois.183 I-T-E objected to its cases being sent to Chicago, but the judges, 
including Judge Becker, overrode their objections and transferred the cases 
anyway, sometimes on their own motion.184 I-T-E went so far as to seek 
mandamus against Becker in the Eighth Circuit, but its gambit was 
unsuccessful.185 The Eighth Circuit rejected its position, both lauding the 
success of the national program and noting that I-T-E “has not formulated 
any program, and indeed that it is without even a suggestion of any plan, for 
effecting termination of the litigation thus pending against it, either by way 
of desire to engage in trials, of intention to attempt settlements, or of basis 
to seek dismissals.”186 The court added that what I-T-E “seemingly wants 
done is simply to have all of the suits against it left alone.”187 
As a result of the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the I-T-E cases were 
transferred to Chicago, where the parties eventually settled on the first day 
of trial.188 Once I-T-E settled, settlements of the rest of the cases followed 
quickly without trial, and by the end of 1966 the litigation was over.189 No less 
 
180 See id. at 339-41 (discussing the Coordinating Committee’s proposed plan to handle the 
outstanding cases); see also Atl. City Elec. Co. v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., 247 F. Supp. 950, 953 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (“There are obvious advantages to having the remaining cases in a particular 
produce line centered in one locale before one judge.”). 
181 See id. (discussing how I-T-E “had refused to discuss settlement” and had “consistently 
resisted all steps looking toward trial of the cases in which it was a party defendant”); see also 
Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 103 (1967) [hereinafter Jan. 24, 1967 Senate Hearings] (statement of 
Philip Price, Esquire, Dechert, Price & Rhoads) (explaining that Dechert was “‘national counsel’ for 
I-T-E Circuit Breaker Company”); infra text accompanying notes 438–39 (recounting I-T-E 
attorney Phillip Price’s testimony before the subcommittee in opposition to the MDL bill). 
182 See BANE, supra note 136, at 339. 
183 See id. at 339-40 (describing how the Committee determined that “all cases were to be 
transferred to the Northern District of Illinois”). 
184 See Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., 240 F. Supp. 121, 124 (W.D. 
Mo. 1965) (Becker, J.) (ordering the transfer of five civil damages actions against I-T-E); see also 
BANE, supra note 136, at 340 (“Judge Becker, initially acting almost on his motion but ultimately on 
the basis of plaintiffs’ motion, ordered the transfer of five cases . . . .”). 
185 See I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) 
(refusing to grant I-T-E’s petition for writ of mandamus against Judge Becker). 
186 Id. at 362. 
187 Id. 
188 See BANE, supra note 136, at 378 (detailing the “true courthouse steps settlement” that 
occurred on the first day of trial). 
189 See id. at 379 (describing how the I-T-E settlement “broke the logjam” and led to the 
resolution of “practically all of the remaining pending cases” by the end of 1966); see also Milton 
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important a figure than Chief Justice Warren himself lauded the Committee’s 
achievement in a speech at the American Law Institute: “If it had not been 
for the monumental effort of the nine judges on this committee of the Judicial 
Conference and the remarkable cooperation of the 35 district judges before 
whom these cases were pending, the district court calendars throughout the 
country could well have broken down.”190 
But the reaction to the mass settlements was not universal praise. The 
pace of the national discovery program played a role in resolving the cases. 
As one of the lead lawyers for the plaintiffs, Charles Bane, put it, “[D]oubtless 
the pressures of the national discovery program contributed greatly to the 
defendants’ desire to be relieved of the burden of the electrical equipment 
cases.”191 Defense counsel roundly criticized the speed with which discovery 
proceeded, judges’ lack of regard for their arguments, and their impression 
that the hearings were simply for show, the Committee having decided on 
pretrial orders in advance of argument.192 They also complained that “it 
became very clear . . . that the national program of the Committee would 
move forward and that ‘nothing’ would interfere with its progress,” 
particularly pleas for relief from the pace of discovery by the defendants.193 
Defense lawyer John Logan O’Donnell complained that the coordinated 
proceedings inured to the exclusive benefit of the plaintiffs. O’Donnell 
argued that the Committee’s actions eliminated defendants’ best institutional 
advantage: their “advantage of numbers which we all know has significance in 
any litigation such as antitrust which can be so time-consuming and complex 
 
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
9 (1971) (“[A]lthough a total of 1,912 cases had been filed, only nine trials were required.”). 
190 Earl Warren, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Address to the Annual Meeting of 
the American Law Institute, in MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 6 (1st 
ed. 1969); see also, S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 4 (1967) (observing that the Committee’s “procedures 
worked exceptionally well”); Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 2, at 32 (“Much legal 
commentary describes the work of the Committee as successful.”). 
191 BANE, supra note 136, at 266. 
192 See, e.g., John Logan O’Donnell, Pretrial Discovery in Multiple Litigation from the Defendants’ 
Standpoint, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 133, 137 (1966) (arguing that the way discovery was handled “virtually 
eliminated” defendants’ “ability . . . to point out and question specific characteristics of the cases”). 
Typical of the allegations of a power grab by the judges are the comments of Breck McAllister, of 
the Donovan Leisure firm, at the 1966 New York State Bar Association Antitrust Law Symposium: 
The extraordinary point to be made about this Co-ordinating Committee at the outset is 
this: without any mandate from statute or other source, it was able to embark upon and 
carry out a program of action in discovery and pretrial in this mass of cases that was largely 
accepted, often only after vigorous protest by the parties, and that was almost invariably 
applied and carried out in many district courts in which these cases had been filed. This 
was surely an extraordinary exercise in the use of judicial prestige and persuasion. 
Breck P. McAllister, Judicial Administration of Multiple-District Treble Damage Administration, in N.Y. 
STATE BAR ASS’N, 1966 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 55, 58 (1966). 
193 McAllister, supra note 192, at 60. 
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as to tax the energy and perseverance of the best of lawyers.”194 O’Donnell 
added, in a passage that wins high marks for frankness, 
In multiple litigation, however, the differential is eliminated in large part. 
Plaintiffs pool their resources and generally designate their most experienced 
lawyers and skilled cross-examiners as lead counsel to conduct depositions 
and supervise and coordinate all phases of plaintiffs’ pretrial discovery . . . . 
First, costs are lessened and, in fact, there may be virtually no cost to a 
particular individual plaintiff. Like it or not, from the defendants’ standpoint 
the potential cost to be incurred by plaintiffs in prosecuting a triple damage 
case is a factor which may lead to a favorable, reasonable and satisfactory 
settlement under ordinary circumstances. Second, and more important, each 
plaintiff is handed a ready-made case to the extent that expert lead counsel 
can establish it and, in any event, a far better case than most plaintiffs’ counsel 
could ever establish without the coordinated program.195 
Defendants also decried the pressure they felt to settle due to the pace of 
discovery. As William M. Sayre, Vice Chairman of the New York State Bar 
Section on Antitrust, noted in a meeting of his group in 1966, 
The defendants litigated, but it was all uphill. The courts had little sympathy for 
their plight, and it must have been obvious to the courts that their burden would 
be relieved if enough pressure were put upon the defendants to force them to 
settle. And pressure there was. The judges put into the game a series of new and 
unprecedented rules . . . and greatly accelerated the discovery and trial 
timetables. . . . Settlements came in most of the cases, and they were expensive.196 
For their part, plaintiffs, perhaps recognizing the benefits of coordination 
and speed, were generally in favor of coordinated proceedings.197 
Despite the voices of complaint on the defense side, most commenters 
considered the settlement of the electrical-equipment litigation a resounding 
success. In fact, district judges were so impressed by the work of the 
Committee that as new multidistrict cases arose in the 1960s, they repeatedly 
sought out the Committee’s help.198 By the middle of the 1960s, the 
 
194 O’Donnell, supra note 192, at 138. 
195 Id. at 138-39. 
196 William M. Sayre, Developments in Multiple Treble Damage Act Litigation—Introduction, in 
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, 1966 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 46, 51-52 (1966). 
197 See BANE, supra note 136, at 131 (noting that while defendants’ counsel were objecting to 
the national deposition program, nearly eighty plaintiffs attorneys were meeting to organize a 
litigation steering committee); see also Charles A. Bane, Pretrial Discovery in Multiple Litigation from 
the Plaintiffs’ Standpoint, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 117, 129 (1966) (proclaiming that the national discovery 
program in the electrical-equipment cases “must be considered to have been an unqualified success”). 
198 See Neal, supra note 156, at 104 (noting that by the time the electrical-equipment cases 
ended, “other judges had begun to come to the Committee for advice and aid”). 
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Committee was coordinating cases pending around the country dealing with 
subjects as diverse as patents and airplane crashes, as well as large-scale 
antitrust cases involving the concrete pipe, children’s schoolbooks, and rock 
salt industries.199 The Committee coordinated this litigation at the request of 
other judges despite having no permanent staff, source of funding, or any 
statutory authority to act.200 By the mid-1960s the Committee—whose 
members had advocated strong pretrial management even before their 
approach had proven successful in the electrical-equipment litigation—was 
riding high. They next turned to making their activities a permanent fixture 
of the federal litigation system. 
III. DRAFTING THE MDL STATUTE 
A. Inventing Pretrial Transfer 
It was not long after its inception that the Coordinating Committee began 
to consider more permanent mechanisms for the type of coordination it had 
begun in the electrical-equipment cases. As early as September 1962, the 
Judicial Conference endorsed the development by the Committee of “general 
principles applicable to the handling of discovery problems in multiple 
litigation . . . in the light of the methods developed in processing the cases 
presently under consideration.”201 This early move toward a broader application 
of the case-management techniques the Committee was pioneering is 
unsurprising. The enthusiasm of both Chief Justice Warren and the 
Committee’s members for the innovations of the Handbook was especially great 
for strong judicial control over discovery and early definition of the issues for 
settlement or trial. Moreover, the members of the Committee were pleased 
with how the electrical-equipment consolidation had gone in its first year. 
Discovery was proceeding rapidly, settlement talks were already underway, and 
judges were cooperating with the national program. Buoyed by their success, 
the Committee began to formulate ideas to codify a new statute or rule of civil 
procedure that would coordinate litigation pending in multiple districts. In 
support of this effort, the Committee began studying various consolidation 
 
199 See Co-Ordinating Comm. for Multidistrict Litig., Minutes of Special Preliminary Meeting 
of the Co-Ordinating Committee 2-3 (Nov. 3, 1967) [hereinafter Co-Ordinating Committee Nov. 3, 
1967 Meeting Minutes] (on file at Becker Chronological Files, supra note 33, Box 11, Folder 8) 
(describing Committee member’s coordination of various multidistrict cases). 
200 See id. at 2 (discussing how to delegate the Committee’s workload given “the absence of a 
staff for the Co-Ordinating Committee”); see also Neal, supra note 156, at 104 (discussing the quickly 
expanding caseload of the Committee). 
201 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES: PROCEEDINGS, SEPTEMBER 19-20, 1962, at 45 (statement of Alfred P. Murrah, 
Chairman, Comm. on Pretrial Procedure). 
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mechanisms in federal courts around the country.202 The Committee’s efforts 
gained further momentum in the spring of 1963, thanks to Chief Justice 
Warren’s endorsement at the annual meeting of the American Law Institute.203 
Dean Neal, the executive secretary of the Committee, floated his inchoate 
ideas for a permanent response to multidistrict litigation during a speech to 
the Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference in Chicago on May 14, 1963.204 
Echoing sentiments raised by Committee members, Neal both predicted 
“that similar batches of related litigation will continue to be part of the 
business of the federal courts”205 and suggested that in such circumstances it 
would be “desirable to recognize a class of cases in which much greater 
flexibility in the transfer of cases would be permitted.”206 This would mean 
that “cases could be brought within the control of a single district judge 
simply to obtain the advantages of consolidation or partial consolidation 
which would be available if the cases had all been brought originally in a single 
district.”207 With language that would have made Chief Justice Taft smile, 
Neal argued, “Surely at least a part of the answer lies in making a fuller use 
of the potential unity of the federal judicial system, and allowing ourselves 
some of the advantages which would be available if the federal district courts 
were parts of one court rather than many courts.”208 
Emphasizing “the interest of the public in the efficient administration of 
justice, and the interest of all the other litigants in clearing the dockets of the 
courts,”209 Neal concluded that “what is needed is some supervisory mechanism 
in the federal judicial system for identifying related cases filed in different 
districts as soon as they are filed, reviewing such cases to determine whether 
justice requires that they be brought together, and directing transfer to the 
 
202 See CO-ORDINATING COMM. FOR MULTIPLE LITIG., REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATING 
COMMITTEE FOR MULTIPLE LITIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, A SUB-
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1963) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, 
Box 23, Folder 51) (discussing the Committee’s approach for executing national coordination of the 
electrical-equipment cases). 
203 See Earl Warren, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Address to the Fortieth Annual 
Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 22, 1963), in 40 A.L.I. PROC. 25, 34 (1963) 
(commending the subcommittee of the Judicial Conference Committee on Pretrial Procedure for its 
work on “discovery problems arising in multiple litigation”). 
204 See Phil C. Neal, Exec. Sec’y, Coordinating Comm. for Multidistrict Litig., Talk at the 
Annual Judicial Conference of the Seventh Federal Circuit at the Ambassador West (May 14, 1963) 
(on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 17, Folder 39, Divider 4). 
205 Id. at 16. 
206 Id. at 17. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 16-17. 
209 Id. at 17-18. 
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proper district.”210 Candidly, however, Neal conceded, “This is perhaps a radical 
proposal, and I am unable to suggest any close analogy for such a power.”211 
By summer, however, Neal, Judges Becker and Robson, and the 
Committee’s law clerk, Perry Goldberg, began laying out options for possible 
legislative or rule-based reform along these lines. Reflecting the difficult 
communication capabilities of the period, their primary initial concern was the 
problem of identifying litigation involving the same subject matter pending in 
multiple districts. Although “the immensity and resultant publicity” of the 
electrical-equipment litigation made the need for action apparent in those 
cases,212 typically, litigation involving common questions would be pending 
in multiple districts without the assigned judges being aware.213 As a result, 
they understood the need for some federal mechanism for identifying 
multidistrict cases for special treatment.214 
But the drafters also understood that “identification is clearly only a first 
step, and quite possibly not of itself very meaningful . . . leaving for judicial 
determination the basic question of whether coordination, consolidation, or 
some combination technique would have net utility.”215 The drafters, 
therefore, also cited the necessity of asserting centralized judicial control 
early in the litigation, a concept consistent with the Handbook, but “clearly in 
conflict with the basis of the Federal Discovery rules where party governed 
pre-trial is an overriding object.”216 As a result, according to an early memo, 
Neal, Becker, and Robson recognized the need for “[a] new rule or new rules 
to permit unified judicially controlled discovery in situations of multiple 
litigation,”217 but they expressed concern about complete transfer of all related 
cases nationwide to a single district because it “might present problems with 
due process overtones.”218 Nevertheless, the drafters emphasized the need for 
“centralization of the power to make decisions.”219 By the fall of that year, 
however, the drafters believed they had developed a solution: “Consolidation 
before [a] panel of Judges” who would facilitate “[a]ssignment of cases to one 
 
210 Id. at 18. 
211 Id. 
212 DISCOVERING INSTANCES OF MULTIPLE LITIGATION - A CLUE TO THE NEED FOR 
MANUALLY OPERATED RULES? 5 (1963) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 17, Folder 39, 
Divider 1). 
213 See id. at 1-4 (discussing the difficulty of identifying instances of multiple litigation). 
214 See id. at 4-6 (identifying the need for “rules or [a] formula . . . to deal with future situations” 
like the one presented by the electrical-equipment cases). 
215 Id. at 2. 
216 Id. at 5. 
217 Id. (emphasis in original). 
218 Id. at 6. 
219 Id. 
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judge and consolidation for pre-trial purposes” combined with “[v]enue 
problems and consolidation of cases in one district for pre-trial and trial.”220 
As the team began developing these ideas, Judge Robson thought it 
important to coordinate its activities with the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee (the Rules Committee), which was by then fully engaged in its 
work on a revised Federal Rule 23 on class actions.221 Early that summer, Neal 
reached out to the Rules Committee’s reporters, Professors Benjamin Kaplan 
and Albert Sacks of Harvard Law School.222 Kaplan responded with 
interest,223 and he and Sacks agreed to attend the Coordinating Committee’s 
next meeting in November 1963 in New York to collaborate.224 
Though the Rules Committee significantly reworked Rule 23 in ways that 
brought on the class-action revolution,225 they explicitly did not intend so-called 
“mass accidents” to be the typical grist for the class-action mill.226 In other 
words, the Rules Committee did not intend to reshape the law to facilitate 
class treatment of claims in which individual litigation was justified by the 
amount of damages at stake; to the contrary, the Rules Committee hoped to 
 
220 Perry Goldberg, Coordinating Comm. for Multiple Litig., Outline of Suggested Topics for 
Discussion on Problems Related to Multiple Litigation 1 (Oct. 16, 1963) (on file at Becker Papers, 
supra note 33, Box 17, Folder 39, Divider 1). 
221 See Letter from Edwin A. Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N.D. Ill., to the Co-
Ordinating Comm. for Multiple Litig. (Nov. 4, 1963) (on file Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 18, 
Folder 19) (suggesting an agenda and setting out the contents of the upcoming meeting). 
222 See Letter from Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of 
the Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Phil C. Neal, Dean, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. (May 28, 1963) 
(on file at Neal Papers, supra note 34, Box 4, Folder XYZ) (“Al Sacks tells me that you expressed 
interest in our draft rule on class actions.”). 
223 See id. (“We’d be delighted to know what you [Neal] think of it.”). 
224 See Letter from Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of 
the Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Phil C. Neal, Dean, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. (Nov. 6, 1963) 
(on file at Neal Papers, supra note 34, Box 4, Folder XYZ) (“Al and I plan to be in New York . . . , 
and we will await word about where and when to meet you.”). Judge Roszel Thomsen of the District 
of Maryland was a member of both the Coordinating Committee and the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee. Thomsen was a major proponent of the two committees exchanging ideas. See Letter 
from Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, to Dean Acheson 
(Dec. 4, 1963), microformed on CIS No. CI-7003 (Cong. Info Serv.) (noting Thomsen’s proposal that 
the two committees consult with one another). 
225 See Burbank, CAFA in Historical Context, supra note 4, at 1487 (noting that the drafters of Rule 
23(b)(3) “were aware that they were breaking new ground and that those effects might be substantial”). 
226 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 393 (1967) (“[T]he Committee stated that 
litigation arising from ‘mass accidents’ injuring numerous persons would ordinarily not be 
appropriate for class handling.”). One focus of the amendments was the facilitation of civil rights 
suits seeking injunctions under Rule 23(b)(2). See D. Marcus, supra note 31, at 608 (noting that 
committee “[m]embers designed Rule 23(b)(2) expressly for [civil rights enforcement]”); R. Marcus, 
Bending in the Breeze, supra note 7, at 500 (“[O]ne goal of the 1962-1966 rewriting of Rule 23 was to 
. . . enable injunction suits to enforce civil rights.”). 
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clarify an outmoded and vague rule to better reflect current practice.227 If the 
Rules Committee had any ideological valence, it was to better facilitate civil 
rights class actions.228 
Indeed, Rules Committee member John Frank sought to delete proposed 
Rule 23(b)(3) entirely on the ground that a rule facilitating such “mass 
accident” class actions would open the door to serious due process abuses for 
absent plaintiffs represented by unscrupulous lawyers.229 Although Kaplan was 
committed to retaining Rule 23(b)(3), despite its somewhat “adventuresome” 
quality, he agreed that 23(b)(3) should be used sparingly in cases where the 
damages to individual plaintiffs justified separate litigation.230 
In any event, the debate over Rule 23(b)(3) was in full swing within the 
Rules Committee when Kaplan met with the Coordinating Committee in 
November 1963 in New York. Consistent with the Rules Committee’s view that 
class actions were generally not appropriate for mass torts, all assembled agreed 
that the class-action rule amendments did not obviate the need for a more 
permanent mechanism to consolidate litigation pending in multiple districts.231 
According to the Coordinating Committee’s minutes, after review of the 
suggested Rule 23 amendments “[t]he consensus was that the proposed rule [23] 
change would be most beneficial for resolving certain existing ambiguities of 
class actions, but that a general solution of the problems posed by multiple 
litigation w[ould] require more comprehensive treatment.”232 Judge Becker 
added that the “[b]ig problem in electrical suits is one of management,” adding 
that the “[p]roblem cannot be handled under rule making power . . . . Who’s 
 
227 See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the 
“Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 669-70 (1979) (discussing the intentions and goals of 
the drafters of the 1966 amendment and concluding that “the rulemakers apparently believed that 
they simply were making rule 23 a more effective procedural tool”). 
228 See D. Marcus, supra note 31, at 604 (contending that the rulemakers’ primary “job was to 
craft a cleaner, more flexible rule that better reflected how some courts had begun to use the class 
action device”); David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the 
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702-08 (2011) (describing the centrality of facilitating 
desegregation cases to the drafters of the Rule 23 amendments). 
229 See Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 2, at 9-15 (quoting the Frank–Kaplan 
correspondence about their concern that the class action not be used for mass tort claims); see also John P. 
Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions (“There was great concern that in 
mass torts perhaps there should be no class actions at all.”), in 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 264, 268 (1997). 
230 See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 498 (1969) 
(arguing that making each individual plaintiff meet the amount in controversy was “inapposite to 
the new Rule [23]”). 
231 See Co-Ordinating Comm. for Multiple Litig., Bulletin No. 20 to the Judges Before Whom 
Electrical Equipment Anti-trust Cases Are Pending 2 (Nov. 27, 1963) [hereinafter Bulletin No. 20] 
(on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 8, Folder 19) (discussing the continued need for 
“solutions” outside of the Rule 23 amendments). 
232 Id. 
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going to say where the cases should go?”233 Becker and the Committee 
concluded that it was necessary to “[c]reate a new package for multiple 
litigation.”234 
Kaplan and Sacks’ reflections of the meeting, memorialized in a December 
2, 1963 memorandum to the Rules Committee, are consistent with those of the 
Coordinating Committee. Regarding the meeting, the memo notes the 
Coordinating Committee’s conviction that “multiple litigation—perhaps not 
often of the scale of these anti-trust cases, but nevertheless of a sizable 
character—will henceforth be a staple item appearing with increasing frequency 
on the Federal court calendars.”235 The memo also describes the attendees’ 
consensus that district judges must have significant flexibility in handling large 
litigations, stating, “[I]t would be unwise to introduce stiff rules excluding 
judicial discretion. On the contrary, a good deal of play in the joints is 
imperatively required.”236 
More generally, the memo states, “The judges were quite aware of the 
problem that has given us concern, namely, that of allowing the individual 
litigants a fair amount of freedom while at the same time not undercutting 
the values (which in part accrue to the individuals) of efficient unitary 
adjudication.”237 Along those lines, when consulted about the Rules 
Committee’s debate over whether to allow individuals to opt out of a class 
action, the Coordinating Committee judges expressed that opt-out “should 
not be allowed simply on the say-so of the individual member of the class. 
The interest of the individual in litigating as he pleased may be strong, but it 
should not be considered absolute.”238 
The following day, November 18, 1963, the Coordinating Committee met 
with all of the judges before whom electrical-equipment cases were pending, 
with Kaplan again in attendance.239 At the meeting, Judge George Boldt of 
Seattle, a Committee member, expressed the urgent need to create permanent 
legislation to handle multidistrict cases due to the growing resistance of 
 
233 Co-Ordinating Comm. for Multiple Litig., Minutes of Meeting of Co-Ordinating 
Committee Held on Sunday, November 17, 1963, at 3:00 PM, at 2 (Nov. 17, 1963, 3:00 PM) (statement 
of William H. Becker, J., U.S. Dist. Court for the W.D. Mo.) (emphasis in original) (on file at 
Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 10, Folder 23). The notes also reflect that the Committee’s work 
went beyond antitrust and included “[d]isaster (cases)” and “[p]roducts [l]iability” cases as well. Id. 
at 1 (statement of Edwin A. Robson, J., U.S. Dist. Court for the N.D. Ill.). 
234 Id. at 2. 
235 Memorandum to the Chairman & Members of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 4 (Dec. 
2, 1963), microformed on CIS No. CI-7104 (Cong. Info Serv.) [hereinafter Memorandum to the 
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules]. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 6. 
239 See Bulletin No. 20, supra note 231, at 2. 
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defense lawyers and judges to the Committee’s actions in the electrical cases. 
Boldt emphasized, and the attending judges agreed, that “[c]ooperation in 
[the] future cannot be expected,” and that such coordination “[c]an’t be left 
to voluntary good will.”240 As the memos of both the Coordinating 
Committee and Kaplan and Sacks demonstrate, all parties left the November 
1963 meetings in agreement that the class action amendments were not 
intended for mass-tort litigation and that a multidistrict litigation statute 
would be necessary to provide for centralized management of widespread tort 
cases.241 Indeed, it was this meeting with the Coordinating Committee that 
prompted Kaplan to add the “superiority” requirement to Rule 23(b)(3), on 
the ground that in most mass-tort cases, MDL should be considered as an 
alternative to the class action.242 This view was also eventually expressed in 
the Rule 23 advisory committee notes.243 
By March 1964, with the electrical-equipment cases proceeding apace, the 
Judicial Conference again affirmed its support for the Coordinating 
Committee’s efforts at reform.244 So Neal, Goldberg, and Judge Becker picked 
up where the November 1963 meeting left off: beginning in earnest to develop 
a proposal intended to apply broadly to all litigation pending in multiple 
districts, including “[c]ontract, fraud, negligence, antitrust and civil rights” 
as well as “[p]roducts liability cases with absolute liability.”245 
 
240 Co-Ordinating Comm. on Multiple Litig., Minutes of Meeting of Co-Ordinating Committee 
Held on Monday, November 18, 1963, at 9:30 A.M. at 4 (Nov. 18, 1963) [hereinafter Co-Ordinating 
Comm. Nov. 18, 1963 Meeting Minutes] (statement of George H. Boldt, J., U.S. Dist. Court for the 
W. Dist. of Wash.) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 17, Folder 39). 
241 See Bulletin No. 20, supra note 231, at 1-2 (reporting that the judges had met with Kaplan and 
Sacks and “[t]he consensus was that the proposed rule change would be most beneficial for resolving 
. . . ambiguities of class actions, but that a general solution of the problems posed by multiple litigation 
w[ould] require more comprehensive treatment”); see also Memorandum to the Advisory Comm. on 
Civil Rules, supra note 235, at 5. See generally Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: 
MDL’s Roots As A Class Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
242 See Memorandum to the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, supra note 235, at 6 (“The 
discussion with the judges showed the wisdom of stressing the need for considering alternative 
procedures, and in this connection it will be advisable to refer in the Note to the increasing and 
developing experience with devices other than the class action for managing multiple litigation.”). 
243 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes on the 1966 Amendment (noting that 
“[a] ‘mass accident’ . . . is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action” and that “[c]urrently the 
Coordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation . . . is charged with developing methods for 
expediting such massive litigation”). 
244 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 42-43 (Mar. 16-17, 1964) (resolving that the 
Committee “develop . . . general principles and guidelines for use in other multiple litigation, 
including any recommendations for statutory change” and “any desirable rules of procedure for 
multiple litigation”). 
245 Outline of Alternatives for Processing Multiple Litigation 3 (May 19, 1964) (on file at 
Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 17, Folder 39). Among the alternatives they considered were 
complete transfer and consolidation under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “limited transfer for discovery (other 
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In June, Becker presented the group’s progress to the Coordinating 
Committee in New York, explaining that creating a panel to order partial 
transfer for pretrial proceedings was the “maximum practical objective that is 
attainable.”246 More aggressive consolidation alternatives, such as complete 
transfer through trial, would attract resistance from the Bar due to the 
“propriet[ar]y notion of their cases.”247 Becker, emphasized however, that 
although transfer would be limited to pretrial proceedings, “the procedure 
should invest the transferee Judge, Judges, or Court with plenary pre-trial 
powers, including among other things, powers to render summary judgments, 
to invoke sanctions for violation of pre-trial orders and other pre-trial powers 
ordinarily reposed in the District Court.”248 
Becker also added that even though he thought “[a] substantial case could 
be made for rule making authority on the theory that venue is procedural,” he 
believed that the reform must be accomplished through legislation in order to 
eliminate doubts under the Rules Enabling Act.249 Because venue had typically 
been a subject of legislation, Becker believed “no chance should be taken here 
if it can be avoided.”250 Nevertheless, Becker recognized the challenge of 
obtaining congressional approval, so he suggested that “a minimum amount of 
legislation be sought and that the rule making power be employed to the 
maximum” in order to “allow greater flexibility for amendment and supplement 
of the procedures.”251 In sum, Becker argued that Congress must authorize 
pretrial transfer but that the Rules Committee should be in charge of drafting 
 
aspects of pre-trial),” voluntary coordination of judges involved in multiple litigation, and expanded 
use of class actions. See id. at 3-5 (discussing these alternatives). 
246 William H. Becker, Proposal for Legislation and Rules for Multiple Litigation 1 (June 3, 
1964) [hereinafter Becker Proposal] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 1, Folder 1). 
247 Co-Ordinating Comm. on Multiple Litig., Minutes of the Co-Ordinating Committee in the 
United States Courthouse in New York City 8 (June 5, 1964, 2:00 PM) [hereinafter Co-Ordinating 
Comm. June 5, 1964 Meeting Minutes] (on file at Becker Chronological Files, supra note 33, Box 1, 
Folder 1). Although the text of the minutes uses the word “propriety,” I believe this is a typo and 
that the intended language is “proprietary.” Aside from the observation that “propriety” makes no 
sense here, use of the word “proprietary” would be consistent with reservations about the transfer 
proposal expressed at the November 18, 1963 New York meeting of the judges involved in the 
electrical-equipment cases with the Coordinating Committee and Professors Kaplan and Sacks. See 
Co-Ordinating Comm. Nov. 18, 1963 Meeting Minutes, supra note 240. In discussing the possibility 
of formalizing change of venue in multiple litigation, Chief Judge Roy W. Harper of the Eastern 
District of Missouri expressed concern that local bars would oppose any such reform for fear of 
losing control over their cases in a national litigation. See id. at 4 (“Venue will be fought by [the] 
practicing Bar.”). 
248 Becker Proposal, supra note 246, at 1. 
249 Id. at 2. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 1. 
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rules to provide standards for when such transfer would be appropriate and 
procedures for conducting the litigation following the transfer.252 
The Committee was receptive to Becker’s suggestions and agreed to a set 
of “general objectives,” including creating “a panel to manage and transfer 
multiple litigation” named by the Chief Justice and that “the proposal should 
require a minimum of legislation and employ the rule making power to the 
maximum.”253 Judge Becker was enthusiastic, even though he recognized the 
political limitations to the statute’s aims, noting that the Committee “felt that it 
was desirable from a practical standpoint to return the cases to the jurisdiction 
in which they arose for local discovery and for trial. One reason for this is to 
allay massive resistance to the new legislation and new rules.”254 
B. Drafting the New Statute 
With the Committee’s endorsement of the pretrial-transfer concept in 
hand, Judges Becker and Robson, Dean Neal, and Perry Goldberg met in 
Chicago to begin drafting the new statute on June 24, 1964.255 All four 
concurred with the Committee’s view that the authorization of pretrial 
transfer must be accomplished by statute rather than amendment of the 
Federal Rules.256 The first draft of the statute reflects the outline agreed to in 
New York, including the plan to provide for most details through subsequent 
rulemaking.257 Indeed, the initial draft delegates to the Supreme Court, 
through the process created by the Rules Enabling Act, 
the power to prescribe, by general rules . . . the method and criteria by which 
the determination to transfer shall be made, the district to which the actions 
shall be transferred, the District Judges who shall conduct pre-trial proceedings 
 
252 See id. at 2-3 (discussing the need to seek “statutory authority for the transfer” but also for 
a statute that “delegated rule making power”). 
253 Co-Ordinating Comm. June 5, 1964 Meeting Minutes, supra note 247, at 9. 
254 Letter from William H. Becker, Judge, W. Dist. of Mo., to Albert B. Maris, Senior Judge, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 3 (June 15, 1964) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 
33, Box 16, Folder 14). 
255 See Letter from William H. Becker, Judge, W. Dist. of Mo., to Alfred P. Murrah, Chief 
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 1 (June 26, 1964) (on file at Becker Papers, supra 
note 33, Box 16, Folder 4) (“On Wednesday, June 24, 1964, Judge Robson, Dean Neal, Perry 
Goldberg, and I met in Chicago . . . .”). 
256 See id. (“All of us agreed that adequate procedures for the identification of multiple 
litigation, and the management of pre-trial procedures therein, could not be provided by amendment 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure under existing rule-making powers.”). 
257 See generally Co-Ordinating Comm. on Multiple Litig., Draft of § 1401. Change of Venue 1 
(June 25, 1964) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 16, Folder 1). 
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therein, and the places where pre-trial proceedings shall be conducted, and the 
practice and procedure in such actions following transfer.258 
Becker, Neal, and Goldberg continually revised the proposal throughout 
the summer of 1964.259 Many of the specifics of the statute we are now 
familiar with began to take shape during this period. For instance, a draft of 
a proposed rule to be promulgated under the statute includes a provision for 
a “standing Panel on Multi-District Litigation” appointed by the Chief 
Justice, as well as for transfer to any district for “consolidated pre-trial 
proceedings” where “common elements may be present in the actions.”260 
C. Obtaining Judicial Conference Approval 
Judges Becker, Boldt, Estes, and Murrah, as well as Dean Neal, Perry 
Goldberg, and Mr. Cooper met to consider the proposed draft in Chicago on 
July 28, 1964, with the intention of presenting the proposal to the Judicial 
Conference at its upcoming August meeting.261 All of the judges recognized 
the importance of Judicial Conference approval. By the 1960s, Chief Justice 
Warren had realized Taft’s vision of using the Conference as a major driver 
of the courts’ Congressional agenda.262 If they could secure approval from the 
Judicial Conference, the judges on the Committee could then set their sights 
on Congress. But without such approval there would be virtually no hope of 
getting Congressional attention, since the legislation would be seen as a pet 
project of a few judges rather than the position of the judiciary as a whole.263 
 
258 Id. 
259 See, e.g., Draft Rule on Multi-District Litigation (July 16, 1964) (on file at Becker Papers, 
supra note 33, Box 16, Divider 1, File 3). 
260 Id. at 1-2. 
261 See Co-Ordinating Comm. on Multiple Litig., Meeting of Co-Ordinating Committee 
Judges in Chicago, July 28, 1964, at 1, 4 (July 28, 1964) [hereinafter Co-Ordinating Comm. July 28, 
1964 Meeting Minutes] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 8, Folder 19) (listing the 
meeting’s attendees and noting their decision to have “Chief Judge Murrah . . . attempt to take the 
proposal straight to the top . . . at [the Committee on Revision of the Laws’s] meeting in August”). 
Although Murrah noted “the difficulties and delay involved with securing legislative passage,” the 
judges again agreed that “such a provision must take the form of legislation. Historically, venue is a 
statutory field.” Id. Becker’s notes provide additional color. In response to Murrah’s concerns about 
opposition to the legislation, Becker quotes himself as saying, “‘Venue is a substantial right’ – not for the 
rules.” William H. Becker, Handwritten Notes on Meeting of Co-Ordinating Committee Judges in 
Chicago, July 28, 1964, at 1 (July 28, 1964) [hereinafter Becker Notes on July 18, 1964 Meeting] (on file at 
Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 8, Folder 19). 
262 See FISH, supra note 93, at 301 (explaining that “congressional committee chairmen looked 
to the Conference . . . for authoritative pronouncements of the judiciary’s legislative program”); see 
also Judith Resnik, Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
657, 666 (1999) (“Through the Judicial Conference, the judiciary can make policy.”). 
263 See FISH, supra note 93, at 304 (describing the huge importance of obtaining Conference 
approval). 
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Approval by the Conference would give the bill the imprimatur of the federal 
judiciary and would also invite the assistance of the legislative liaisons at the 
Administrative Office.264 
The judges wanted to proceed as quickly as possible partly because, as 
noted above, the Committee was accepting requests by other judges to 
coordinate litigations other than the electrical cases, but had no explicit 
authorization—or resources—to do so.265 The judges also understood that due 
to the negative reaction to their activities by defense counsel in the electrical 
cases and the increasingly skeptical reaction of some recalcitrant district judges, 
voluntary coordination would likely not be feasible in future multidistrict 
litigations.266 As a result, Judge Becker thought it important that the group 
sidestep the lengthy process of presenting its draft for revisions by the Civil 
Rules Committee, which could take years and would also leave their statute 
vulnerable to revision by other judges.267 Yet this presented a problem. Given 
its similarity to the large package of joinder provisions that had recently been 
produced by the Rules Committee,268 it is likely that such a proposal would have 
been considered within that Committee’s purview, and an attempt to 
circumvent its consideration might have risked losing the committee’s support. 
Lack of support from such a crucial committee could have generated opposition 
to the proposal in the Judicial Conference.269 
Murrah, the Judicial Conference stalwart since the early 1940s, had the 
answer. Rather than seek approval from the entire Rules Committee, Murrah 
decided to “take the proposal straight to the top” by lobbying the Rules 
Committee’s chairman, Dean Acheson, its Reporter, Benjamin Kaplan, and 
the chairman of both the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure and 
the Committee on Revision of the Laws, Judge Albert Maris of the Third 
Circuit.270 The Coordinating Committee “felt that with the endorsement of 
these three people the provision would stand a good chance of winning 
widespread support.”271 
 
264 See id. at 303-06 (same). 
265 See supra text accompanying notes 198–200. 
266 See Becker Notes on July 18, 1964 Meeting, supra note 261, at 1 (detailing Becker’s view that 
the judges would “never be able to do this again as in antitrust cases”). 
267 See id. (noting Becker’s desire that the group not “have proposal rise through rules 
committee”). 
268 See Charles Alan Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal, and Appellate Procedure, 
31 TENN. L. REV. 417, 436 (1964) (noting that the new (b)(3) provisions “might be appropriate” in 
situations like “the electrical cases which are now so numerous” as well as “airplane crash[es] or 
similar mass tort[s]”). 
269 Cf. FISH, supra note 93, at 265-66, 271-72 (describing the importance of approval of 
legislative proposals by the relevant committees). 
270 Co-Ordinating Comm. July 28, 1964 Meeting Minutes, supra note 261, at 4; see id. (noting that 
Murrah “should attempt to enlist the support of Judge Maris, Professor Kaplan, and Dean Atcheson [sic]”). 
271 Id. 
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At its July meeting the Coordinating Committee also considered “the 
problems that [were] likely to be encountered in seeking passage of this 
legislation” in Congress.272 The major problem the Committee predicted—also 
noted by Judge Becker at the June meeting—was that “great opposition would 
arise from local lawyers fearful that all their business [was] about to be seized 
by the city attorneys.”273 The judges’ proposed solution was to mollify lawyers 
by emphasizing the statute’s modesty in a “note . . . drafted to accompany the 
proposal” that would “stress the fact that transfer is only for pre-trial purposes.”274 
The judges also noted other potential “strategic weapons” they could deploy in 
support of the proposal, including “some sympathetic members of the Bar” 
and “some recorded testimony by members of the Bar praising the work done 
in the electrical equipment cases.”275 
Murrah presented the draft to the Pretrial Committee as a whole at its 
August 1964 meeting on Cape Cod, where the draft was approved in principle 
for presentation to the Judicial Conference.276 
On behalf of the Pretrial Committee, Judge Murrah presented the 
proposed statute to the Judicial Conference at its September 1964 meeting.277 
The explanatory commentary drafted by Judge Becker and Dean Neal 
accompanied the statute.278 The commentary is consistent with the strategy 
devised by the judges in Chicago; at numerous points, it emphasizes the statute’s 
purportedly modest aims279—in particular that the transfer would be for pretrial 
proceedings only and not trial and that the statute would not be self-executing; 
that is, it “would not require that any case be transferred for pre-trial purposes 
unless the Supreme Court exercises the power to prescribe general rules for such 
transfers.”280 Despite its supposed modesty, the comment is not shy about its 
“major innovation”: “the technique of transferring related cases to a single 
 
272 Id. at 5. 
273 Id. at 6. 
274 Id. (emphasis in original). 
275 Id. 
276 See Letter from Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
to Joe E. Estes, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Tex.; George H. Boldt, Judge, U.S. 
Dist. Court. for the W. Dist. of Wash. & William H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. 
of Mo. 1 (Aug. 10, 1964) (on file at Becker Chronological Files, supra note 33, Box 1, Folder 6) (noting 
“that it would be propitious for us to discuss this matter in connection with the meeting of the National 
Pre-Trial Committee, to be held . . . at . . . Harwich Port (Cape Cod)”). 
277 See generally Proposed Amendment to Title 28, U.S.C. § 1404 (Sept. 2, 1964) (on file at 
Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 9, Folder 22, Divider 3) (detailing the Committee’s proposal). 
278 See id. 
279 See, e.g., id. at 26-27 (“The Statute does not change the existing methods of joint treatment 
and explicitly leaves untouched ‘the power to transfer for any or all purposes under any other 
statutory provision or rule.’”). 
280 Id. at 29. 
2017] “A Radical Proposal” 875 
district solely for pre-trial purposes.”281 The note explains that such a provision 
was necessary because the general transfer provisions, Sections 1404(a) and 
1406(a), only provided for transfer to a district where the case might otherwise 
have been brought—significantly limiting the possibility of transferring all 
related cases to a single district (if jurisdiction or venue would not lie against 
the defendant in that district).282 Murrah successfully convinced the Judicial 
Conference to “approve[] the amendment in principle,”283 but to delay 
submission of the proposal to Congress.284 
D. Rebuffing the Defense Bar 
After receiving the Judicial Conference’s partial approval, the draft was 
circulated to all district judges handling the electrical-equipment litigation in 
Chicago on October 2, where “[t]here was unanimous consent that the Co-
Ordinating Committee continue its work on the legislative proposal along the 
form outlined.”285 At this meeting, Judge Alfonso Zirpoli of the Northern 
District of California reaffirmed that “the feature of return of the cases for 
trial where filed is important in getting support from the Bar.”286 
The following day, the judges held a hearing with lawyers in the electrical-
equipment cases, to whom they presented the draft statute and from whom 
the judges sought input.287 At the hearing, Robson asked that the plaintiffs and 
defendants name representatives who could survey lawyers on their respective 
sides for their views on the proposal.288 Charles Bane, the lawyer representing 
Commonwealth Edison in the Northern District of Illinois, responded that he, 
William Ferguson of Seattle, and Harold Kohn of Philadelphia would represent 
the plaintiffs.289 On behalf of the defendants, Steven E. Keane of Milwaukee 
 
281 Id. at 27. 
282 See id. at 28 (describing the limited flexibility of the then-existing transfer provisions). 
283 Memorandum from Meeting of All the Judges Before Whom Electrical Equipment 
Antitrust Cases Are Pending 18 (Oct. 2, 1964, 9:30 AM) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 
9, Folder 22). 
284 See id. (“Chief Judge Murrah will work with Chief Judge Maris on the form of the 
legislation and on having it sponsored in Congress.”). 
285 Id. at 18. 
286 Id. at 19. 
287 See id. at 19 (“[C]opies of the proposed amendment would be distributed to the lawyers at 
the hearing on October 3 . . . .”). 
288 See Letter from Steven E. Keane, Partner, Foley, Sammond & Lardner, to Edwin A. 
Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill. 1 (Oct. 19, 1964) [hereinafter Defendants 
Committee Letter] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 16, Folder 4) (responding to Robson’s 
“request that three representatives each of counsel for the plaintiffs and for the defendants in the 
pending electrical equipment cases be designated to serve on a committee in connection with the 
proposed amendment of Section 1404”). 
289 See Letter from Charles A. Bane, Att’y, Isham, Lincoln & Beale, to Edwin A. Robson, 
Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill. 1 (Oct. 9, 1964) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 
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responded that he, Ralph L. McAfee of New York, and Edward W. Mullinix of 
Philadelphia would represent the defendants.290 
On behalf of defense counsel, Keane refused to provide any comment on 
the proposal, explaining that “[t]here is, however, substantial unanimity of 
opinion that it may well be regarded as inappropriate for a committee 
composed only of counsel actively engaged in the pending litigation to serve 
the purposes you have in mind.”291 He added, “[S]ince the scope of the 
proposed legislation extends far beyond the area encompassed by the electrical 
equipment cases and is of such great importance to the overall administration 
of justice, it seems to us that your Committee of Judges would want to obtain 
the views of the Bar generally.”292 Keane also offered, “Many of the lawyers 
who have been actively engaged in the electrical equipment litigation are 
giving thoughtful consideration to the proposed legislation, and we are 
certain they will be prepared to present their individual views to any 
appropriate committee of the Bar.”293 
Judges Robson and Becker did not appreciate this suggestion. In their 
view, the defendants sought only to delay and eventually thwart the 
legislation. The last thing the judges wanted was for the electrical-equipment 
defense lawyers, who by then had expressed that they felt bullied by the 
national program,294 to present their proposal to the Bar at large. In a letter 
to Becker, Robson plainly stated, “It is apparent that defendants wish to kick 
the ball around . . . .”295 He added, “In my opinion certainly some of the 
defendants, if not a substantial number of them, are trying to do all they can 
to block this amendment.”296 
Judge Becker responded, expressing his own skepticism about the 
defendants’ motives, 
Underlying the action of some of the defendants’ counsel throughout this 
litigation must have been the hope that this electrical equipment antitrust 
litigation would overwhelm the Courts and demonstrate the unworkability of 
the antitrust laws allowing treble damage recoveries in civil suits. 
 
33, Box 16, Folder 4) (nominating himself, Ferguson, and Kohn “to constitute the committee of three 
plaintiffs’ counsel”). 
290 See Defendants Committee Letter, supra note 288, at 1 (writing to inform Judge Robson of 
the three men’s nominations to represent the defendants). 
291 Id. 
292 Id. at 1-2. 
293 Id. at 2. 
294 See supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text. 
295 Letter from Edwin A. Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill., to William 
H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo. 1 (Oct. 21, 1964) (on file at Becker Papers, 
supra note 33, Box 16, Folder 4, File 2). 
296 Id. 
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Every measure proposed which would make multiple civil antitrust 
litigation manageable, impairs that hope. Yet we must deal with the 
defendants’ counsel who are inspired by this hope.297 
Soon thereafter, Robson wrote to Murrah reaffirming his concerns that 
the defendants would attempt to block the bill. Referring to the “committee” 
of lawyers invited to comment, Robson noted, 
We, of course, have to keep in mind the problem presented primarily by the 
defendants in that they are not overly enthusiastic about this proposed 
legislation . . . . I think a meeting should be held with the respective members 
of the committee to ascertain their attitude, and determine then whether to 
enlarge the committee, place others in it, or thank them and just forget about 
their assistance.298 
Such a meeting was scheduled. The attorneys for each side submitted 
memoranda in advance containing remarks on the proposed statute. The 
plaintiffs expressed “general, but not unanimous, support for enactment of 
the basic provisions in the Proposed Amendment.”299 The defendants, on the 
other hand, did not offer specific feedback.300 Rather, they reaffirmed their 
view that the legislation should be presented to the entire American Bar 
Association for reactions from lawyers across a wide range of fields.301 On 
November 13, Becker and Robson met with these lawyers in Washington.302 At 
the outset, though, the judges explained “that the purpose of this meeting was 
not to obtain [counsels’] endorsement for the proposal, but to receive and 
 
297 Letter from William H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., to Edwin 
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at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 7, Folder 18, Divider 1). 
299 Letter from Charles A. Bane, Att’y; William H. Ferguson, Att’y & Harold E. Kohn, Att’y, 
to William H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo.; George H. Bolt, Judge, U.S. 
Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Wash. & Edwin A. Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. 
of Ill. 1 (Nov. 11, 1964) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 16, Folder 3, File 13). 
300 See Letter from Steven E. Keane, Att’y, Foley, Sammond & Lardner, to Edwin A. Robson, 
Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill. 2 (Nov. 6, 1964) [hereinafter Keane–Robson Nov. 6, 
1964 Letter] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 16, Folder 3) (reporting that due to “the 
divergent opinions” of defense attorneys, Keane, McAfee, and Mullinix were “not authorized to, and 
indeed could not accurately, represent the views of counsel with whom we are associated in the 
defense of the electrical litigation”). 
301 See id. at 1-2 (reaffirming their position “that views of the Bar generally should be sought” 
by the judges). 
302 See generally Summary of Meetings Held in Washington, D.C., November 13 and 14, 1964 
Re: Proposed Amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (Nov. 13-14, 1964) [hereinafter D.C. Meetings Re: 
Proposed Amendment] (on file at Neal Papers, supra note 34, Box 7, Folder on C.O.C. Documents) 
(recounting the attendees and topics of discussion at the meetings). 
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discuss their suggestions on and criticisms of the draft.”303 The defense lawyers 
again urged submission of the proposed statute to relevant members of the Bar 
Association.304 It was made clear that this would not be in the offing because of 
“the length of time required for meaningful study by an outside group, 
reference to a Bar committee would be inappropriate and would unduly delay 
implementation.”305 Perhaps accurately perceiving the direction of the wind, 
the plaintiffs expressed strong support for the proposed statute.306 Their main 
concern related to whether the choice-of-law rules of the transferor forum 
would apply in diversity cases once transferred into the MDL court.307 
In any event, the next day, Judges Robson, Becker, and Boldt, along with 
Dean Neal, held a meeting with Judge Maris to seek his crucial support.308 
At that meeting, Becker explained that there was an “[e]xtreme need for 
central management” in multidistrict cases and that the proposed statute was 
an “[a]lternative to [a] radical forum non conveniens statute” providing for 
complete transfer.309 Maris expressed skepticism as to whether the statute was 
necessary in light of the successful cooperation achieved in the electrical 
cases.310 Becker responded that voluntary cooperation would not be effective 
because “[l]itigants would run cases” in direct opposition to the kind of 
centralized judicial control that was necessary.311 Further, Becker argued that 
the transferee judge needed to have the power to grant summary judgment 
 
303 Id. at 1. 
304 See id. at 1-2 (reporting that “the meeting of defense counsel . . . had concluded that . . . reference 
to a Bar committee consisting of practitioners from relevant areas of law would be more appropriate”). 
305 Id. at 2-3. 
306 See id. at 2 (“Messrs. Bane, Kohn and Ferguson reported that plaintiffs’ counsel generally 
favored the proposal.”). 
307 See id. (reporting the plaintiffs committee’s suggestion that “further study be undertaken 
of the proposal’s effects in diversity cases”). For discussion of the myriad choice-of-law problems 
created by MDL, see generally Bradt, supra note 11, discussing why “MDL is a much better fit with 
choice of law” as compared to other aggregation methods. See also Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among 
Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 680-82 (1984) (arguing that 
“section 1401(a) created a new species of choice-of-law problem in diversity cases”). Judge Becker 
eventually adopted the plaintiff lawyers’ preferred view, contending that transferred cases would be 
governed by the law of the transferor court under the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack. See Co-Ordinating 
Comm. on Multiple Litig., Meeting of the Co-Ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation, at 
New Orleans, February 7, 1965, at 2-3 (Feb. 7, 1965) [hereinafter Co-Ordinating Comm. Feb. 7, 1965 
Meeting Minutes] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 9, Folder 21) (reporting that Becker 
“pointed out” to the group that Van Dusen would apply in MDL cases). 
308 See generally Minutes of Meeting Held at Washington D.C., Saturday Morning, November 
14, 1964, at 1-4 (Nov. 14, 1964) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 8, Folder 19, Divider 3) 
(listing the attendees of the meeting and recounting their discussion). 
309 Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). 
310 See id. (recounting that Judge Maris asked whether “temporary venue change” could just 
“be done by rule”). 
311 Id. 
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and award sanctions in order for the statute to work effectively.312 Maris 
expressed tentative support for the concept of pretrial transfer,313 and 
everyone involved agreed to meet again.314 
Maris’s support, however, cooled the following month, apparently due to 
comments by defense counsel in the electrical-equipment cases. After the 
November meeting in Washington, defense lawyer John Collins sent the judges 
a memorandum criticizing the statute.315 Abandoning the strategy of refusing 
to comment, the defendants issued a series of objections.316 In essence, they 
argued that litigation on the scale of the electrical-equipment cases would be 
a “rare occurrence” and that adoption of a statute based on experience in the 
electrical cases would be premature.317 The defendants also contended that 
the successful cooperation of judges in the electrical cases demonstrated that 
a transfer statute was unnecessary.318 Beyond these general objections, the 
defendants raised numerous other concerns, mostly regarding the vagueness 
of the concepts of pretrial proceedings and related litigation concepts.319 
Maris seemed to find the critique persuasive. In a letter to Murrah, he 
remarked that he was “much impressed by the points made in the memoranda” 
and endorsed the wait-and-see approach of the defendants.320 Maris added that 
he viewed transfer authority as unnecessary, and that “[f]urther experience 
along these lines may give us much more light on the shape permanent 
procedural provisions should take.”321 
Murrah reacted with apparent alarm. Noting that he thought Maris had 
agreed with the need for legislation in November, Murrah worried that now 
Maris “would not favor any statutory authority to prescribe by general rules the 
 
312 See id. (emphasizing the need for “[s]ummary judgements,” “‘partial’-sanctions,” and 
“discovery denials”). 
313 See id. at 1-2 (showing Maris’s shift over the course of the meeting from questioning the need 
for a new statute to his proposal of potential provisions to be included in the statute). 
314 See D.C. Meetings Re: Proposed Amendment, supra note 302, at 4 (“The discussions concluded 
with the decision to re-evaluate the proposal and to meet again . . . .”). 
315 See Letter from John R. Collins, Att’y, Foley, Sammond & Lardner, to Edwin A. Robson, 
Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill. 3-5 (Dec. 7, 1964) (on file at Neal Papers, supra note 34, 
Box 4, Folder XYZ) (listing concerns about the proposed amendments held by the committee of counsel 
representing the electrical litigation defendants). Collins took over communications from Steven Keane 
after Keane “became seriously ill and was hospitalized with a hemorrhaging ulcer.” Id. at 1. 
316 See id. at 3-5 (listing the committee’s objections and concerns about the proposed amendment). 
317 Id. at 3; see also id. (adding that “[t]here may be an advantage in adopting ad hoc procedures 
for each of the few times when national discovery and pretrial procedures are called for, rather than 
trying to anticipate all of the problems that might arise and cover them by so-called general rules”). 
318 Id. 
319 Id. 
320 Letter from Albert B. Maris, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to Alfred 
Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 1 (Dec. 15, 1964) (on file at Neal 
Papers, supra note 34, Box 4, Folder XYZ). 
321 Id. at 2. 
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method and criteria for transferring multiple district litigation for the sole 
purpose of pretrial.”322 Murrah added, “If this is your view, I would beg you to 
grant us a rehearing . . . .”323 Murrah also cast aspersions on the motivations of 
defense counsel, echoing the observations of Robson and Becker earlier in the 
summer, contending that “[t]he memorandum submitted by certain lawyers in 
the so-called electrical equipment cases is admittedly colored by their 
experience in these cases which, as we know, has not been to their liking. They 
frankly admit their inability to be entirely objective in their approach to this 
problem.”324 Murrah continued, “[T]he judges who have had the responsibility 
of these cases are in a position to be objective. They want nothing more than a 
codification of the procedures which have been followed in the cases.”325 
Maris responded with skepticism, adhering to the view that specific rules 
promulgated by the Rules Committee for multiple litigation would be too 
rigid.326 Instead, he preferred ad hoc consideration by the Judicial Conference 
to cases as they arose.327 But Maris promised that he was “keeping [his] mind 
completely open on the subject of the legislation” and that he would “await a 
copy of the redraft with interest.”328  
Returning to the drawing board in November 1964, Becker and Neal 
developed an ironic solution to Maris’s opposition: they eliminated the 
provision for implementing rules governing procedure in multidistrict 
litigation enacted through the Enabling Act process altogether.329 They 
excised the part of the statute providing for any such rules to be drafted by 
the Rules Committee and approved by the Supreme Court. By that point, 
there had developed among the drafters “considerable sentiment for 
eliminating or short-cutting these steps where possible” due to the “undesired 
possible or probable result that lengthy steps will be required before the 
Court will approve any procedural changes.”330 As the judges noted, such 
 
322 Letter from Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, to 
Albert B. Maris, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1 (Dec. 24, 1964) (on file at Neal 
Papers, supra note 34, Box 4, Folder XYZ). 
323 Id. 
324 Id. at 1-2. 
325 Id. at 2. 
326 See Letter from Albert B. Maris, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to 
Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 1 (Dec. 29, 1964) (on 
file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34) (expressing Maris’s concern that “it should be 
possible to formulate the necessary legislation in broad general terms” to maintain flexibility). 
327 See id. (noting Maris’s desire for “the Judicial Conference [to have] full power to make 
necessary and appropriate provisions” on a case-by-case basis). 
328 Id. 
329 See Perry Goldberg, Two Suggestions on the Draft Venue Statute 1 (Nov. 10, 1964) (on file 
at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 16, Folder 1) (“[T]he draft does not provide for any particular 
rule-making procedures . . . .”). 
330 Id. at 1-2. 
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rulemaking “would require lengthy consideration and review by the standing 
Committee on Federal Rules of Procedure and its Sub-Committee on Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to be followed subsequently by further consideration 
and/or review in the Supreme Court and the Congress.”331 Maris, through his 
skepticism of implementing rules, had sparked the idea to cut the Rules 
Committee out of the implementation of MDL entirely. 
To accomplish this, the drafters made three changes to the statute: they (1) 
added language providing the standard for when cases should be transferred 
for coordinated for pretrial proceedings,332 (2) provided for creation of the 
Panel and its appointment by the Chief Justice,333 and (3) eliminated the 
provision for Supreme Court rulemaking, instead allowing the newly created 
Panel to promulgate its own rules of procedure governing transfer.334 Not only 
would these changes “shortcut” the need for follow-on rulemaking for the 
statute to be implemented, they would assuage Maris’s concerns about rigidly 
codifying one-size-fits-all procedure in all kinds of multidistrict litigation 
through rules drafted by the Rules Committee. This assured the drafters both 
an easier route to Maris’s approval of the statute and less future interference 
with its eventual implementation. The new statute would therefore retain 
maximum future flexibility and ensure control by the new Judicial Panel, to 
which Warren would presumably appoint Becker and Robson. From this 
point forward, all drafts eschew the rulemaking provisions and provide only 
for consolidated pretrial proceedings.335 
The Coordinating Committee next met in New Orleans in February 1965 
to consider this new draft.336 At the meeting, in response to a request by Judge 
Roszel Thomsen for clarification of the powers granted to the transferee 
judge,337 Judge Becker emphasized that the judge assigned by the panel 
would, “while assigned,” have responsibility over “all matters.”338 For the most 
 
331 Id. at 1. 
332 See Co-Ordinating Comm. on Multiple Litig., Preliminary Draft of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(e), at 1 
(Jan. 11, 1964) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 16, Folder 1) (providing that “civil actions 
involving a common question of fact . . . may be transferred . . . upon [a] determination that such 
proceedings are required for the just and efficient conduct of such actions”). 
333 See id. at 3 (establishing that the Panel “shall be constituted by the Chief Justice and shall 
consist of seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice, no two 
of whom shall be from the same circuit”). 
334 See id. (“The panel may prescribe rules for the conduct of its business . . . .”). 
335 Both strategies are implicit in a draft report for submission to the Judicial Conference 
highlighting the need for “rapid and flexible procedures.” Co-Ordinating Comm. on Multiple Litig., 
Comment on Proposed Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(e), at 8 (Dec. 28, 1964) (on file at Becker Papers, 
supra note 33, Box 16, Folder 1). 
336 See Co-Ordinating Comm. Feb. 7, 1965 Meeting Minutes, supra note 307. 
337 See id. at 2 (“Judge Thomsen questioned what authority the local judges would have after 
transfer.”). 
338 Id. 
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part, the judges in attendance were in support, although Judge Sylvester 
Ryan, a member of the Committee and the Chief Judge of the Southern 
District of New York, expressed reservations for the first time about how the 
statute would invade the of authority of transferor judges, who would have 
no say in whether their cases would be transferred.339 Nevertheless, the 
drafters presented the draft the following day to Judge Maris, who expressed 
his support for the new version, “observ[ing] that the draft of the proposed 
statute was greatly improved.”340 
The drafters of the statute also agreed that they would meet with Judge 
Ryan in New York in February to discuss his objections.341 Only Becker’s 
handwritten notes from that February meeting survive, but Ryan is reported 
as believing it would “not [be] desirable to set up permanent institutions with 
power to invade [the] jurisdiction of dist[rict] c[our]t.”342 Apparently, as a 
result of this meeting, new language—later referred to as the “Ryan 
Amendment”—was inserted into the bill providing that “no action shall be 
transferred without consent of the District Court in which it is pending.”343 
With Judge Ryan temporarily mollified and Judge Maris’s support secured, 
the Committee submitted this new draft to the Judicial Conference for final 
approval at its next meeting on March 18, 1965.344 The report submitted by the 
Committee (somewhat disingenuously) trumpets its consultation with “judges 
and various representative counsel who have been involved in the electrical 
equipment antitrust cases” and notes its decision to “revise the draft to permit 
for a largely self-implementing statutory procedure.”345 The commentary also 
notes the limited scope of the statute in that it “affects only the pre-trial stages 
in multi-district litigation.”346 Indeed, the limited nature of pretrial transfer 
was framed as an “advantage” over use of the class action device because “each 
 
339 See id. at 1 (proposing “a joint conference of the panel and all the judges before whom 
related cases are pending before determination to transfer”). Ryan was not in attendance; he 
expressed his reservations by letter. Id. 
340 Legislative Comm., Meeting of Legislative Committee at New Orleans, February 9, 1965, 
at 1 (Feb. 9, 1965) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 9, Folder 21). 
341 See id. (noting that “Judges Thomsen, Robson and Becker will consult with Judge Ryan . . . to 
explain the legislative committee’s actions regarding his suggestions”). 
342 William H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., Notes on Thursday 
Meeting 2 (Feb. 18, 1965) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 17, Folder 39). 
343 Proposed Title 28, U.S.C. § 1407, at 1 (Feb. 10, 1965) (on file at Becker Chronological Files, 
supra note 33, Box 2, Folder 8). 
344 See CO-CORDINATING COMM. ON MULTIPLE LITIG., REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATING 
COMM. FOR MULTIPLE LITIG. OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, A SUB-COMMITTEE 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (Mar. 2, 1965) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, 
Box 16, Folder 1) (suggesting that the “proposed § 1407 and the Comment thereon be considered at 
the March 18, 1965 meeting”). 
345 Id. 
346 Id. at 19. 
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action remains as an individual suit with the litigants retaining control over 
their separate interests.”347 As a result, the “[p]roposed § 1407 would maximize 
the litigant’s traditional privileges of selecting where, when and how to enforce 
his substantive rights or assert his defenses while minimizing possible undue 
complexity from multi-party jury trials.”348 With the support of Judge Maris’s 
committee, and with no dissents recorded, the Judicial Conference approved 
the statute for submission to the Congress.349 
The Committee had come a long way in two years: Dean Neal’s “radical 
proposal” had become a draft statute endorsed without dissent by the Judicial 
Conference. Although the judges may have limited the scope of transfer to 
preempt potential political difficulties, they had conceived of legislation that 
for the first time would provide for identification and centralized control of 
multidistrict litigation in the manner of the electrical-equipment cases. 
Moreover, they had achieved the critical support of the Judicial Conference 
without engaging in the lengthy and deliberative process of rulemaking. And 
thus far the judges had avoided any resistance from the plaintiffs’ bar and 
rebuffed the skeptical and aggrieved antitrust defense bar. By the summer of 
1965, the drafters had reason to be optimistic as they turned their attention 
to Congress. But there were storm clouds on the horizon. The defense lawyers 
they had rebuffed were not going to go down without a fight. 
IV. THE BUMPY ROAD TO CONGRESSIONAL PASSAGE 
The Judicial Conference formally communicated the proposed statute to 
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on April 12, 1965.350 Congressman 
Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, subsequently 
introduced the bill, H.R. 8276, in the House on May 19, 1965.351 All seemed to 
be going according to plan.352 At the June 25 meeting of the Coordinating 
 
347 Id. at 20. 
348 Id. at 21. 
349 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES: PROCEEDINGS, MARCH 18-19, 1965, at 12-13 (reporting the introduction 
of the draft bill and that “[u]pon recommendation of the Committee, the Conference approved the 
draft bill submitted by the subcommittee”). 
350 See Letter from William E. Foley, Deputy Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to 
Hubert H. Humphrey, President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 12, 1965) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 
33, Box 15, Folder 34, Divider 4) (providing the draft bill to the President of the Senate); Letter 
from William E. Foley, Deputy Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to John W. McCormack, 
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 12, 1965) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 
15, Folder 34, Divider 4) (providing the draft bill to the Speaker of the House). 
351 See H.R. 8276, 89th Cong. (1st Sess. 1965). 
352 See Letter from Edwin A. Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill., to the Co-
Ordinating Comm. for Multiple Litig. 1-2 (May 26, 1965) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 
15, Folder 34) (expressing enthusiasm over the cooperation of Congress so far). Review of Congressman 
Celler’s papers did not reveal anything of note regarding MDL. 
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Committee in Denver, Judge Robson optimistically “reported that the 
proposed legislation has been introduced into the House and that hearings 
will be conducted before the House Judiciary Committee in July. After 
passage in the House, the bill will be introduced in the Senate where no 
problems are anticipated.”353 This optimism was premature. 
A. Achieving Department of Justice Support 
Any possibility of quick action in the House hit an immediate snag. The 
Judiciary Committee deferred action on the statute until the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) could present its views. This was not necessarily cause for 
worry, as the Congress regularly consulted the DOJ on the Judicial 
Conference’s statutory recommendations, but it did mean that DOJ support 
would be vital.354 Judge Robson, Dean Neal, and Goldberg set up a meeting 
with Donald Turner, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, on August 4, 
1964, to discuss the statute.355 Turner, though, was noncommittal; although he 
expressed general support for the concept, Turner apparently believed that 
actions by the government should be exempt in order to avoid having the 
government’s cases become enmeshed in private actions.356 Neal acknowledged 
Turner’s request but hoped the Department would nevertheless “affirmatively 
support the legislation in principle.”357 Turner, however, was unwilling to offer 
a quick endorsement, citing “the pressure of [the] circumstances” and the need 
to “take some time” to consider the proposal.358 
Radio silence from the DOJ persisted through the fall of 1965.359 
Concerned about the Department’s ability to derail the legislation, the 
 
353 Co-Ordinating Comm. for Multidistrict Litig., Minutes of Meeting of the Co-Ordinating 
Committee 3 (June 25, 1965, 2:00 PM) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 9, Folder 21). 
354 See FISH, supra note 93, at 208 (describing how the Judicial Committee “strove to ameliorate 
conflicts with the Department of Justice” in order to accomplish the Committee’s agenda). 
355 See Letter from Phil C. Neal, Exec. Sec’y, Coordinating Comm. for Multidistrict Litig., to 
Donald F. Turner, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice 1 (Aug. 5, 1965) (on file at 
Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34) (thanking Turner “for the generous amount of time” 
he spent with the men the previous day discussing § 1407). 
356 See id. (“[W]e are hopeful that after further consideration . . . you may see your way to endorsing 
the proposed Section 1407 without the need for a special exclusion in behalf of the United States.”). 
357 Id. 
358 Letter from Donald F. Turner, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice to Phil 
C. Neal, Exec. Sec’y, Co-Ordinating Committee for Multidistrict Litig. 1-2 (Aug. 12, 1965) (on file 
at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Jacket 34, Divider 1). 
359 See Co-Ordinating Comm. for Multidistrict Litig., Minutes of the Meeting of the Co-
Ordinating Committee 1 (Dec. 9, 1965, 2:00 PM) [hereinafter Co-Ordinating Comm. Dec. 9, 1965 
Meeting Minutes] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 9, Folder 21) (“Congressional action 
remains delayed pending the Justice Department’s recommendations. Though repeated efforts have 
been made to determine the Department’s position, no report has been received.”); see also Co-
Ordinating Comm. for Multidistrict Litig., Minutes of Meeting of the Co-Ordinating Committee 1 
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Committee authorized Murrah “to take all necessary steps to secure action by 
the Department.”360 Murrah eventually secured a meeting in Washington with 
Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark late in the evening of December 13,361 
at which Murrah agreed to support an amendment exempting any cases brought 
by the government from the statute’s ambit.362 But Clark also expressed 
confusion about the Ryan Amendment requiring consent to transfer from the 
transferor judge.363 Murrah, who had consented to inclusion of the amendment 
only to mollify Judge Ryan, made clear to Clark that he would not oppose a DOJ 
suggestion that the Ryan Amendment be eliminated from the bill in Congress.364 
Clark apparently took Murrah’s hint and sent a letter to the House 
Judiciary Committee on January 7, 1966, expressing the Department’s 
support for the statute with his two requested amendments.365 In the letter, 
Clark referred to the Ryan Amendment as “superfluous” given the need for 
the Panel to approve the transfers and added that “[r]equiring the consent of 
the transferor district judge would give a veto power and in essence require 
voluntary cooperation of all in order to consolidate discovery proceedings,” 
defeating the purpose of the bill.366 With the amendments, however, Clark 
enthusiastically endorsed the bill on behalf of the Department.367 
Having achieved the DOJ’s support, the Committee began preparations 
to report this development to the Judicial Conference at its upcoming March 
1966 meeting.368 This bothered Judge Ryan, who resisted removal of his veto 
 
(Sept. 29, 1965, 10:00 AM) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 9, Folder 21) (“Judge Robson 
reported that Congressional action on proposed Title 28, U.S.C. § 1407 has been deferred pending 
recommendations from the Justice Department.”). 
360 Co-Ordinating Comm. Dec. 9, 1965 Meeting Minutes, supra note 359, at 1. 
361 See Letter from Alfred Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
to Ramsey Clark, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 16, 1965) (on file at Neal Papers, supra note 
34, Box 4, Folder XYZ) (“It was so typically fine and cooperative of you to see me late Monday evening 
concerning the proposed venue legislation. I am sure we all agree that the legislation is needful.”). 
362 See id. (assuring Clark that “the judges are perfectly willing to except the Government to 
the extent [Clark] deem[ed] advisable and feasible”). 
363 See Letter from Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, to Ramsey Clark, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 27, 1965) (on file at Neal Papers, 
supra note 34, Box 4, Folder XYZ) (responding to Clark regarding the provision requiring consent 
by the transferor court). 
364 See id. (stating that “[t]he Committee ha[d] not taken any position on the suggested 
deletion of the provision” but that “[i]t would be unfortunate, however, if the legislation was so 
restricted to nullify its intended salutary purposes”). 
365 See Letter from Ramsey Clark, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Emanuel Celler, 
Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 7, 1966), reprinted in Judicial Administration: Hearings Before 
Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 27–28 (1966) [hereinafter House Hearings]. 
366 Id. at 28. 
367 See id. (“The Department of Justice favors its enactment but suggests that it be amended 
in two respects.”). 
368 See Letter from Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, to William H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo. 1 (Feb. 15, 1966) (on 
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provision.369 Ryan objected to any endorsement of Clark’s suggested 
amendments in the Coordinating Committee’s report to the Judicial 
Conference, “since it presents but one view which is opposed to the specific 
approval by the Conference and this Committee of legislation which has been 
already introduced.”370 Robson attempted to smooth things over in a subsequent 
letter to the whole Committee, putting the question of the Clark amendments 
to a majority vote.371 As Murrah probably could have predicted, the majority 
overruled Ryan and expressed its support of Clark’s proposed amendments to 
the Judicial Conference, which approved the acceptance of the amendments 
over Judge Ryan’s dissent.372 Moreover, anticipating subsequent congressional 
hearings on the bill, the Committee authorized Robson to designate 
Committee members to appear at any such hearings, and “[o]ver Chief Judge 
Ryan’s objection the designated Judges were authorized to express their 
personal opinions on suggested changes.”373 As a result, the judges appearing 
at any hearings could effectively disown Ryan’s veto provision. 
Despite the approval of the DOJ and the continuing support of the 
Judicial Conference, the bill remained bogged down in the House.374 As the 
summer of 1966 wore on, the judges agreed to lobby the Senate to hold hearings 
on the bill first.375 Becker personally reached out to Senator Edward Long from 
 
file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34, Divider 1) (expressing doubt over the 
advisability of going back to the Judicial Conference with the proposed statute given that the statute 
would later “undergo Congressional scrutiny, and may be further amended there”). 
369 See Letter from Sylvester J. Ryan, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to 
Edwin A. Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill. 1-2 (Feb. 16, 1966) (on file at Neal 
Papers, supra note 34, Box 4, Folder XYZ) (registering his “objections to the draft as presently 
worded” and requesting that his “dissent be recorded as outlined” if the Committee submitted the 
“report as presently worded”). 
370 Id. at 1. 
371 See Letter from Edwin A. Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill., to Co-
Ordinating Comm. for Multiple Litig. 1 (Feb. 21, 1966) [hereinafter Robson–Co-Ordinating Comm. 
Feb. 21, 1966 Letter] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34) (enclosing the letter from 
Ryan and asking the Committee members for their vote on whether or not to delete the provision). 
372 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURT, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 25 (Mar. 10-11, 1966) (approving “the concept of 
the subcommittee’s work . . . including the recommendation of appropriate legislation”); see also Robson–
Co-Ordinating Comm. Feb. 21, 1966 Letter, supra note 371, at 1 (“Judge Robson reported that the . . . 
Report, which had indicated Chief Judge Ryan’s dissent, had been accepted by the Judicial Conference.”). 
373 Coordinating Comm. for Multiple Litig., Minutes of Meeting of the Co-Ordinating 
Committee 2 (Mar. 31, 1966, 2:00 PM) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 9, Folder 21). 
374 See Letter from William E. Foley, Deputy Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Edwin 
A. Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill. 1 (Apr. 12, 1966) (on file at Becker Papers, 
supra note 33, Box 15, File 34, Divider 1) (“I regret that I do not have any worthwhile suggestions as 
to how we can move this any faster unless someone has direct access to the Congressman and can 
urge it on him.”). 
375 See, e.g., Letter from William H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., 
to Edward V. Long, Senator, U.S. Senate 1 (Aug. 1, 1966) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, 
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his home state of Missouri.376 Long responded, agreeing to move things 
forward, but also inquiring about the Ryan Amendment,377 which Becker 
assertively undermined, claiming, “I believe that I can say that practically all of 
the judges who have reviewed this proposed bill would consider the bill to be 
a great advance if it were adopted in the form suggested by the Attorney 
General.”378 With things apparently gaining steam in the Senate, the House 
Judiciary Committee surprised the judges by scheduling a bill hearing on 
August 31, 1966.379 Once again, things appeared to be on track, but the judges’ 
biggest obstacle was developing: the organized opposition of the lawyers they 
had rebuffed in November 1964. 
B. Roadblock: Opposition by the ABA 
The ABA had long been an important ally of the Judicial Conference.380 
Going back to the Taft Era, the Judicial Conference had relied on the ABA as 
an advocate for legislation that would be politically challenging for judges to 
support, such as salary increases or provision for additional judgeships.381 At the 
same time, ABA opposition could be a death knell, even for a proposal supported 
by the Judicial Conference.382 As discussed in Part II, the lawyers in the Antitrust 
Section of the ABA had been full partners in the creation of the Handbook.383 But 
by the time the MDL statute was introduced, relations had cooled—perhaps 
because defendants’ experience with the Handbook’s recommendations in their 
harshest form, as implemented in the electrical-equipment cases, did not turn 
out to be too beneficial.384 
 
Box 15, Folder 34) (“The bill was introduced in the House but has become bogged down in 
Congressman Celler’s committee.”). 
376 See id. at 1-3 (informing Senator Long of the history of and need for the bill). 
377 See Letter from William H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., to 
Edward V. Long, Senator, U.S. Senate 1 (Aug. 12, 1966) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 
15, Folder 34) (responding to Long concerning “both changes” to the bill). 
378 Id.; see also id. (informing Long that only “[o]ne judge on the drafting committee wished 
to give the district court from which the action was transferred a veto power”). 
379 See House Hearings, supra note 365. 
380 See FISH, supra note 93, at 331-32 (noting the ABA’s importance in “congressional enactment 
of measures important to the federal courts”). 
381 See id. at 334-36 (noting that judges “looked to the bar for assistance” on “politically 
sensitive issue[s]”). 
382 See DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 256-57 (1988) (noting 
that opposition from the “organized bar” meant “little chance of legislative success”); see also Baar, 
supra note 96, at 99 (explaining that Congress will refer “[b]ills affecting the administration of the 
courts . . . to the Administrative Office,” giving the Judicial Conference “the role of [a] veto group” 
on any proposed legislation). 
383 See supra subsection II.A. 
384 See supra text accompanying notes 191–96. 
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When the Committee asked for comments from defense counsel in 
November 1964, the lawyers’ main contention was that the Committee should 
refer the proposal to the ABA for review.385 The judges roundly rejected this 
proposal. Having been rebuffed, some opposing lawyers decided to generate 
formal ABA opposition through its Antitrust Section, whose executive council 
contained numerous lawyers for defendants in the electrical cases.386 At the 
Section’s April 1965 meeting, it was announced that an ad hoc committee had 
been formed to study the MDL legislation.387 On April 13, 1966, with the 
legislation pending in the House Judiciary Committee, the ad hoc committee 
recommended that the Antitrust Section adopt a resolution opposing the 
legislation and that this resolution be presented to the ABA as a whole.388 On 
August 10, at the nationwide meeting of the House of Delegates in Montreal, 
after a brief statement in support of the resolution opposing the bill by lawyer 
Richard McLaren of Chicago, the ABA adopted it without debate.389 
The Committee was blindsided. As Robson described in a letter to Becker 
on August 16, 1966, the ABA “unbeknownst to anybody, voted to oppose the 
legislation. Both Perry [Goldberg] and [Judge] Joe Estes were in Montreal as 
members of the section, and received no notice that this was coming up for 
discussion.”390 Robson summarized, “It is apparent from the sessions that Perry 
and Joe attended that the cards were stacked against us by the defendants.”391 
Following adoption of its resolution, the ABA drafted a report outlining 
its opposition.392 The main thrust of the report was that the statute went too 
far, too fast, and that the electrical-equipment cases demonstrated that regular 
 
385 See Keane–Robson Nov. 6, 1964 Letter, supra note 300, at 2 (urging that the “views of the 
Bar generally should be sought and . . . solicited from the appropriate sections or committees of the 
American Bar Association”). 
386 See Executive Session of the Council of the Section of Antitrust Law, 27 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST 
L. viii, viii (1965) (listing the present members of the Council of the Section of Antitrust Law). 
387 See id. at x (reporting that “[t]he Council reviewed the effort . . . to implement Judge 
Prettyman’s proposal” and “the Chairman was authorized to create an ad hoc committee”). 
388 See Executive Session of the Council of the Section of Antitrust Law, 30 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST 
L. i, ix (1966) (reporting that “Stewart Kerr presented the report of the ad hoc committee . . . , which 
presented a resolution recommending that H.R. 8276 . . . be opposed”). 
389 See Proceedings of the House of Delegates: Montreal, Canada, August 8-11, 1966, 52 A.B.A. J. 
967, 976 (1966) (reporting these events, which ended with “the House vot[ing] to adopt the 
resolution [in opposition to H.R. 8276] without debate”). The ABA further resolved, “[T]he Section 
of Antitrust Law is authorized to urge the foregoing views of the American Bar Association on the 
Committee on the Judiciary.” Proceedings of the House of Delegates at the 1966 Annual Meeting, 91 ANN. 
REP. A.B.A. 347, 375 (1966). 
390 Letter from Edwin A. Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill., to William 
H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo. 1 (Aug. 16, 1966) (on file at Becker 
Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34, Divider 1). 
391 Id. 
392 See REPORT OF SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON H.R. 8276, 89TH CONGRESS, reprinted in House Hearings, supra 
note 365, at 33-36. 
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procedures were adequate to meet the demands of a crisis.393 Becker and 
Robson did not see a copy of the report until August 30, the night before the 
House Subcommittee hearing,394 so they dictated responses to the criticisms 
in their Washington hotel the night before the hearing.395 
C. The House Hearings 
The House Hearings commenced the following morning. The MDL 
statute was one of four statutes the subcommittee was considering that day.396 
Robson and Becker appeared on behalf of the Committee, as did Neal.397 In 
their testimony, the judges adhered to their established strategy: emphasizing 
the urgent need for the legislation. Neal went first and described the successes 
of the electrical-equipment cases,398 but then turned to “the different theory” 
underlying the MDL statute.399 Neal explained that the procedure followed in 
the electrical cases was “cumbersome” and “fragile . . . because it [was] dependent 
upon the unanimous agreement of the judges involved for it to work.”400 
Moreover, “perhaps most important, section 1404(a) [was] inadequate because it 
le[ft] the question of transfer to the determination of the court in a particular 
case and to the initiative of the parties in that case.”401 The bill would respond 
by providing “machinery in the Federal judiciary [to] determine what ought 
to be done from the standpoint of the judiciary as a whole, and the interests 
not only of the parties in a single case in a single district but of the parties 
affected by the entire mass of litigation.”402 
Judge Becker testified next and amplified the need for the bill: 
 
393 See id. at 35 (arguing that it was “too early to assess the relative merits and disadvantages 
of pretrial proceedings utilized in the electrical cases” and that, either way, “existing statutes and 
applicable Rules” had allowed for “coordinated pretrial proceedings in those cases”). 
394 See generally House Hearings, supra note 365. 
395 See Letter from William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., 
to Edward V. Long, Senator, U.S. Senate 1 (Sept. 6, 1966) [hereinafter Becker–Long Sept. 6, 1966 
Letter] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34) (“On August 30 we received a 
copy of the resolution . . . . It was necessary to dictate a response . . . .”); see also Multidistrict 
Litigation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 24 (1966) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of William H. Becker, C.J., 
U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo.) (“We discovered the existence of this document only the 
day before we were to appear before the House committee on H.R. 8276.”). 
396 See House Hearings, supra note 365, at 1 (listing H.R. 3391, H.R. 6703, H.R. 8276, and 
H.R. 16575 as comprising the subcommittee’s agenda). 
397 See id. at 21 (statement of Edwin A. Robson, J., U.S. Dist. Court for the N.D. Ill.) (explaining 
that the presentation would be divided between himself, Neal, and Becker). 
398 See id. at 21 (statement of Phil C. Neal, Executive Secretary, Coordinating Comm. for 
Multiple Litig.) (offering a brief history of the electrical-equipment cases). 
399 Id. at 22. 
400 Id. 
401 Id. at 23. 
402 Id. 
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We feel that there is a litigation explosion occurring in the Federal courts 
along with the population explosion and the technological revolution; that 
even with the addition of many new judges, the caseload, the backlog of cases 
pending, is growing; and that some new tools are needed by the judges in 
order to process the litigation which results from the matters which I have 
mentioned, as well as from extensions of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts 
by acts of Congress. And this is a method which we think will work.403 
Becker then endorsed the two amendments suggested by Deputy 
Attorney General Clark.404 Becker noted the Committee’s endorsement of 
the first proposed amendment, exempting suits brought on behalf of the 
government.405 With respect to the second suggestion, the deletion of the 
Ryan Amendment allowing for a transferor-court veto, Becker stated, “I am 
authorized to state that this suggested amendment has the approval of a 
majority of the Committee and I feel and the majority of the Committee feel 
that this change should be made, so we are in agreement with the Department 
of Justice on this matter.”406 Becker closed by again stressing the apparently 
limited nature of the proposal as compared to a complete transfer—that it 
would not require the creation of a new court or the appointment of any new 
judges, and that there was a “mandatory duty” to remand the case when 
pretrial proceedings are concluded.407 
Although no witnesses appeared against the bill, the report of the ABA’s 
opposition was entered into the record,408 as was Becker and Robson’s point-
by-point refutation of it,409 dictated in their hotel the night before. The Becker–
Robson rejoinder is remarkable for its force. The thrust of the judges’ response 
was that current procedure was plainly inadequate to deal with the massive 
litigation on the horizon, and that a failure to pass the bill would threaten the 
 
403 Id. at 26-27 (statement of William H. Becker, C.J., U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. Of Mo.). 
404 See id. at 27 (stating that Becker, and the majority of the Committee, supported both amendments). 
405 See id. (“This suggested modification is agreeable to the Committee.”). 
406 Id. Murrah testified even more forcefully along these lines in the Senate hearings, 
responding to Senator Tydings’s question about the veto provision, “I suppose that it is fair to say, 
of course, that when you are hammering out proposed legislation of this kind, especially with 
hardheaded Federal judges, you have to make some concessions along the way, sometimes even to 
the point of emasculation. I think it is appropriate for me to say that I never did approve the 
provision which allowed veto power to one judge. My argument was and is that if you do that, you 
almost completely render the legislation impotent.” Senate Hearings, supra note 395, at 55-56 
(statement of Alfred P. Murrah, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit). 
407 House Hearings, supra note 365, at 32 (statement of William H. Becker, C.J., U.S. Dist. 
Court for the W. Dist. of Mo.). 
408 See supra note 392 and accompanying text. 
409 See House Hearings, supra note 365, at 29-32 (recording the memorandum submitted by 
the Coordinating Committee addressing, in turn, each criticism in the ABA Report by number). 
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basic functioning of the federal courts. The judges also appealed to process—an 
appeal we now know was disingenuous in light of Becker’s papers: 
[T]he Coordinating Committee wishes to inform your Committee that before 
final drafts of H.R. 8276 were submitted to the Judicial Conference, conferences 
were held with lawyers representing both the plaintiffs and defendants in the 
electrical equipment antitrust cases. The lawyers consulted represented the 
major portion of the Antitrust Bar of the United States and many of their 
suggestions were incorporated in what is now H.R. 8276. On the other hand, no 
opportunity was given by the Council of the Section of Antitrust Law for 
discussion or hearing of objections to the report discussed hereinabove.410 
D. Shifting Attention to the Senate 
Due to the ABA’s opposition in the House, the judges left the House 
hearings less than confident about the bill’s prospects, so they instead turned 
their attention to lobbying the Senate Judiciary Committee, which eventually 
agreed to hold a hearing on the bill in October in Chicago.411 The Senate 
immediately proved to be a more promising avenue. Senator Long and 
Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery, introduced the bill in the Senate on 
September 9, 1966—with both of Clark’s amendments incorporated.412 That 
Tydings was the chair was serendipitous. Not only was he exceptionally 
interested in improving the operations of the federal courts,413 his mentor both 
in law school and beyond was Chief Judge Roszel Thomsen of the District of 
Maryland, an influential member of both the Coordinating Committee and the 
Rules Committee.414 
The hearing was held on October 20-21, 1966.415 The only Senator in 
attendance was Tydings,416 and again only witnesses in favor of the bill 
 
410 Id. at 32. 
411 See Becker–Long Sept. 6, 1966 Letter, supra note 395, at 1 (expressing optimism about the 
Chicago hearings set for October). 
412 See S. 3815, 89th Cong. (1966). Becker later thanked Long for introducing the bill: “This 
proposed legislation appears to be a very minor matter, but I can assure you that it is truly of great 
importance.” Letter from William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., 
to Edward V. Long, Senator, U.S. Senate 1 (Oct. 17, 1966) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, 
Box 15, Folder 34). 
413 See, e.g., Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The Federal Magistrates Act: History and Development, 1974 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 565, 567 (noting Tydings’s interest in judicial administration). 
414 See Senate Hearings, supra note 395, at 3-4 (statement of Senator Joseph D. Tydings, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach.) (“I am particularly gratified to see my own 
former mentor . . . Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, who taught me most of the law I know, not only when I 
was a U.S. attorney but even earlier when I was in law school at the University of Maryland.”). 
415 Id. at 1, 41. 
416 See id. at 1 (listing Senator Tydings, and no other senators, as present). 
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testified. But this time, nearly the entire Coordinating Committee attended. 
As in the House hearing, Robson,417 Becker,418 and Neal419 each testified, 
trumpeting the success of the electrical-equipment actions, but pressing the 
need for a case-consolidating machinery in the future that did not rely on the 
voluntary cooperation of judges. This time, however, they were joined by an 
additional witness: Charles Bane, the lawyer for Commonwealth Edison, the 
plaintiff in the electrical litigation, and an advocate for the statute.420 
Becker and Bane targeted the ABA’s opposition, both in process and 
substance. On process, they attacked the means by which the ABA’s report 
was drafted—as an ad hoc committee report, approved by the executive 
council of the Antitrust Section, and approved without debate by the House 
of Delegates.421 In Becker’s view, “the recommendation of the American bar 
loses a great deal of its value and influence under those circumstances.”422 
Becker also implied that his opponents’ activities were questionable, noting 
that “[t]he recommendation was prepared by a special committee which had 
been appointed and, which, so far as I know, never granted a hearing to 
anyone,” and that “the Coordinating Committee and lawyers who were 
supporting this proposal for new section 1407 were never given an 
opportunity to discuss it.”423 Moreover, Becker added, 
Several members of the Coordinating Committee are members of the Antitrust 
Section . . . . Nothing was ever said at the meeting they attended. 
I undertook recently, therefore, to find out how this could happen and I 
learned on reliable information from a person intimately connected with this 
recommendation . . . that the recommendation opposing H.R. 8276 was 
never made known to the membership of the Antitrust Section of the 
American Bar Association.424 
For his part, Bane attributed the ABA’s recommendation to the influence 
of defense lawyers on the executive council, contending that “there is a 
substantial influence in this report by parties who defend electrical 
equipment antitrust cases and very ably defend them . . . . [B]ut at no time 
 
417 See id. at 4 (introducing the statement of Edwin A. Robson, J., U.S. Dist. Court for the N. 
Dist. of Ill.). 
418 See id. at 15 (introducing the statement of William H. Becker, C.J., U.S. Dist. Court for the 
W. Dist. of Mo.). 
419 See id. at 7 (introducing the statement of Phil C. Neal, Dean, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.). 
420 See id. at 25 (introducing the statement of Charles A. Bane, Esquire, Chi., Ill.). 
421 See id. at 24-25 (statement of William H. Becker, C.J., U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of 
Mo.) (drawing into question the robustness of the process by which the report was drafted and approved). 
422 Id. at 24. 
423 Id. 
424 Id. 
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did they abandon the advocacy of their clients’ causes.”425 Bane added that he 
was present at the Montreal ABA meeting and that, even though he was 
chairing a committee of the Antitrust Section, he “at no time” had “any 
indication . . . that the council of the antitrust law section was presenting to 
the house of delegates this type of a resolution.”426 Bane also noted that when 
the judges in the electrical-equipment cases offered counsel the opportunity 
to comment on the bill, “the defendants did not comment, but the plaintiffs 
did,” and observed that “plaintiffs’ counsel by and large were wholeheartedly 
in favor of these proposals.”427 
The witnesses on the second day of hearings repeated the themes of the first 
day: the urgent need for the legislation, the success of the electrical-equipment 
cases, the unlikely success of any future attempt at voluntary coordination, 
and the unrepresentative and biased nature of the ABA opposition. Two other 
lawyers in the electrical-equipment cases joined Bane in support of the bill: 
Ronald W. Olson, who—like Bane—represented plaintiffs,428 and, more 
surprisingly, Edward R. Johnston, who represented defendant McGraw-Edison 
Company, and who, at the time, was the senior partner at Raymond, Mayer, 
Jenner & Block.429 Johnston affirmed the value of coordinated proceedings for 
a defendant. He noted the “distinct advantage” of “uniformity of action” and 
recognized that without coordination before a single judge, “it becomes 
necessary for counsel charged with the representation of a defendant 
nationally to either attend the hearings in the different districts or to spend 
a great amount of time with local counsel apprising them of the facts and the 
legal questions involved.”430 
Johnston also questioned the ABA’s process, albeit diplomatically, noting 
that “[t]here was no debate on any of these resolutions” and that he “therefore 
[could not] attach too great importance to that resolution.”431 Despite having 
“the greatest respect for the members” of the council, Johnston speculated 
that “there were at least one or two members on the council who did not favor 
this type of pretrial proceeding.”432 
 
425 Id. at 38 (statement of Charles A. Bane, Esquire, Chi., Ill.). Bane added his view that 
defense counsel was opposed to the bill and that they were “quite likely in the future, in the event 
that this were tried on a voluntary basis, to be more sophisticated and experienced in their opposition 
than they were about the electrical equipment litigation, and I am just not at all certain that they 
might not in some quarters be effective in their opposition.” Id. at 37. 
426 Id. at 38. 
427 Id. at 39. 
428 See id. at 48 (introducing the statement of Ronald W. Olson, Esquire, Chi., Ill.). 
429 See id. at 42 (introducing the statement of Edward R. Johnston, Esquire, Chi., Ill.). 
430 Id. at 43. 
431 Id. at 47. 
432 Id. 
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Judge Murrah, speaking at the same hearing, anchored the testimony by 
expressing in stark terms the urgent need for the legislation. He offered, “I 
think it is important to say that this multiple-district litigation can very well 
break our backs out of sheer weight of numbers unless we do have an orderly 
procedure for it.” 433 
The Senate subcommittee scheduled a third day of hearings for January 
24, 1967.434 Unlike the earlier hearings though, this one would feature 
witnesses testifying in opposition to the bill—including Phillip Price of 
Dechert, Price & Rhoads in Philadelphia, the firm which had represented 
defendant I-T-E Circuit Breaker in the electrical cases, and William Simon 
of Howrey & Simon in Washington, the attorney who had chaired the ABA 
ad hoc committee which produced the report opposing the bill.435 
Upon learning that Price would appear before the subcommittee, Becker 
sought to preemptively cast doubt upon his credibility. On January 12, 1967, 
Becker sent a letter to George Trubow, counsel to the subcommittee, attaching 
documents from the electrical-equipment litigation to “show the unsound and 
uncooperative tactics of I-T-E Circuit Breaker.”436 Becker added, 
I-T-E resisted going to trial and did not undertake a settlement program until 
it was in the early processes of a jury trial in Chicago. The object of the 
committee was to terminate the cases by trial or settlement or both. Until the 
Chicago trial I-T-E expressed an unwillingness to do either. If the Judges had 
not co-ordinated their efforts these cases would probably be still clogging the 
dockets in many districts. Mr. Price’s testimony should be evaluated in the 
light of the actions of his firm in representing I-T-E Circuit Breaker in the 
electrical equipment litigation.437 
The hearing commenced on January 24, 1967, again with Tydings as the 
only senator in attendance.438 Price did not hold back. Still upset about the 
 
433 Id. at 54 (statement of Alfred P. Murrah, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit). 
434 See Jan. 24, 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 181; see also Co-Ordinating Comm. for Multiple 
Litig., Minutes of the Meeting of the Co-Ordinating Committee 4 (Jan. 20, 1967) [hereinafter Co-
Ordinating Comm. Jan. 20, 1967 Meeting Minutes] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 11, 
Folder 1) (“The Senate Committee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery will hold additional 
hearings on proposed § 1407 to be held in Washington, D.C. on January 24.”). 
435 See Co-Ordinating Comm. Jan. 20, 1967 Meeting Minutes, supra note 434 (“Mr. Phillip 
Price of Dechert, Price & Rhoads (Philadelphia) and a Mr. Simon, representing the American Bar 
Association, are expected to testify . . . . Judge Becker said it should be noted for the record that 
portions of Mr. Price’s statement (distributed to members of the Committee) were inaccurate.”). 
436 Letter from William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., to 
George B. Trubow, Deputy Counsel, Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach., Comm. on the 
Judiciary, U.S. Senate 2 (Jan. 12, 1967) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34). 
437 Id. at 3-4. 
438 See Jan. 24, 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 181, at 101 (listing Senator Tydings as the only 
senator present at the hearing). 
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handling of the electrical-equipment cases, Price excoriated both the judges 
and their bill, arguing that “[i]t would lead to the same kind of abuses which 
have . . . appeared during the . . . electrical cases.”439 Price got nowhere, 
however, with his attempt to influence Tydings, who took up Becker’s critique 
that Price’s opposition to the bill was motivated by his client’s interest in 
increasing delay as a weapon against plaintiffs.440 
Simon then attempted to rehabilitate the ABA’s report, arguing that the 
electrical cases proved that existing procedures were adequate to deal with 
massive litigation and casting coordinated proceedings as “a conflict between 
justice and efficiency.”441 Tydings took the bait, characterizing the ABA’s 
stance as opposed to the fair administration of justice: 
Well, as I gather, basically the American Bar Association has taken the position 
that if they have a hundred or 200 cases, and each one with the same set of facts, 
the same pretrial for each different district, that if they want to take up the 
taxpayer’s dollar and the court’s time, and make it a hundred times as long and 
more difficult for the judiciary of the United States, that is fine, because the 
interests of the attorneys and the litigants is the most important.442 
Judge Thomas Clary of Philadelphia attended the hearing on behalf of the 
Coordinating Committee and reported to his colleagues by letter.443 Clary 
felt good about how the hearing went.444 Clary also reported a conversation 
he initiated with subcommittee counsel George Trubow after the hearing; 
Clary learned from Simon’s testimony that the ABA Antitrust Section’s ad 
hoc committee had been appointed by the section’s chair, Edgar Barton, of 
the New York firm White & Case, which had represented General Electric in 
the electrical cases.445 Expressing views reminiscent of those expressed by 
Becker, Robson, and Murrah in 1964, Clary also explained that the ABA’s 
position was “to oppose any legislation looking toward improvement in 
 
439 Id. at 107 (statement of Philip Price, Esquire, Dechert, Price & Rhoads). 
440 See id. at 115 (statement of Sen. Tydings, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (responding 
to Price’s testimony, “As a matter of fact, in many instances it is to the benefit of the counsel to delay 
the trial, if necessary, to postpone it and drag it out for years. In the electrical equipment cases, they 
could have been dragged out for 20 years, if they hadn’t been consolidated for pretrial as they were”). 
441 Id. at 121 (statement of William Simon, Esquire, Howrey, Simon, Baker & Murchison). 
442 Id. at 124 (statement of Sen. Tydings, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
443 See Letter from Thomas J. Clary, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Pa., to the Co-
Ordinating Comm. on Multiple Litig. 1-5 (Jan. 27, 1967) (on file at Neal Papers, supra note 34, Box 
4, Folder XYZ) (reporting Clary’s observations and thoughts from the January 24, 1967 hearing on 
“Senate Bill 159, formerly S. 3815”). 
444 See id. at 5 (“I left the hearing with the feeling that it had gone rather well . . . .”). 
445 See id. at 3 (“[A]t the conclusion of the hearing, I pointed out to Mr. Trubow that the 
Committee had been appointed by Edgar Barton . . . and most of us will remember his active 
participation in all proceedings before the Co-Ordinating Committee.”). 
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expediting antitrust cases and supporting vigorously an extension of loopholes 
which would avoid responsibility for antitrust violation.”446 
Following the hearings, Judge Becker encouraged other judges to commence 
a letter-writing campaign to their Senators.447 The judges participated 
eagerly.448 In the meantime, Becker liaised with Senator Tydings’s office to 
respond to the supplemental statements offered by Price449 and attorneys from 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, the firm that had represented Westinghouse in the 
electrical cases.450 Both offered amendments to the bill.451 Perhaps recognizing 
Tydings’s commitment to the legislation, Price encouraged several strategic 
amendments, all of which would make MDL consolidation more difficult.452 In 
particular, he proposed an amendment that would only allow transfer based on 
a showing that there was “a substantial number of civil actions . . . in which 
common questions of fact and law predominate”453 and transfer only to “the 
district most convenient for the parties and witnesses.”454 The Cravath 
memorandum to the Committee argued that coordination of multidistrict 
litigation should occur only under rare circumstances and proposed that only 
 
446 Id. at 4. 
447 See Letter from William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., 
to Judges Before Whom Multi-District Litig. Is or Has Been Pending 2 (Apr. 3, 1967) (on file at 
Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34) (“It is suggested that, if you approve the bill, you 
support its passage by writing members of the Senate who represent your state or whom you know.”). 
448 See Letter from Bailey Brown, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Ky., to William 
H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo. (Apr. 19, 1967) (on file at Becker 
Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34) (“In response to your letter of April 17 I have written to 
Senator Gore . . . .”); Letter from Roy M. Shelbourne, Senior Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. 
Dist. of Ky., to William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo. (Apr. 19, 
1967) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34) (“I have received your letter of April 
17, with enclosures. I, of course, will write to the Honorable John S. Cooper and the Honorable 
Thurston B. Morton, United States Senators from Kentucky, urging the passage of S. 159.”). 
449 See Phillip Price, Supplemental Statement of Philip Price on Senate Bill 159 [hereinafter 
Price Supplemental Statement] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34). 
450 See Memorandum from Cravath, Swaine & Moore to the Subcomm. on Improvements in 
Judicial Mach., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Feb. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Cravath Memo] 
(on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34). 
451 See id. at 2-5 (offering amendments to fix what the firm viewed as the “several defects” of 
the current bill); Price Supplemental Statement, supra note 449, at 1-5 (offering his “suggestions for 
modifications of the language of S.159”). Trubow reached out to Becker for comments on these 
statements. See Letter from George B. Trubow, Deputy Counsel, Subcomm. on Improvements in 
Judicial Mach., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, to William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. 
Court for the W. Dist. of Mo. 1 (Feb. 10, 1967) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 
34) (asking for Becker’s comments regarding Price’s suggestions); Letter from George B. Trubow 
Deputy Counsel, Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. 
Senate, to William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo. 1 (Feb. 13, 
1967) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34) (soliciting Becker’s feedback 
regarding the Cravath memo). 
452 See Price Supplemental Statement, supra note 449, at 1-5. 
453 Id. at 1. 
454 Id. at 2. 
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a party should be allowed to move for transfer,455 that when doing so the party 
had to provide a list of all related litigation “in that court or elsewhere,”456 
that transfer be for trial as well as pretrial proceedings,457 and that any transfer 
orders be immediately appealable to the Supreme Court.458 The Cravath memo 
also echoed Price’s request for a requirement that common questions of law and 
fact “predominate.”459 
Becker responded forcefully. He decried the suggestion of a predominance 
requirement as “undesirable and crippling,”460 and he objected that requiring 
common questions of law would preclude use of the procedure in diversity 
cases, such as products liability, where the law to be applied would be that of 
multiple states.461 Here, Becker again sought to undermine Price’s credibility: 
“It is difficult for me to believe that the author here has a genuine concern in 
view of past attitudes in the electrical equipment cases . . . wherein I proposed 
to transfer the cases of the client of the author of the Suggestions to its home 
state. Local counsel . . . objected.”462 Becker summarized, stating simply that 
the proposed amendments were “calculated to cripple the bill.”463 
With respect to the Cravath memo, Becker rejected the idea that massive 
litigation or the use of MDL would be rare or even exceptional: “All I can say 
on this is that prophesy is a risky business. I can imagine future developments 
which will make the electrical equipment cases seem to be a relatively simple 
mass of litigation.”464 Becker accurately predicted the future of MDL; in fact, 
 
455 See Cravath Memo, supra note 450, at 4 (suggesting that “[u]pon motion of any party to a 
case” be added to the bill). 
456 Id. 
457 See id. at 2-3 (arguing against subsequent remand for trial). 
458 See id. at 4 (“That determination shall be directly appealable to the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
459 Id. 
460 Memorandum from William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of 
Mo., to the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 
Comments on Supplemental Statements of Mr. Phillip Price on Senate Bill 159, at 2 (Mar. 18, 1967) 
(on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34). 
461 See id. at 3 (“But the words ‘of law’ should not be used at all because of obvious reasons. 
Suppose the United States Courts are flooded with hundreds of thousands of diversity damage 
actions arising in 50 states as might result if a drug (such as a birth control pill) was alleged to have 
side effects injurious to women generally. The principal issue of fact would be the issue of alleged 
injurious effects of the drug. Nevertheless, the law applicable to the facts could be different in some 
respect in each state. The suggested amendment would exclude use of the efficient and economical 
procedures of the bill.”). 
462 Id. at 5 (internal citation omitted). 
463 Id. 
464 Memorandum from William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of 
Mo., to the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 
Comments on Memorandum for Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the Unites States, by Cravath, Swaine and Moore, Dated February 
10, 1967, at 1 (Mar. 18, 1967) [hereinafter Becker Response to Cravath Memo] (on file at Becker 
Papers, supra note 33, Box 15, Folder 34). 
898 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 831 
he accurately predicted a products liability action related to the “injurious 
side effects of a birth-control pills” and cases in which “an automobile 
manufacturer sells millions of a model of an automobile with an obviously 
unsafe feature in violation of federal law, and massive litigation results.”465 
With respect to the rest of Cravath’s suggestions, Becker stated simply that 
their arguments were “vague and unconvincing” and that the proposed 
amendments “would render the bill worthless from a judicial standpoint.”466 
Becker also took aim at Cravath’s credibility, characterizing its position as 
biased: “Advocates necessarily must in appraising a judicial reform take into 
account the interests of their clients and of their own practice. Judges 
necessarily must consider only the interests of the administration of justice.”467 
On May 25, 1967, the judges received good news. Tydings reported that 
the Subcommittee was preparing a report of the bill with three amendments 
intended only to “clarify certain provisions of the bill, but make no substantial 
changes.”468 The amendments were limited. Though two addressed some of 
the objections to the bill, they did not limit the scope of the statutory power 
to consolidate. The three amendments were: (1) adding “the convenience of 
parties and witnesses” as a factor in the decision to transfer along with the 
“just and efficient conduct of such actions,” (2) allowing parties to initiate a 
motion for consolidation, and (3) allowing appeal of an order to transfer by 
the panel on an extraordinary writ.469 The Senate Judiciary Committee 
endorsed the bill as amended on July 27, 1967, and the Senate passed it on the 
consent calendar—with no roll-call vote—on August 9, 1967.470 The short 
report from the Senate Judiciary Committee highlights all of the judges’ 
tactics, with particular emphasis on the urgent need for the legislation in light 
of demands on the federal courts and the unlikelihood of the cooperation seen 
 
465 Id. at 1-2. For current examples of Becker’s prediction having come to fruition, see In re 
Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation, 692 F. 
Supp. 2d 1012 (S.D. Ill. 2010) and In re General Motors Ignition Switch Litigation, Nos. 14-MD-
2543(JMF), 2015 WL 3619584 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2015). 
466 Becker Response to Cravath Memo, supra note 464, at 8-9. 
467 Id. at 10. 
468 Letter from Joseph D. Tydings, Chairman, Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach., 
Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, to Edwin A. Robson, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the 
W. Dist. of Mo. 1 (May 25, 1967) (on file at Neal Papers, supra note 34, Box 4, Folder XYZ). 
469 S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 1-2 (1967). The Report notes that “[t]he amendments suggested in 
this report were the result of recommendations by members of the bar acquiesced in by the 
coordinating committee.” Id. at 6. 
470 See 113 CONG. REC. 22,124 (1967) (reporting that the bill “was read the third time, and passed”). 
2017] “A Radical Proposal” 899 
in the electrical cases ever occurring again.471 The Senate Report does not 
even mention the ABA’s opposition to the bill.472  
E. Back to the House—and Overcoming the ABA 
Despite securing passage in the Senate, the Committee still faced an 
uphill climb in the House, where the bill had languished for two years due to 
the ABA’s opposition.473 In August 1967, Robson and Becker met to determine 
how to proceed.474 By then, the demands arising from his work on the 
Coordinating Committee had begun to take a toll on Judge Becker. Due to 
the end of the electrical-equipment litigation, the Committee no longer had 
any source of funding.475 Nevertheless, the Committee continued to 
coordinate pretrial proceedings in a variety of large-scale cases, including the 
Technograph patent litigation, antitrust actions in the concrete pipe, rock salt, 
and schoolbook industries, and litigation involving helicopter and airplane 
crashes.476 
Feeling the pinch, the Committee redoubled its efforts to achieve passage 
in the House. Judges Murrah, Becker, and Robson met in Chicago on 
September 8, 1967, and, according to minutes of the meeting labeled “Personal 
and Confidential,” they developed a plan.477 The judges would attempt to lobby 
the key lawyers behind the ABA opposition directly: 
Judge Murrah described a discussion which he recently had with a Washington 
lawyer, Leonard J. Emmerglick, Esquire, regarding the suspected subtle 
opposition to [the legislation]. Emmerglick informed Judge Murrah that the 
opposition is based on certain fears, entertained by lawyers (particularly some 
New York lawyers) who make a career of handling antitrust cases. 
 
471 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 7 (concluding that “[t]he demands being put upon the 
Federal courts are greater now than ever” and that the legislation was “necessary to improved judicial 
administration”). 
472 See S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 3-7 (offering a history of the bill that does not mention the ABA 
opposition). 
473 See supra text accompanying note 374. 
474 See August 21, 1967 Meeting of Judges Becker and Robson, Kansas City: Important Topics 
for Discussion (Aug. 21, 1967) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 18, File 1) (listing “how 
to proceed to gather support for passage of § 1407 in the House” as an “Important Topic[] for 
Discussion”). 
475 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
476 See Co-Ordinating Committee Nov. 3, 1967 Meeting Minutes, supra note 199. 
477 See Minutes of the Steering Committee, September 8, 1967, Chicago, Illinois (Sept. 8, 1967) 
(on file at Becker Chronological Files, supra note 33, Box 11, Folder 7); see also Letter from William 
H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., to Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 1 (Oct. 3, 1967) [hereinafter Becker–Murrah Oct. 3, 1967 
Letter] (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 11, Folder 7) (noting that the meeting minutes 
“were marked personal and confidential”). 
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Judge Murrah said he would like to initiate an informal meeting with 
some of the leading members of the Bar to speak frankly with them about S. 
159 for the purpose of allaying some of the misapprehensions upon which the 
opposition is based. Judge Murrah said that unless such a meeting is held, 
various members of the Bar (especially those residing in New York) may be 
able to prevent the passage of S. 159. Others present agreed with Judge 
Murrah’s proposal.478 
Murrah seemed to recognize the sensitive nature of this strategy, as he, 
upon receipt of the minutes, wrote to Judge Becker’s law clerk, stating, 
Your proposed minutes certainly do reflect what was said and done at the 
breakfast session re S. 159. 
But I doubt the efficacy of perpetuating it in the minutes lest they get in 
the hands of those who would misunderstand and misuse them. I would 
suggest that we refrain from perpetuating our session, but if the other judges 
think it would serve a useful purpose, I shall not object.479 
Becker responded, noting that the minutes “were marked personal and 
confidential” and circulated only to those in attendance, but offered to “have 
them recalled and amended.”480 
Shortly thereafter, Murrah reported that a meeting with these New York 
antitrust lawyers had been scheduled for October 19-20, 1967, at the Bar 
Association of New York City.481 The judges of the Coordinating Committee 
and numerous lawyers who had been involved in the electrical-equipment 
cases, as well as lawyers who had been on the executive council of the ABA 
Antitrust Section when it opposed the bill, attended the meeting.482 
Attendees included, among others, Whitney North Seymour, the managing 
partner of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, Bethuel Webster, a prominent New 
 
478 Id. at 2-3. 
479 Letter from Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
to William G. Levi, Law Clerk to William H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of 
Mo. 1 (Sept. 27, 1967) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 11, Folder 7). 
480 Becker–Murrah Oct. 3, 1967 Letter, supra note 477. 
481 See Letter from Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, to Co-Ordinating Comm. on Multiple Litig. 1 (Oct. 3, 1967) (on file at Becker 
Chronological Files, supra note 33, Box 16, Folder 1) (“[I]t is proposed to meet with Mr. Emmerglick 
and other designated members of the bar on October 19 and 20 at the offices of the Bar Association 
of New York City . . . .”); Letter from Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, to Members of the Joint Comm. on Problems Related to the Proof of Sci. & Econ. 
Fact – & Related Matters 1 (Oct. 11, 1967) (on file at Becker Chronological Files, supra note 33, Box 
12, Folder 10) (enclosing the agreed-upon agenda for his meeting with Emmerglick scheduled for 
October 19-20). 
482 See William H. Becker, Handwritten Notes on Meeting, Thursday October 19, at 1 (Oct. 
19, 1967) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 12, Folder 1) (listing the attendees of the 
meeting). 
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York City lawyer and confidant of Mayor John Lindsay, Cyrus Anderson, the 
general counsel of the Pittsburgh Plate & Glass Company, and Marcus 
Mattson, a prominent Los Angeles antitrust lawyer.483 
Becker’s handwritten notes of the meeting survive.484 Judge Ryan, who had 
apparently recovered from having his amendment to the statute be 
unceremoniously disowned, took the lead in explaining to the lawyers the need 
for the legislation in cases other than antitrust, such as products liability, 
securities, and patents.485 Ryan added that he understood that the bill had 
been opposed by defense attorneys, and that the Committee did “not want to 
force [the] bill down [the] throat of the bar—We want [the] support of [the] 
bar.”486 Ryan therefore expressed his hope that the ABA would recognize the 
need for the bill, but he also made clear that “If [the] Bar doesn’t agree [the] 
judges owe it to Courts to push [the] bill as it is.”487 Whitney North Seymour 
responded that the situation had gotten “off track” but believed that, after 
further consultation with the Bar, an agreement might be reached.488 The 
notes—albeit somewhat sparse—suggest that, at the judges’ urging, the 
Antitrust Section agreed to take a second look at the legislation.489 
In the meantime, the judges stepped up their correspondence campaign 
with Congressmen.490 For the time being though, the bill remained held up 
in the House due to ABA opposition.491 Becker’s pleas for relief from his 
workload became stronger; he claimed he was “barely able to keep the work 
of the Co-Ordinating Committee from coming to a complete halt.”492 He 
continued, 
It would be very detrimental to the effort of the judiciary of the United States 
to meet the increasing burdens of the litigation explosion if the efforts of this 
 
483 See id. 
484 See id. at 1-9. 
485 See id. at 3-4 (offering Becker’s notes on Ryan’s opening remarks to the lawyers). 
486 Id. at 4. 
487 Id. at 5. 
488 Id. at 6. 
489 See id. at 5 (recording the comments of Webster, a “member of [the] subcommittee of 
section on Antitrust”). 
490 See Co-Ordinating Committee Nov. 3, 1967 Meeting Minutes, supra note 199, at 2 (“It was 
agreed that the Co-Ordinating Committee should urge the judges . . . to write members of Congress 
requesting their support of the passage . . . of S. 159 . . . .”). 
491 Robson had reached out to Congressman Robert McClory of Illinois, who, in turn, reached 
out to Congressman Celler. See Letter from Robert McClory, Congressman, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to Edwin A. Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill. 1 (Nov. 8, 
1967) (on file at Neal Papers, supra note 34, Box 4, Folder XYZ) (“I brought up the subject of S. 159 
at the meeting of Subcommittee #5 . . . .”). 
492 Letter from William H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., to Alfred 
P. Murrah, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 1 (Nov. 20, 1967) (on file at 
Becker Chronological Files, supra note 33, Box 16, Folder 1). 
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Committee were terminated. It is simply beyond the capacity of an active judge 
and a law clerk to carry on this extra burden for any protracted length of time.493 
F. The Dam Breaks 
The dam finally broke in January 1968, when the ABA suddenly reversed 
its position. Lawyer (and later district judge) Richard McLaren notified 
Murrah that the ad hoc committee of the Antitrust Section had issued a new 
report in favor of the bill.494 McLaren noted, “The basic reasons for this 
change in position are the changes in the bill itself, the assurances contained 
in the Senate Report and, most particularly, the need for the legislation 
demonstrated by the representatives of the Judicial Conference.”495 Referring 
to the October meeting, McLaren added, 
I think we both understand that there was a breakdown in communications 
between our Section and the Judicial Conference prior to our earlier adverse 
report on H.R. 8276. This was particularly regrettable in the light of the fine 
cooperation and understanding we had in connection with the development 
of the Handbook and other matters in the past, and I am particularly pleased 
that the air has now been cleared.496 
The ABA’s new report, which was to be submitted to its upcoming House 
of Delegates meeting in February in Chicago, cited the amendments to the 
bill and the assurances in the Senate Report that the transfer procedure would 
be used only in exceptional cases.497 The report also cites a greater 
understanding of the need for the bill, which was “brought to our attention 
by members of the Judicial Conference,” including the need for the legislation 
in cases “outside the antitrust field.”498 Soon after the ABA issued its report, 
 
493 Id. 
494 See Letter from Richard W. McLaren, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 1 (Jan. 11, 1968) [hereinafter McLaren–Murrah Jan. 11, 
1968 Letter] (on file at Neal Papers, supra note 34, Box 4, Folder XYZ) (“[T]he Ad Hoc Committee 
of this Section has reviewed the developments since its original report in opposition to H.R. 8276 
and has now submitted a report with the recommendation that the American Bar Association 
support S. 159, as amended . . . .”). 
495 Id. 
496 Id. at 1-2. 
497 See RICHARD W. MCLAREN, CHAIRMAN, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT OF 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION ON S. 159, 90th Congress 5 (Jan. 19, 1968) (on file at Neal Papers, supra note 34, Box 7, 
Folder on C.O.C. Documents) (“[O]nly in the ‘few exceptional cases’ which ‘share unusually complex 
questions of fact’ or in the situation of ‘many complex cases’ which ‘share a few questions of fact,’ will 
consolidation be ordered in the absence of many cases with many common issues of fact.”). 
498 Id. at 7. 
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on February 20, 1968, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution in 
support of the bill.499 
It is not entirely clear why the ABA made this 180-degree turn. One could 
take McLaren at his word—that the Antitrust Section had been persuaded by 
the amendments and convinced of the need for the legislation. This is 
possible, but seems unlikely in light of the ABA’s prior vociferous opposition 
to the legislation and the fact that the amendments to the statutory 
language—adding “convenience of the parties and witnesses” as a standard, 
allowing a party to a litigation to move for consolidation, and providing for 
review of the Panel’s orders only by extraordinary writ500—were marginal and 
only barely responsive to the ABA’s more fundamental criticisms. 
Another theory is that the lawyers may simply have mellowed in their 
opposition. With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps some defense counsel 
recognized the potential benefits of the bill to their clients and concluded that 
their clients had not come out so badly in the electrical-equipment cases. 
After all, their clients had been able to settle the entire litigation quite 
promptly and move on.501 One of the great benefits of consolidated litigation 
for defendants is the opportunity to achieve closure through a global 
settlement.502 It is possible that the defendants, with the dust having settled, 
realized that the coordinated proceedings had worked in their favor. 
To me, however, the most persuasive theory is that the October 1967 New 
York meeting had an effect. McLaren alludes to the meeting in his letter,503 
and the judges may have been especially convincing about the need for the 
legislation in areas beyond antitrust. Moreover, at least based on Becker’s 
notes, the judges appear to have pressured the lawyers, claiming that they 
would push the bill with or without their support.504 While it is unclear how 
effective this brute-force approach would have been, it is clear that these 
lawyers—all from major law firms or corporations—were repeat players in 
high-stakes federal litigation. One might rationally assume that antagonism 
with these judges was not in these lawyers’—or their clients’—best interests. 
There was also another reason for the lawyers present at the meeting to 
be interested in warmer relations with the Committee. Judge Becker was 
taking the lead in the first draft of what would become the Manual for Complex 
 
499 See Proceedings of the House of Delegates: Chicago, Illinois, February 19-20, 1968, 54 A.B.A. J. 
510, 521 (1968) (“Be it resolved, That the American Bar Association recommends to the House of 
Representatives . . . that it pass S.159 . . . .”). 
500 S. REP. NO. 90-454, at 1-2 (1967). 
501 See supra notes 179 and 189. 
502 See supra note 17; see also Silver & Miller, supra note 25, at 123 (arguing that MDL generally 
favors defendants in mass-tort cases because “MDL judges cannot try cases,” which “declaws 
plaintiffs . . . by depriving them” of “the threat of forcing an exchange at a price set by a jury”). 
503 See supra text accompanying note 496. 
504 See supra text accompanying note 487. 
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and Multidistrict Litigation (the Manual).505 As Arthur Miller remembers it, 
“the lawyers were fighting the manual as it was then drafted tooth and nail” 
because it appeared to facilitate the kind of benefits for plaintiffs that the 
defendants had complained of in the electrical-equipment cases.506 Perhaps 
recognizing that aggregate litigation would be the way of the future, these 
large-firm lawyers may well have decided that they would be better off 
participating in the Manual’s creation rather than stonewalling it. 
There is evidence to support this theory in Becker’s papers. In McLaren’s 
letter informing Judge Murrah of the ABA’s change of heart, McLaren mentions 
the Manual specifically, noting, “I am concerned that a new misunderstanding 
might be abuilding.”507 McLaren asks for a seat at the table, seeking the 
opportunity to formally comment on the draft Manual, suggesting, “I believe 
that the path will be much smoother and far greater progress will be made in 
the long run if time and opportunity are allowed for the organized bar to study, 
comment upon, and get used to, the ‘Outline’ before it is formally adopted.”508 
Lo and behold, such a meeting between the lawyers at the New York 
meeting and the judges drafting the Manual did, in fact, come about on June 
4, 1968.509 A transcript of this meeting survives in Judge Becker’s papers.510 
At the meeting, lawyer Cyrus Anderson of Pittsburgh Plate & Glass—the 
Chair of the ABA Antitrust Section at the time the unfavorable report on 
proposed § 1407 was issued, and who was present at the October 1967 New 
York meeting—spoke first, on behalf of the newly formed ABA Special 
Committee on Complex and Multi-District Litigation.511 Anderson 
highlighted the meetings Judge Murrah had set up “between the Judicial 
Conference Coordinating Committee and our ABA anti-trust section 
group.”512 Anderson continued, 
 
505 See Arthur R. Miller, In Memoriam: Judge William H. Becker, 807 F. Supp. LXXII (W.D. 
Mo. 1992) [hereinafter Miller, In Memoriam] (“[I]t was Judge Becker’s pen that really was reflected 
in the first draft of the manual.”); see also Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in 
Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
286, 294 n.26 (2013) (“The motor force behind the drafting of the Manual was the leadership of 
William H. Becker . . . .”). 
506 See Miller, In Memoriam, supra note 505. 
507 McLaren–Murrah Jan. 11, 1968 Letter, supra note 494, at 2. 
508 Id. 
509 See Transcript of Proceedings of United States Judicial Conference Coordinating Committee 
on Complex and Multi-District Litigation (June 4, 1968) (on file at Becker Chronological Files, supra 
note 33, Box 13, Folder 2). 
510 See id. 
511 See id. at 4 (statement of Cyrus V. Anderson, Co-Chairman, ABA Special Comm. on 
Complex & Multi-Dist. Litig.) (offering the first statements of the meeting). 
512 Id. at 4-5. 
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Last fall when S-159 became hot, the Coordinating Committee asked the anti-
trust section to reconsider its former adverse position respecting an earlier 
version of that Bill. That we did, and I think the rest is now history. 
To make a long story short, a new ABA report came out recommending 
adoption of S-159 in the light of various changes that were made in committee 
and the Bill was recently enacted into law, as you know. Now, at our October, 
1967 meeting with the Coordinating Committee, the draft outline of the 
proposed Manual came up for discussion. Our ABA committee promised to 
study it . . . . Thanks to Judge Murrah and his recommendation, and those of 
others . . . our Committee was then formed.513 
At the meeting, Anderson, joined by several others who had attended the 
New York meeting, and McLaren, who wrote the report endorsing the MDL 
statute, gave a “preliminary identification of our problem areas”—primarily the 
commanding tone of the suggestions in the Manual that judges take rigid 
control of discovery and move as quickly as possible.514 There were several 
additional meetings between the Coordinating Committee and the ABA 
Committee throughout 1968,515 and the Manual ultimately did reflect the 
lawyers’ desire that it be written as a set of flexible suggestions.516 
In any event, Anderson’s description of events regarding the MDL statute 
was completely accurate: the bill did pass in the House quickly once the ABA 
reversed itself.517 At a meeting of the Coordinating Committee in Philadelphia 
on January 18, the judges discussed the need to capitalize on the ABA’s new 
 
513 Id. at 5-6. 
514 Id. at 9 (statement of Richard McLaren, Chairman, Section of Antitrust Law); see also id. 
(statement of Leonard J. Emmerglick, Att’y, Antitrust Section) (“The values of flexibility cannot be 
adequately built into the Manual by an introductory paragraph . . . .”). McLaren also opined, “I was 
awfully sorry that that relationship between our group—well, the organized Bar and the Judicial 
Conference Committee sort of lapsed after 1960. In fact, I think it got worse than that. We ended 
up on opposite sides of some different matters working more or less at cross purposes separately 
. . . . I am delighted that contact has been re-established and more than pleased that we were able 
to change our position on the new S-159 to see it go through, and I am delighted also that we are 
working on this very worthwhile project.” Id. at 15-16. 
515 For instance, these same lawyers met with the Coordinating Committee in San Francisco 
on July 24, 1968. See Transcript of Special Meeting re: ABA Special Committee Recommended 
Changes in the Proposed Manual for Complex and Multiple Litigation 2-4 (July 24, 1968, 2:00 PM) 
(on file at Becker Chronological Files, supra note 33, Box 13, Folder 2) (listing the attendees of the 
San Francisco meeting). At this meeting, the lawyers repeatedly expressed their view that the draft 
of the Manual was written in terms of rigid commands to judges rather than flexible suggestions. 
For instance, the lawyers sought an explicit statement in the Manual that its suggestions were flexible 
and could be tailored to the individual case, a statement that eventually was included. See id. at 31-
32 (statement of Leonard J. Emmerglick, Att’y, Antitrust Section) (“[T]hese problems will disappear 
if affirmatively there is built in to the main text of the Manual a clear notion that flexibility is an 
ingredient of primary value . . . .”). 
516 See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (1st ed. 1969). 
517 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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position.518 Speed remained critical to the judges because, as Becker observed, 
without additional staff “the day-to-day operations of the Committee could 
not continue for long,” and Murrah regretted that “despite the chaos in the 
federal judicial system which would result from a discontinuance of the Co-
Ordinating Committee’s services, he had exhausted what he felt to be ‘all 
available resources’ in obtaining additional staff assistance.”519 The minutes 
note that, “action upon S. 159 by the House could provide an additional 
alternative for obtaining staff assistance in the future since, as Mr. Foley 
pointed out, funds could be released from the Administrative Office if S. 159 
were to be passed and became a law.”520 
There was little debate from then on in the Congress. The House 
Judiciary Committee reported the bill on February 28, 1968.521 According to 
Representative Mathias of Maryland, who spoke on the House floor, “In our 
deliberations in both the Subcommittee and the full Committee on the 
Judiciary, we did not have a single voice raised in opposition to the bill. All 
of those present agreed that it was a necessary and desirable piece of 
legislation.”522 The bill then passed on March 4, 1968, with no dissent.523 
President Johnson signed the bill on April 29, and Chief Justice Warren 
appointed the first Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on May 29.524 
Unsurprisingly, its membership included Judges Murrah, Becker, and 
Robson.525 Three years after it was introduced in the House and Senate, the 
Multidistrict Litigation Act became law. After the House passed the legislation, 
the Wall Street Journal reported, tersely, “Congress has just passed without 
fanfare a bill likely to result in a substantial speedup in the handling of 
 
518 See Co-Ordinating Comm. on Multiple Litig., Minutes of Special Preliminary Meeting of 
the Co-Ordinating Committee 1 (Jan. 18, 1968) (on file at Becker Papers, supra note 33, Box 11, Folder 
6) (“The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the future of the Committee’s work.”). 
519 Id. at 2-3. 
520 Id. at 6. 
521 See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130 (1968). 
522 90 CONG. REC. H4927-28 (daily ed. March 4, 1968) (statement of Rep. Mathias). Mathias 
added that he had “discussed [the bill] personally with several of the distinguished Federal judges 
who have firsthand knowledge and experience with this kind of problem. I know how urgently they 
feel the bill is needed in order to make the administration of justice more expeditious and more 
efficient.” Id. at H4927. 
523 See id. at H4928 (“[T]he bill, as amended, was passed.”). The House later corrected three 
typographical errors in the bill; Tydings had to return to the Senate floor on April 10, 1968 to amend 
it. See 90 CONG. REC. S9448 (daily ed. April 10, 1968) (statement of Sen. Tydings) (offering 
amendments to insert the words “the” and “an” into various parts of the statute and to correct the 
spelling of “transfer”). 
524 See Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat. 109 (1968); see 
also DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 321 (1986) (listing the initial membership of 
the Panel). 
525 See Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 
1005 n.20 (1974) (describing the membership of the original Panel). 
2017] “A Radical Proposal” 907 
basically similar court suits.”526 With that short statement, the era of 
multidistrict litigation had begun. 
V. ASSESSING THE JUDGES’ EFFORTS 
When considered in light of its creators’ goals, MDL is a remarkable 
success story and an important moment in the development of modern 
procedure. A small group of men—mainly Neal, Murrah, Becker, and 
Robson—invented and shepherded to passage a statute creating, out of whole 
cloth, the power to consolidate potentially thousands of cases filed around the 
country in a single court before a single district judge. A half a century later, 
the MDL statute is playing the central role in the litigation world that they 
accurately predicted. 
At least for civil-procedure enthusiasts, the story of the judges’ legislative 
swashbuckling is compelling in its own right. But the story of MDL is also 
revealing in important ways, particularly if one approaches procedure from 
the perspective that it is primarily about power—in Stephen Burbank’s words, 
“who has it and who should have it both in litigation and in making the rules 
for litigation.”527 Here, a small group of judges engineered a transfer of power 
in large litigations from the parties and district judges in individual cases 
around the country to themselves and the other members of the newly formed 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The MDL statute was an 
intentional power grab, accomplished at an especially opportune moment. 
The judges knew this, and they took full advantage of their success in the 
electrical-equipment cases and the perception of an imminent litigation 
crisis.528 As believers in judicial control of cases, they believed that litigants, 
particularly defendants who enjoyed war-of-attrition-like advantages from delay 
(and whom they believed had an interest in showing the judicial system could 
not handle massive litigation), and uncooperative judges who were not believers 
in active case management simply could not be in charge. Instead, power had to 
be centralized before judges who could manage cases to a conclusion, as was 
accomplished in the mass settlements of the electrical-equipment cases. 
 
526 Congress Passes Bill to Speed Up Handling of Similar Civil Suits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1968, at 12. 
527 Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 44, at 513. 
528 It is noteworthy that the MDL judges’ reaction to a litigation explosion was to create a 
statute facilitating litigation rather than attempting to shut it out, as would be the typical response 
to such claims beginning in the 1970s. See id. at 515 (discussing how judges sought to minimize the 
number of claims litigated); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: 
The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1890 (2008) (describing 
the “tort reform” movement’s efforts “vigorously and systematically to blame most of America’s woes 
on a frightening, unjustified, and greed-inspired ‘litigation explosion’” to advance “a broad range of 
legislative and judicial reform measures designed to drive plaintiffs from the courts”). 
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To say that MDL was a power grab is not to cast aspersions on the judges’ 
good intentions. Nor is it to say that they paved the road to hell. Effective 
administration of justice and our commitment to private enforcement of the 
law require some mechanism to aggregate large numbers of cases, particularly 
in a system with limited judicial resources.529 Whether MDL is preferable to 
other available alternatives is an open question, subject to dynamic and ongoing 
debate.530 But what the history should lay to rest is any perception that the 
ambitions of the statute and its creators were modest. To the contrary, their aims 
were to profoundly change the way the courts process what they believed would 
be the lion’s share of federal civil cases—and their ambitions were fulfilled. In a 
sense, then, the story of MDL is a microcosm of the story of modern procedure, 
in which judicially managed aggregate litigation is the norm.531 
Moreover, the judges were willing to go to great lengths to achieve this 
expansive vision. Although they were ultimately successful, some of their 
tactical maneuvers should nevertheless give us pause. The fact that the judges 
entered the legislative fray is not itself a problem: judges’ participation in 
lawmaking is inevitable.532 And it can be particularly beneficial when it comes 
to matters of procedure, in which judges have particular expertise and a stake 
in the outcome.533 In fact, dialogue between the branches on issues of court 
administration is salutary, especially when one recognizes that congressional 
acts increasing litigation may place burdens on courts without the necessary 
 
529 See, e.g., COFFEE, JR., supra note 4, at 98 (noting courts’ “determination to find a solution 
(indeed any solution) to the impending caseload crisis that they perceived mass torts to pose for 
them”); Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1177, 1186 (2009) (noting the benefits of aggregate settlements). 
530 See Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
1155, 1167 (2006) (“How best to aggregate related cases for adjudication is a hotly debated question 
in procedure circles these days.”); cf. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (E.D. Tex. 
1990) (emphasizing that if every defendant insisted on an individual trial in mass-tort cases, that 
would mean, practically speaking, “these cases will never be tried”). 
531 See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1722-24 
(2012) (noting that “federal civil trial’s decline was probably aided by Supreme Court rulings that 
provide for more robust judicial intervention at various procedural steps”); Resnik, From “Cases” to 
“Litigation,” supra note 2, at 21-22 (discussing how “[m]ulti-party, multi-claim litigations are . . . 
increasingly viewed as fixtures of [the modern litigation] landscape”). 
532 See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s 
Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1168-69 (1996) (“Judges have always played an 
important extrajudicial role in the legislative process by proposing, drafting, testifying on, and 
lobbying for and against innumerable proposals regulating or affecting federal court operations.”). 
533 See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, & When?, 49 ALA. 
L. REV. 221, 222 (1997) (emphasizing “the importance of early and ongoing cooperation between the 
federal judiciary and the Congress in responding to calls for procedural change”); see also CHRISTOPHER 
E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT ADMINISTRATION 8-9 (1995) 
(noting judges’ significant influence in matters of procedure). 
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resource allocations.534 Such dialogue also enhances interbranch relations and 
may lead to better procedural law.535 More generally, to criticize judges for 
lobbying Congress ignores the reality that judges regularly lobby Congress.536 
As Judith Resnik’s work on the development of the Judicial Conference and 
Administrative Office demonstrates, the judiciary has long been an active 
political player.537 Anyone shocked by the judges’ tactics in this case might also 
be shocked to learn that there was gambling going on at Rick’s Café Américain.538 
But that does not mean that some of the judges’ actions did not cross the 
line of acceptable judicial lobbying. Even if one embraces judicial involvement 
in legislation, one must still recognize when judges do step into the political 
thicket, they put themselves in, as Charles Geyh describes it, a “precarious 
position.”539 When they lobby Congress, judges shed their role of neutral 
arbiter and act as an interest group.540 And if they are lobbying for legislation 
 
534 See Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: 
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 7, 8 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (describing the dynamic 
of congressional actions increasing court activity without additional appropriations); see also Roger 
E. Hartley, “It’s Called Lunch”: Judicial Ethics and the Political and Legal Space for the Judiciary to 
“Lobby,” 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 389 (2014) (“The very nature of legislative and executive processes 
necessitates and rewards active, and sometimes aggressive . . . [j]udicial lobbying . . . to secure 
needed resources . . . .”). 
535 See Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch 
Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 911 (2007) [hereinafter Burbank, Judicial Independence] (“[P]olitics of a 
certain sort must play in the work of courts and the judiciary if they are to continue to serve as the 
guardians of our fundamental rights . . . .”); Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing 
the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 279, 279 (1991) (arguing for “systematic dialogue between those 
who make and those who interpret legislation”). 
536 See Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 1155, 1160 (2007) (“As Congress legislates about the courts, the judiciary tries to affect the 
legislative product. The judiciary defends requests for funds. It proposes, and comments on, bills to 
alter its organization, operations, and workload.”); John W. Winkle III, Interbranch Politics: The 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts as Liaison, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 43, 48 (2003) (“One senator, for 
example, commented that ‘mutual communication is a necessity’ and, in his view ‘judges have a 
responsibility to come to [us] . . . . The judiciary, it seems, appreciates and perhaps fears the 
prerogatives of Congress and, as a result, strives to cultivate harmonious work relationships.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
537 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the 
Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 288 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, The Programmatic 
Judiciary] (“[T]he last forty years of Judicial Conference reports offer many examples of policymaking—
acts of ‘political will’ that judges routinely as adjudicators claim to be beyond their ken.”). 
538 CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). 
539 Geyh, supra note 532, at 1170; see also Burbank, Judicial Independence, supra note 535, at 917 
(noting judges’ “dilemma . . . of participating in a political system without becoming the victim of 
politics”); Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary, supra note 537, at 289 (referring to judicial 
involvement in legislation “an act of redefining the identity of the Third Branch”). 
540 See FISH, supra note 93, at 433 (“To obtain favorable legislative action, . . . judges, behaving like 
interest groups, generally must take the initiative.”); SMITH, supra note 533, at 18-19 (“[D]ependence 
upon legislative action forces [judges] to engage in the kinds of political strategies, such as lobbying 
and persuasion, that other interested parties employ when seeking beneficial legislation.”). 
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that enhances their own power at the expense of litigants or that reduces their 
caseload, they run the risk of sacrificing their legitimacy and independence, 
which relies in part on the perception that they remain above the fray, even 
when their interests overlap with the public’s.541 
Here, the judges were very much in the fray, and rather aggressively so. 
Some of their activities, such as drafting legislation,542 testifying in 
congressional hearings,543 and engaging in a letter-writing campaign544 are 
wholly unobjectionable.545 But trumpeting extensive cooperation with lawyers 
when it barely happened,546 undermining lawyers’ credibility in private 
memoranda to Senate committees,547 and strong-arming lawyers who would 
likely appear before them face-to-face548 are all actions that might rightly make 
us queasy.549 Judge Becker’s papers reveal that the judges were willing to throw 
sharp elbows to succeed. Ultimately, of course, the judges succeeded in their 
aims. And, scholarly criticism notwithstanding, the judges’ product has been 
impervious to any threat to its legitimacy. 
Yet, one should be hesitant to extrapolate from the judges’ conduct lessons 
for today, as the landscape of procedural lawmaking is quite different now. The 
judges launched MDL at a moment when Judicial Conference influence was at 
its height550 and when Congress was willing to empower private litigants to 
enforce the substantive law.551 The advent of MDL also came while procedure 
 
541 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 
J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 654 (1994) (explaining ways in which judges’ self-interest can converge with 
the public’s interest); Christopher E. Smith, Judicial Lobbying and Court Reform: U.S. Magistrate Judges 
and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 163, 173-74 (1991) (explaining 
how “strategic political activity by judges aimed at influencing legislation” can negatively impact the 
public’s opinion of the judiciary). 
542 See supra Section III. 
543 See supra subsection IV.C. 
544 See supra notes 447–48 and accompanying text. 
545 Cf. Geyh, supra note 532, at 1210 (“Congress needs the judiciary’s expertise to make 
informed legislative choices, and the judiciary needs informed legislative choices to maintain control 
of its dockets and preserve the integrity of the judicial process.”). 
546 See supra text accompanying note 345. 
547 See supra text accompanying note 462. 
548 See supra text accompanying note 487. 
549 See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 240 
(1998) (“When judges rather than lawyers frame rules by which they will decide between litigants, 
judges open themselves to criticism and the perception of partiality. That perception becomes acute 
when the judge decides an issue under a rule that grants the court broad powers of discretion.”). 
550 See Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration: Creating the 
Federal Judicial Center, 51 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 53 (1988) (describing the creation of the 
Federal Judicial Center as “an exception to [the general] rule” of judicial independence); see also 
FISH, supra note 93, at 301 (“Increasingly [Congress] looked to the Conference for cues, for 
authoritative pronouncements of the judiciary’s legislative program.”). 
551 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1543, 1547 (2014) (describing the “unmistakable explosion of private lawsuits to enforce 
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could masquerade as mere “adjective” law, or as the “handmaiden” of the 
substantive law.552 Beginning with the clash over the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in 1973 and the unexpected proliferation of class actions, that myth 
was exploded.553 It is fair to say that Congress is now well aware of the power 
of procedure—and even its political salience.554 Today, efforts at so-called 
litigation reform are now “political footballs” providing point-scoring 
opportunities.555 But, in the 1960s, the judges’ actions—important as they 
were—could still generally fly under the radar. 
Notably, the process of procedural lawmaking is now much more open 
than the 1960s. The political world in which MDL, and the original 1938 
Federal Rules for that matter, were born, in which a small insider group of 
academics and lawyers could create a new procedural system behind closed 
doors,556 is a thing of the past. So, too, is the relative homogeneity of 
demography and interest among federal judges and the federal-court bar.557 
Leading up to the MDL statute, federal judges and the lawyers who appeared 
before them were remarkably philosophically aligned, but the fight over 
MDL portended early cleavages between the bench and the bar, especially 
the defense bar, whose complaints about plaintiffs’ lawyers run amok would 
soon be heard—and acted upon—by Chief Justice Burger.558 
 
federal statutes” as resulting from “self-conscious choices of statutory design by . . . Congress 
seeking to mobilize private enforcers”); see also SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC 
REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 234 (2010) (noting “Congress’s proactive 
inclusion” of “economic incentives for private enforcement” when drafting new federal statutes); 
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 47 (2001) 
(describing the increase in federal statutes that rely on private enforcement). 
552 See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and 
Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 894 (1999) (describing how “proponents of court rulemaking” 
viewed procedure as “merely a means to the end of finding the facts and applying the substantive law”). 
553 See Geyh, supra note 532, at 1187 (describing the “imbroglio” over the Rules of Evidence in 1973 
and the subsequent response by Congress to assert its exclusive power over substantive lawmaking). 
554 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1704 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power] (describing 
“dramatic changes in Congress’s attitudes toward procedural lawmaking” after 1973). 
555 See, e.g., Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 44, at 516 (observing that by the 1990s 
“civil justice reform” was a “political football”). 
556 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in 
Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 667 (1993) (describing how 
“the original drafting of the Federal Rules during the 1930s was a much more closed affair. A handful 
of prominent white male lawyers drawn largely from the Northeastern states was selected and 
deliberated in relative anonymity before producing a fully developed code of civil procedure.”). 
557 See Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, supra note 554, at 1722 (describing the breakdown 
between the federal judiciary and the bar following the judiciary’s use of “rulemaking strategies that 
either empowered [judges] at the expense of lawyers and their clients . . . or that simply 
disempowered lawyers”). 
558 See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 551, at 1588 (describing Chief Justice Burger’s “antipathy 
toward the ‘litigation explosion’ of the 1970s” and his “counteroffensive against notice pleading and 
broad discovery”). 
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Now, by virtue of the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, the 
process of Supreme Court rulemaking—and by extension congressional 
procedural legislating—has become far more transparent and participatory.559 
And, as the flood of comments on the recent amendments to the discovery rules 
demonstrates, changes in procedural law now attract the attention and resources 
of those affected on both sides of the proverbial “v.”560 Although one might 
lament the challenges associated with the new world of procedural lawmaking, 
“politicization” is not an epithet.561 Open participation of potentially impacted 
groups is a necessary corollary to the recognition of the power of procedure.562 
And the politicization of rulemaking became inevitable in any event once 
Congress woke up to the fact that it “holds the cards” when it comes to 
procedural law.563 The story of MDL is therefore an artifact from a different 
world—but is representative of a shift in the way we make procedural law, for 
better or for worse. 
While the circumstances surrounding the passage of MDL may belong to 
a different time, MDL of course exists in the present. To express qualms 
about the judges’ methods in advancing the bill does not diminish the impact 
of the statute. Current criticisms of MDL suggest that the statute was 
intended to be used rarely, or that MDL was a modest procedural innovation 
whose powers have been expanded out of proportion by imperialistic district 
judges.564 It is easy to understand why this is the common perception. The 
drafters intentionally pitched the statute as one to be used only in exceptional 
circumstances, and current MDL judges are innovating at a rapid clip without 
much in the way of formal limitations on their power. But the statute’s history 
demonstrates that the judges who developed the statute did not intend for it 
to play a limited role or for MDL judges to feel hemmed in. 
For one thing, the judges believed MDL would be invoked regularly as 
mass torts became the grist of the federal-litigation mill;565 that was one 
reason Judge Becker opposed amendments to the statute that would restrict 
 
559 See id. at 1594 (describing the “open meetings” and extension of the “minimum period 
before proposed Federal Rules . . . can become effective” that Congress now requires). 
560 See Richard Marcus, How to Steer an Ocean Liner, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 615, 616 
(2014) (noting that the proposed 2013 amendments “attracted about 2,300 public comments and also 
produced three oversubscribed public hearings”). 
561 See Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and 
the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 
1334 (2006) (defining “politicization” as “returning foundational normative choices of social policy 
to those who are representative of and accountable to the electorate”). 
562 See id. at 1305 (describing the supposed dichotomy between procedure and substance as 
“political nonsense”); see also Bone, supra note 552, at 903 (describing the increased interest-group 
activity in all stages of rulemaking post-1973). 
563 Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, supra note 554, at 1678. 
564 See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
565 See supra text accompanying notes 204–06 and 403. 
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its use.566 Nor was MDL exclusively about discovery, as the judges insisted 
from the beginning that the MDL court must have the power to grant 
dispositive motions.567 MDL was designed to give judges complete control 
over cases to bring them to a conclusion, as they had in the electrical-
equipment litigation. Moreover, the goals of the drafters were to ensure 
flexibility in the hands of the district judges assigned to MDL cases.568 
Though one can debate whether judges are using the power created by the 
MDL statute in a beneficial way, or whether the MDL statute is consistent 
with principles of due process, one cannot deny that judges are using the 
statute as its drafters intended. 
It is also clear that the drafters acutely anticipated how aggregation could 
be tolerated in American litigation. The central problem in aggregate 
litigation is balancing the persistent need for efficient processing of claims in 
a system that relies on litigation for enforcement of rights with the 
foundational American norms of individual participation and a day in 
court.569 The damages class action—and its later use in the service of global 
settlement—has proven to be too blunt a tool, at least according to the 
Supreme Court.570 As a result, unless something unexpected happens, the 
experiment in mass-tort class actions spawned by the 1966 Rule 23 amendments 
is coming to an end.571 But the need for aggregation—by litigants on both sides 
and the courts—remains. MDL fills that gap. And, despite continuing scholarly 
critique, MDL remains undisturbed by due-process attack.572 
The question of what makes MDL work—and in what respects it does 
not—is fertile ground for future theoretical and empirical research. But as a 
matter of doctrine, one aspect of MDL that renders it palatable in a way damages 
class actions are not is its accommodation of the traditional American litigation 
 
566 See supra note 406 and accompanying text. 
567 See supra text accompanying note 248. 
568 See supra text accompanying note 335. 
569 See Burbank, CAFA in Historical Context, supra note 4, at 1484 (detailing “the most critical 
dilemma of modern procedure, that is, how to provide sufficient access to court in a society that 
depends heavily upon private litigation for compensation for injury and the enforcement of 
important social norms with (1) fidelity to those norms, (2) due attention to the interests of litigants 
and others affected by litigation, and (3) adequate attention to the limited capacity of American 
courts”). 
570 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 4, at 114 (describing the Supreme Court’s “basic message . . . that 
‘sprawling’ classes could not be certified”); Sherman, The MDL Model, supra note 19, at 2212 (contending 
that “[t]he class action settlement had bitten off too much”); see also Klonoff, supra note 65, at 747-48 
(noting that “courts have become increasingly skeptical in reviewing” class certification decisions). 
571 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 4, at 2 (arguing that the class action’s “dismantling appears to 
be the major procedural project of the conservative majority of the contemporary Supreme Court 
in the twenty-first century”). 
572 See, e.g., Redish & Karaba, supra note 20, at 115 (“The sweeping deprivations of an 
individual’s ability to protect his legal rights brought about by MDL cannot be justified by naked 
concerns of pragmatism if the concept of the process is to mean anything.”). 
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norms of individual and decentralized control.573 Unlike a class action, there are 
no absentees in an MDL; every party has filed her own case in the forum of 
her choice and is represented by a lawyer of her own choosing.574 The cases 
retain their individual identities within the mass and remain governed by the 
law that would be applicable had they remained in their original forum.575 And, 
perhaps most importantly, there is the prospect (however slim) of return to the 
original forum for trial, something a party may always demand.576 All of this 
notwithstanding, MDL looks a great deal like class actions from the ground. 
The cases proceed en masse, directed by lead lawyers appointed to steering 
committees and paid from a common fund.577 Case-management orders apply 
universally to all of the cases, as do the orders on many motions, including 
dispositive motions like those brought under Rule 12(b)(6) and near-dispositive 
motions like those to exclude an expert witness. And, most importantly, most 
MDLs are resolved by global settlement—settlements which can sometimes 
be quite coercive.578 Perhaps the most controversial example is the Vioxx 
settlement, which required lawyers for plaintiffs to inform their clients 
that they would withdraw from the representation if the clients chose to 
go to trial.579 Indeed, large MDLs are so much like class actions that judges 
have taken to referring to them as quasi-class-actions.580 
Yet, unlike mass-tort class actions, courts have accepted MDL. There are 
numerous reasons for this, the most important of which is likely how MDL 
accommodates the interests of powerful repeat players.581 But another reason 
is that MDL’s incorporation of traditional norms of individual control 
 
573 See YEAZELL, supra note 31, at 268 (“The roots of the difficulty [with group litigation] lie in a 
tension basic to modern legal and political thought: a belief in individual autonomy and a desire to 
achieve forms of political and economic organization incompatible with strong individual autonomy.”); 
Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1870 (2000) (“The model of one-by-one resolution of each individual’s rights 
. . . in the context of our system of federalism is the predominant model. Circumventing those 
principles, even if it means a more efficient overall outcome, is not acceptable.”). 
574 See supra text accompanying note 78. 
575 See Bradt, supra note 11, at 762 (describing how cases within MDL “retain their individual 
identities”); Grabill, supra note 26, at 457 (noting that “MDL consolidation of related lawsuits does 
not merge the suits into one massive case”); see also Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and 
Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918, 933 (1995) (describing the “ongoing rhetorical commitment to 
individual processing” in MDL). 
576 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
577 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
578 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
579 See Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 218 (“Individual claimants remained free to reject the 
proposed deal but . . . would have to find other counsel to handle their claims.”). 
580 See Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines, supra note 20, at 389 (“[T]he term ‘quasi-class action’ has 
been appearing with increasing, uncritical frequency in a spate of federal court decisions.”). 
581 See id. at 421 (describing how “the interests of the plaintiff and defense bars (and the judiciary) 
converged to encourage development” of MDL as an alternative to class actions). 
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insulate the structure from the kinds of due process attacks that plagued the 
class action.582 And it is these features of individual control that facilitate the 
aggressive consolidation that the statute provides. In a world in which trials 
are increasingly rare and pretrial procedure is dominant,583 a consolidation 
mechanism whose legitimacy is based on costly trials unlikely to ever occur, 
MDL is the poster child for twenty-first-century procedure. 
One contribution of this Article is to demonstrate that the people who 
created the statute understood this dynamic well. The judges behind MDL 
intended to centralize power over national litigation in the hands of a single 
judge who could control cases and manage them to a resolution. In so doing, 
that judge would keep the federal judicial system going in the face of a 
litigation explosion. The judges understood that complete transfer of cases 
would face “massive resistance” from both lawyers and judges.584 But they also 
believed that consolidation must be ironclad and not vulnerable to opt out by 
parties who wanted to go it alone. Their solution was the MDL structure, a 
device that preserved individual control just enough to give cover to the 
centralization of control they thought necessary. Taken alone, that centralization 
of control troubles critics because the statute seems to provide no meaningful 
limits on the power of the MDL judge, at least so long as the case remains in 
the pretrial phase. But the judges who built the statute, as proponents of 
active case management, understood that pretrial was the main event. Now, 
in a litigation universe dominated by MDL, there may be good reason for 
modern commentators to applaud or criticize what the drafters created, but 
they should begin the conversation with a clear-eyed appraisal of what the 
statute is: a device intended to concentrate judicial power. 
CONCLUSION 
With the demise of the mass-tort class action, multidistrict litigation is 
now in the spotlight as the key mechanism for facilitating mass-tort litigation 
in the federal and state courts. But with success comes attention, and MDL’s 
ascendance has brought significant criticism. One aspect of this criticism is 
that judges exercising imperial control over national litigation are acting 
beyond the scope of the statute, a modest tweak to the venue rules that fifty 
years after passage is now being abused. But this Article goes back to the roots 
of the MDL statute to examine the intentions of the small group that created 
it and the methods they used to manage its passage without a single dissenting 
 
582 See R. Marcus, Cure-All, supra note 13, at 2248 (noting that MDL has “not caused the sort 
of controversy the class action produced” (internal citation omitted)). 
583 See Galanter & Frozena, supra note 12, at 116 (citing the “long, steady decline in the percentage 
of cases that reach trial”). 
584 See supra text accompanying note 254. 
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vote in Congress. The judges’ contemporaneous papers demonstrate that, far 
from a modest tweak, they intended MDL to be an ambitious statute 
designed to transfer power over nationwide litigation from the hands of 
litigants and dispersed judges into the hands of a single judge who could 
shepherd the litigation to a final resolution. The statute’s proponents thought 
such power was necessary in order to avoid the federal courts from becoming 
overwhelmed by a coming “litigation explosion” primarily sparked by an 
increase in mass-tort cases. They were remarkably prescient: the explosion in 
mass-tort did come, and after a long period of class-action dominance, the 
MDL statute is now playing essentially the role they expected it would. 
Perhaps the last word should go to Judge Becker, speaking in 1972 about 
how the electrical-equipment litigation spawned a “revolution in the national 
administration of civil justice.”585 He added, 
From a perspective it seems to me that the most significant and least noted 
event of the history of the electrical equipment litigation was the sudden and 
inescapable realization that in these times we cannot afford the concept of a 
provincial bar and a provincial judiciary. Under the pressure of the 
circumstances the Bar was treated as a national bar, guided by voluntarily 
formed national steering committees and freely permitted to act in any 
district of the nation. Under the same pressures the federal judges were 
treated as a national, rather than provincial, resource to be deployed and 
employed where and when needed.586 
It is fair to say that Judge Becker’s revolution persists. 
 
585 William H. Becker, Modern Pretrial Practice in Complex Cases, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 581, 584 (1972). 
586 Id. at 583-84. 
